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Abstract 
 
The introduction of PPPs in infrastructure provision has changed the way in which 
governments around the world now view infrastructure provision. However, the 
introduction of PPPs to deliver the needed infrastructure has benefited only a few 
companies. Most of these companies are the big construction firms that possess 
technological know-how and those that have the financial ability to execute large 
infrastructure projects. Although SMEs are important for employment creation, 
inequality and poverty reduction, the participation of SMEs in these PPP projects is 
very low. This is because PPP models in developing countries are based on those 
used in developed economies, and such models ignore the socio-economic 
problems facing developing countries.  
 
Therefore, this study argues that PPP projects in developing countries present an 
opportunity for growing the SME sectors in developing countries. It challenges the 
viewpoint of seeing infrastructure backlogs only as providing opportunities to big 
private sector companies and argues that infrastructure backlogs can be used by 
governments to reduce the triple challenges of unemployment, poverty and 
inequality by linking SMEs to PPP projects. The traditional PPP model that is being 
applied by many developing countries does not fully encourage the participation of 
SMEs in PPP projects, as most of the projects executed through this model are 
bundled into big projects that SMEs cannot execute due to a lack of technological 
know-how and weak balance sheets.   
 
The study therefore suggests different ways in which the participation of SMEs in 
PPP projects could be improved based on the results of the survey conducted for 
this study. The study then proposes an “innovative conceptual PPP model for 
sustainable SME development” that takes into account the needs for developing 
countries to create jobs, reduce poverty and inequality. It also takes into account all 
challenges for SMEs identified through the review of literature and the study survey. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
An increase in global economic growth, demographic trends, public health needs, 
safety needs as well as transport needs have led to infrastructure requirements far in 
excess of currently available financing resources (OECD, 2006a:3 and Quiggin, 
1996:53). The increase in demand for infrastructure services has put a lot of 
pressure on governments to increase investment in infrastructure (De Bettignies and 
Ross, 2004:135). Failure to meet this ever-increasing pressure for infrastructure 
investment could prove costly in terms of economic growth and development. 
 
As a result of this increasing pressure on governments around the world to provide 
more and better services to their citizens on limited budgets, innovative infrastructure 
delivery mechanisms have been developed by both the public and the private 
sectors to deliver the needed public services (Urban Land Institute, 2005; De 
Bettignies and Ross, 2004:135). Many governments have resorted to forming public-
private partnerships (PPPs) to benefit from both technical and financial know-how of 
the private sector (Harris, 2003:2). Although the use of PPPs (private sector 
partner/party or the concessionaire) by governments has increased in the past 
decade to procure the needed infrastructure, governments have not yet fully taken 
advantage of the potential that PPPs have to address some of the socio-economic 
challenges facing developing countries, such as unemployment and poverty. 
 
The objective of this study was therefore to develop an innovative conceptual PPP 
model for sustainable SME development and to determine the potential role of PPPs 
in the South African economy. The study therefore, demonstrates that PPP projects 
can be used by governments to create jobs, thus reducing poverty and inequality, 
given the long-term nature of PPP concessions that may last for more than 25 
years.. It begins by defining PPPs and the global demands that have somewhat 
compelled governments to engage PPPs in service delivery, as well as the different 
PPP schemes.  
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The first part of this chapter starts by discussing the role of infrastructure in 
economic development, followed by a discussion on the new infrastructure financing 
mechanism and how it has changed the nature of infrastructure procurement around 
the world. The chapter then briefly discusses the potential role of PPPs in developing 
sustainable small businesses (SMEs) and also gives a brief discussion on PPP 
trends in South Africa. The last part of the chapter focuses on the rationale for the 
study, problem statement, study objectives, research questions, research 
methodology and the layout of the rest of the chapters of the study. 
 
1.2 The role of infrastructure in economic development 
 
The contribution of infrastructure to economic development is widely recognised as 
very important for both households and private firms. Its availability and quality 
influence a number of decisions related to investment, migration, business 
establishment and locations (United Kingdom. Department for International 
Development, 2007:15). Infrastructure services are used as final consumption by 
households and intermediate consumption items for firms. However, the link 
between infrastructure and development outcomes is still a topic for debate among 
economists (Snieska and Simkunaite, 2009:16). 
 
Although the debate on the link between infrastructure and economic outcomes is 
still ongoing, several empirical studies, such as those conducted by Rives and 
Heaney (1995:69), Bafoil and Ruiwen (2010:75), Kim (2006:4), Munnell (1992:192), 
and Boopen (2006:48) found a positive relationship between infrastructure 
availability and economic development. The results of these studies show clearly 
that infrastructure availability is imperative for the facilitation and acceleration of 
socio-economic development.  
 
According to Snieska and Simkunaite (2009:16), if adequate infrastructure is not in 
place, economic development will be hampered and it will be very difficult to achieve. 
If achieved, it would have been attained at a much higher cost than would be the 
case if infrastructure was adequately provided by the state. The way a country 
invests in its infrastructure is imperative for economic development. Adequate 
infrastructure stock is important for the expansion of a country’s productive capacity. 
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It helps to accelerate the rate of economic growth and enhance the pace of socio-
economic development. According to Rives and Heaney (1995:60) and Khan and 
Weiss (2006:2), infrastructure does the following: (i) it provides services that are part 
of the consumption bundle of citizens, for example services such as water, sewer, 
electricity, telecommunication; (ii) it manages large-scale public expenditures on 
infrastructure increases aggregate demand and provides short-run stimulus to the 
economy through economic multipliers; (iii) it serves as an input into private sector 
production; and (iv) it serves as a magnet in the location decisions of firms and 
households. What this means is that poor quality infrastructure leads to poor 
services for both households and firms. 
 
According to Kim (2006:14), the economic effects of infrastructure can be broadly 
divided into two types, namely the demand creation effect and the stock effect. The 
demand creation effect relates to the assertion that investment in infrastructure 
stimulates local demand in other economic sectors, creating jobs and stimulating the 
economy, thereby increasing overall production. The stock effect relates to the 
assertion that investment in infrastructure increases infrastructure stock in the 
economy and this helps with providing infrastructure services at lower prices. 
Through the improved services provided by infrastructure stock, the production costs 
of the private sector are reduced indirectly and their productivity is increased. It also 
expands market opportunities that positively affect competitiveness and production, 
and lead to economic growth (Roller and Waverman 1996:2; African Development 
Bank, 2009b:1). Human development is also dependent on infrastructure availability, 
as it relies on services that require supportive infrastructure such as water and 
sanitation to prevent diseases, electricity to serve schools and health clinics and 
roads to access them. Infrastructure forms a foundation upon which an economy is 
built (OECD, 2009:12; Snieska and Simkunaite, 2009:19). 
 
Infrastructure availability enhances the productivity of firms. Empirical evidence in a 
study conducted by Munnell (1992:192) in the USA in 1990 found that public 
investment in infrastructure enhances the productivity of private capital by raising its 
rate of return and encouraging more investment. Another empirical work that 
supported the impact that infrastructure has on productivity is that by Yoshino and 
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Nakahigashi (2000:8), which assessed the impact of infrastructure on productivity for 
both Japan and Thailand before and after World War II. The results of this study 
showed that the impacts are large in most industries except in agriculture. Boopen 
(2006:48) also opined that empirical analysis supports the positive effect of 
infrastructure on productivity. This study looked at the link between transport 
infrastructure and economic growth in African countries and island states, and found 
that transport capital is an important element of these countries’ development and it 
has an average productivity level of overall investment. Noriega and Fontenla 
(2005:11), using Mexican data for 1950 to 1994, found that shocks to infrastructure 
have positive and significant effects on real output.  
 
These findings are in agreement with the growth models used to analyse the impact 
of infrastructure on economic growth and development, and they show clearly that 
there is no doubt that infrastructure contributes to economic development through an 
improvement in productivity and an increased return on investment. This is true, 
because good quality infrastructure reduces input costs for private firms as it is used 
as intermediate inputs into their production processes, thus increasing firms’ 
profitability in the long term. 
 
Infrastructure investment improves income disparity through the trickling-down and 
spill-over effects when economic growth continues for a long period. Infrastructure 
development in rural areas has a considerable impact on the distribution of rural 
income since it leads to improved farm outputs, and because of access to 
infrastructure, these outputs get sold to urban markets (Kim, 2006:13, OECD, 
2009:12; United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), 
2007:15). According to Snieska and Simkunaite (2009:19) and Gunatilaka (1999:1), 
basic services such as water and electricity often occupy a significant fraction of the 
budgets of poor households. Easy access to such infrastructure services by poor 
households significantly improves their income levels and their living conditions 
(Yoshino and Nakahigashi 2000:8; Calderon and Serven, 2008:29; Ali and Pernia, 
2003:3). 
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Infrastructure development can be considered as a prescription needed for reducing 
poverty. Fan (2004:4) summarises a number of empirical studies that indicate that 
road infrastructure and infrastructure in general have both direct and indirect effects 
on poverty reduction. The indirect effects come as a result of improved productivity in 
the economy that ensures sustained growth in output, employment and income that 
is a prerequisite for achieving long-term poverty reduction. The direct effect comes 
about as a result of employment opportunities, improved health due to easy access 
to health facilities, access to clean water and sanitation which decreases incidences 
of illness, thus increasing productivity and through increased FDIs. For example, the 
construction of road infrastructure directly improves productivity, wages, employment 
and economic welfare of the poor (Ali and Pernia, 2003:9, Fan, 2004:5; Munnell, 
1992:192). An empirical study conducted during 1999 in India found that about 7% of 
the growth in aggregate output could be directly attributed to road investments, in 
addition to indirect contributions through the attraction of banks in areas with 
improved roads conditions (Pouliquen, 1999:2). 
 
It is imperative to note that the link between infrastructure and poverty alleviation is 
neither straightforward nor necessarily creating infrastructure automatically and 
directly alleviating poverty (Pouliquen, 1999:6). Infrastructure may not have the 
desired economic impact if not properly planned. Sometimes its impacts may go well 
beyond simple economic consideration (Pouliquen, 1999:7). Empirical work by 
Yoshino and Nakahigashi (2000:13) on South East Asian countries using data from 
1905 to 1940 for Japan and 1970 to 1996 for Thailand failed to find any relationship 
between infrastructure and inequality. This may imply that investment in 
infrastructure needs to be accompanied by relevant policies that are aimed at 
improving the effectiveness of infrastructure in reducing inequality. Equally important 
is the institutional environment that needs to be in place in order to allow 
infrastructure investments to be translated into economic growth that also addresses 
inequality (Dodonov, Von Hirschhausen & Sugolov, 2002:30). This implies that it 
may be difficult to reduce inequality in a country where there is no or poor 
infrastructure stock. According to Mills (2014:2), in 2014 about 80% of jobs in 
infrastructure construction in the United States of America are at small businesses 
and that is the largest small business concentration of any industry. Investment in 
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infrastructure has a direct impact on small construction business development and 
SMEs in general. 
 
1.3 New developments in financing infrastructure projects 
 
There seems to be little disagreement about what should be done to reduce poverty, 
inequality and unemployment. A market-oriented and growth-inducing approach that 
expands opportunities for production and employment among the poor, and 
development strategies that improve access to social services such as health, 
education and other poverty alleviation initiatives are key to any poverty-reduction 
strategy (Gunatilaka, 1999:1). Investment in infrastructure that improves access to 
these services and markets is imperative for both economic growth and 
development.   
 
For infrastructure to have the desired impact on poverty and unemployment there 
has to be a proper infrastructure plan with clear objectives that are linked to the 
development strategies of a country (Kim, 2006:1). One of these developmental 
strategies can be the development of the small and medium enterprises (SME) 
sector, as is being advocated in this study. However, an infrastructure plan needs to 
be accompanied by another plan that details the way in which the infrastructure plan 
will be financed. Given the fact that most governments no longer have adequate 
budgets that can finance their desired level of infrastructure stock, they have 
identified a new infrastructure-financing mechanism which is different from the 
traditional method (Masika and Baden, 1997:2). The traditional method of financing 
infrastructure is such that the government finances the construction of the 
infrastructure asset from its own balance sheet or from the national budget 
allocation. It also takes all the risks and responsibilities associated with constructing 
and operating the infrastructure asset. Such responsibilities include, but are not 
limited to, designing, financing, maintaining and operating the infrastructure asset. 
This new financing mechanism is called public-private partnerships (PPP). The PPP 
approach has led to the introduction of a new form of management and financing for 
infrastructure provision. Under this new form of financing, ownership is no longer 
seen as the exclusive responsibility of the public sector. It is now shared between the 
public and the private sectors for a specified period, as it involves collaboration 
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between both parties with the aim to build and operate an infrastructure asset that 
will deliver services to the public. According to Yescombe (2007:3), PPPs have the 
following key elements: (i) long-term contracts between the public party and the 
private sector party, (ii) design, construction, financing, and operation of public 
infrastructure by the private sector, (iii) payments over the life of the PPP contract to 
the private-sector party for the use of the facility, made either by the public sector 
party or by the public as users of the facility; and (iv) the facility remains in private-
sector ownership, or reverts to public-sector ownership at the end of the PPP 
contract1. 
 
According to Grimsey and Lewis (2005:xiv), “PPPs bring together, for mutual benefit, 
a public body and a private company in a long-term joint venture for the delivery of 
high-quality public services, drawing on the best of the public and private sectors”. 
As a result, PPPs provide additional resources for investment in the public sector 
and the efficient management of the investment. This has led to the private sector 
providing or constructing most of the big infrastructure projects on behalf of the 
public sector, using their own funds with little or no cost to the public sector. This has 
freed up limited government budgets to focus on providing other priority public 
services. In addition to bringing together both the public and the private sectors, this 
study argues that PPPs have the potential to also bring in the SME sector in a PPP 
project for the benefit of the economy as a whole. 
 
In recent years the private sector has shown an increased interest in working with 
the public sector in providing infrastructure and infrastructure services. Ramamurti 
and Doh (2004:152) identify five reasons why the role of the private sector has 
increased in infrastructure provision; namely (1) infrastructure sectors are losing their 
natural monopoly characteristics; (2) first-movers expect to profit handsomely from 
the emerging liberalisation of these sectors; (3) novel techniques such as project 
financing help reduce investment risks sharply; (4) the climate for foreign direct 
investments (FDIs) in developing countries has changed in recent years; and (5) the 
likelihood of the host developing countries to expropriate has decreased significantly 
                                                          
1
 More discussion on the nature of PPPs is covered under Chapter 2 of this study. 
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due to improved political stability and globalisation. It is envisaged that the 
involvement of the private sector in public infrastructure provisioning is to increase 
over time as pressure on governments for infrastructure services increases.  
 
The introduction of PPPs in infrastructure provision has changed the way in which 
governments around the world now view infrastructure provision. Yescombe (2007:3) 
asserts that PPPs are an alternative to the traditional public-sector procurement of 
goods and services. The traditional public sector’s procurement of an asset or facility 
is such that the design, building, financing, operating (DBFO) and maintenance of 
the asset to be built remain the responsibility of the public sector. Although the public 
sector does not build the facility itself, as it contracts a private sector contractor to 
construct the facility, it however carries all the risks involved in the procurement of 
the asset. In a PPP, the public authority transfers all these responsibilities to the 
private sector. The public authority only specifies its requirements in terms of 
outputs, which sets out the public services the facility is intended to provide. The 
private sector then designs a facility that will meet the public authority’s long-term 
outputs requirements. The government’s role in a PPP arrangement changes from 
one of managing and operating the asset to managing contracts and ensuring that a 
predetermined level of service quality is delivered. Even in the case where the 
private partner agrees to take a full range of designing, building, financing and 
operating activities, the public sector continues to maintain an on-going business 
relationship with the private partner. This is to ensure that the agreed quality service 
levels as stipulated in the PPP contract are met by the private partner.  
 
Bojovic (2006:302) attempts to define the nature of the relationship between the 
public and private sector parties in a PPP arrangement. He asserts that it is a profit 
and risk-sharing relationship that brings about the desired public policy outcomes. 
He further asserts that PPPs seek to draw upon the best available skills, knowledge 
and resources, whether they are in the public or the private sector, and deliver value 
for money (VfM) in the delivery of infrastructure or a service. The reasons for 
establishing such partnerships vary, but generally, involve the financing, design, 
construction, operation and maintenance of public infrastructure and services. The 
private sector undertakes to provide public infrastructure assets for their “full-life-
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cycle”, generally 20 to 30 years, after which the assets revert to government 
(Blondal, 2005:19).  
 
However, the introduction of PPPs in many countries to deliver the needed 
infrastructure has benefited only a few companies. Most of these companies are the 
big construction firms that possess technological know-how and those that have the 
financial ability to execute large infrastructure projects. Although SMEs are important 
for employment creation, inequality and poverty reduction, the participation of SMEs 
in these PPP projects, especially in terms of the contract size based on the amounts 
that are allocated to SME firms, is too low. This calls for a direct intervention to find a 
way in which the participation of SMEs in PPP projects could be improved in order to 
create the needed jobs and reduce poverty, especially in developing countries. The 
traditional PPP model (see Figure 1.4) that is being applied by many countries does 
not fully encourage the participation of SMEs in PPP projects, as most of the projects 
executed through this model are bundled into big projects that SMEs cannot execute 
due to lack of technological know-how and weak balance sheets.   
 
Below is a discussion on why it is important to use public-private partnerships to 
develop the SME sector and what needs to be in place in order to achieve this. It 
discusses how PPPs should be used by developing countries to fight poverty, 
unemployment and inequality through the development of the SME sector.   
 
1.4 Public-private partnerships and SME development 
 
The contribution of SMEs to economic growth and development is not questionable. 
SMEs’ contribution to economic development is through job creation, offering 
advanced and innovative products and services and enhanced international trade of 
an economy through diversification (Hussain, Farooq & Akhtar, 2012:1582). 
According to UNIDO (2007), SMEs are effective job creators and enjoy the 
reputation of being sources of income for a big proportion of a country’s population. 
 
As SBP (2009) asserts, one of the most obvious and surprising untapped ways in 
which companies can support development objectives in countries and communities 
in which they operate is through spreading economic opportunities through a variety 
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of small enterprise development, training and business linkage initiatives. This is the 
role that large PPP projects should play in the economies of developing countries. 
PPP firms should make use of SMEs to provide them with the services that PPP 
projects need.  
 
The traditional PPP model (see Figure 1.4) does not mention the use of SMEs as 
potential providers of goods and services for PPP projects. These models have 
overlooked or underestimated the potential that PPP projects can have in developing 
a sustainable SME sector that can create jobs for the unemployed and generate 
income for the poor, while at the same time addressing the challenge of 
infrastructure backlogs. Most debates in the PPP arena are about finding the best 
way of using the private sector to deliver public infrastructure, but little is said about 
using PPPs to develop SMEs and create jobs for the poor. This is the missing link 
that governments should use to boost job creation through SME development. 
 
As Hussain et al., (2012:1584) assert, PPPs are a source of developing businesses 
in developing countries. It may seem that the failure of developing countries to use 
PPPs to fight poverty and unemployment through the development of the SME 
sector is due to the fact that developing countries adopt PPP models that are based 
on developmental objectives of developed economies. These PPP models seem to 
ignore the realities facing developing countries, such as poverty, unemployment and 
inequality. As a result, most PPPs in South Africa and other developing countries 
seem to copy PPP models from developed economies such as Europe and North 
America. Any PPP model that is to fully benefit citizens of developing countries 
should at least seek to deal with these three challenges faced by developing 
countries. 
 
The National Treasury PPP Manual, does at least refer to SMEs as one of the 
requirements that the private sector party must consider once been awarded a PPP 
project contract. However this requirement is not the main requirement for PPP 
projects in the country (South Africa. National Treasury, 2004a:29). The manual 
requires that the private party should demonstrate that at least 30% of its 
procurements will be from Black Enterprise's SMEs. This SME’s requirement is 
   11 
 
actually not a PPP requirement, but since it falls within the requirement of the Broad-
Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) policy as per the sector BBBEE 
charter, it is indirectly a PPP requirement. If the BBBEE charter did not have this 
SME requirement, maybe it would not have been part of the PPP requirement. The 
main requirement for PPP projects is that the special purpose vehicle (SPV) should 
be BBBEE compliant. Therefore, the argument in this study is that, in addition to 
being BBBEE compliant, the PPP model should make SMEs’ participation in PPP 
projects a permanent feature of the model. The SME requirement should apply to all 
SMEs regardless of who own them. The study also seeks to argue that the BBBEE 
requirement should then be complied with by all SMEs providing services to PPP 
projects.  
 
As is argued in this study, a PPP collaboration that brings together the public sector, 
private sector and the SME sector can be more effective in fighting poverty, 
unemployment and inequality, which are the most worrying challenges faced by 
developing countries.   
 
Below is a brief discussion on the infrastructure funding gap for Africa and South 
Africa. This funding gap highlights the potential that infrastructure has in addressing 
the main challenges of unemployment and poverty, should this funding gap be 
converted into opportunities for SMEs. 
 
1.5 Infrastructure funding gap for Africa and South Africa 
 
Despite all the achievements made in attracting private-sector investment in African 
infrastructure, challenges still remain in the continent. According to Foster and 
Briceno-Garmendia (2010:3) research’s findings, in 2005 Africa’s infrastructure (a) 
lagged well behind that of other developing countries, (b) infrastructure services 
were twice as expensive as elsewhere, (c) its institutional, regulatory and 
administrative reform process was only halfway, (d) energy was the largest 
infrastructure challenge by far, and (e) its infrastructure spending needs were 
estimated at US$93 billion a year. However, after potential efficiency gains Africa’s 
infrastructure funding gap decreased to US$ 31 billion.  
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The African Development Bank (2009a:2) estimate is that from 2015 forward Africa 
will need about US$80 billion of investment per year by both the public and the 
private sectors over the next decade for operation and maintenance in order to close 
the infrastructure gap if it is to achieve its growth target of 7% per year. However, 
half of the need is currently being met, while US$20 billion of the gap can be met 
through improved efficiency and the gap decreases to US$20billion. The same 
problems facing Africa are also faced by SADC as well as South Africa. Table1.1 
shows Africa infrastructure needs by sector and Figure 1.1 shows infrastructure 
funding gaps by country group. 
 
Although these infrastructure backlogs are considered to be a constraint for 
economic development, at the same time they present an opportunity for SMEs to 
work together with the private sector to facilitate sustainable development through 
PPP projects. 
 
Table 1.1: Africa’s infrastructure needs (2009) 
Infrastructure services Percentage of population with 
infrastructure needs 
Lack access to safe water 40% 
Lack basic sanitation 60% 
Lack access to electricity 70% 
Without telephone penetration 88% 
Without internet penetration 97% 
Source: African Development Bank (AfDB), 2009a:1 
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Figure 1.1: Funding gaps by country group (USD$ billions) 
 
Source: Foster and Briceno-Garmendia (2010:75)  
 
Table 1.1 and Figure 1.1 show clearly that a lot still needs to be done by African 
countries in order to achieve an acceptable level of infrastructure quantity and 
quality. The good thing about this challenge is that, while addressing the issue of 
infrastructure backlog using PPPs, countries can also turn this challenge into an 
opportunity to develop their SME sectors. This introduces a new perspective about 
infrastructure challenges in developing countries. That is, the challenges of 
developing countries can be converted into opportunities not only for the private 
sector, but also for the public sector to drive their broader socio-economic objectives. 
Currently, infrastructure backlogs and the use of PPPs to address these backlogs 
are being seen by both government and the private sector as presenting an 
opportunity only to the private sector to invest in infrastructure development. This 
perspective to infrastructure development needs to change. This study therefore 
aims to show how this perspective can be changed. 
 
In South Africa, the monetary value of the required infrastructure in 2012 was 
estimated to be R3,5 trillion (Republic of South Africa. The Presidency, 2012b). This 
infrastructure financing requirement presents a good opportunity for the government 
to use PPPs to deliver the required projects, thus creating job opportunities through 
the involvement of SMEs in infrastructure delivery.  
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The above analysis shows the extent of SME opportunities in infrastructure 
development in the continent in general, and in South Africa in particular. The 
following section discusses the South African PPP projects that have reached 
financial closure since the establishment of the South African PPP unit in 2000. 
 
1.6 Trends for South African PPP projects 
 
This section focuses on South African PPP trends. It discusses projects that have 
reached financial closure since the establishment of the PPP Unit. It also discusses 
projects that are in preparation and are registered with the PPP Unit. The PPP 
projects discussed in this section exclude road PPPs; which are managed by the 
South African National Road Agency Limited (SANRAL, 2013), and data on these 
projects is not reported on by the PPP Unit. According to SANRAL, since its 
inception in 2008 it has awarded only three PPP concessions to date, namely N3 
Heidelberg to Cedara (N3TC Concessionaire), N4 Maputo Corridor (TRAC 
Concessionaire) and N1/N4 platinum highway (Bakwena Concessionaire). However, 
SANRAL has a number of PPP projects that are not concessionaires, such as the 
Gauteng Road Improvement Project. Furthermore, there are a number of PPP 
projects that are undertaken by different government institutions but are not recorded 
under the PPP Unit data, and this calls for a change in which the country’s data on 
PPP projects is being compiled.  
 
Figure 1.2 shows the number of PPP projects that have reached financial closure 
since the establishment of the PPP Unit in 2000. The pattern covers the period 2000 
to 2013. On average, the number of PPP projects that have reached financial 
closure has declined between 2003 and 2010 and there was no project that reached 
financial closure in 2005, 2008, 2011 and 2013, while only two projects reached 
financial closure in 2007, 2009 and 2010. The highest number of deals that reached 
financial closure happened in 2001 and 2003, where five projects reached financial 
closure in both years, followed by 2006 with four projects. There are a number of 
PPP projects that have reached financial closure in the ports sector, but are not 
recorded in the PPP Unit database, and some prison PPP projects are not recorded 
in the PPP Unit data, and that leads to under-representation of PPP data in the 
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country. There is no doubt that there are PPP projects that reached financial closure 
after 2012, however these statistics are not available. 
 
Figure 1.2: Number of projects that have reached financial closure (2000-2013) 
 
Source: Republic of South Africa. National Treasury (2013) 
 
The trend in the number of PPPs that have reached financial closure has been 
declining over the years. Figure 1.3 below shows PPP projects by sector and sphere 
of government. According to data published by the PPP Unit, there are no municipal 
PPP projects that have reached financial closure since 2000. This might not be a 
true reflection of the PPP market in the country. It is possible that some municipal 
PPP projects are aggregated together with the provincial PPPs or that data on 
municipal PPPs is not properly recorded by the National Treasury. The lack of 
municipal PPP projects that have reached financial closure as per the PPP Unit’s 
quarterly reports (2000–2014) might be due to poor data recording. The figure shows 
the share of provincial and national government PPP projects that have reached 
financial closure in the past ten years. The most popular projects are health-related 
projects, followed by transport, then office accommodation projects. 
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Figure 1.3: PPP projects by sphere of government and by sector (2003-2013) 
 
Source: Republic of South Africa. National Treasury (2013) 
 
The high number of health-related projects is not surprising, given the government’s 
drive to improve conditions in public hospitals (Republic of South Africa. The 
Presidency 2012b:22). The government has identified PPPs as one of the vehicles 
that will play a significant role in improving conditions in public hospitals. 
 
Table 1.2 shows projects that are in the pipeline and are registered with the PPP 
Unit. These projects are categorised by sector and sphere of government. They are 
either at procurement stage, under review, or at feasibility study stage or inception 
stage. It is difficult to precisely categorise these projects by sector, as some of them 
are not clear cut as to which sector they belong to. 
 
As can be seen from Table 1.2, the majority of these projects are national projects, 
followed by provincial and then municipal projects. The number of health projects is 
the highest, followed by water/waste management and then office accommodation.  
 
These projects resemble the same trend observed with projects that have reached 
financial closure. Health-related projects dominate the PPP market, followed by 
office accommodation. The question that one should ask at this stage is what role 
SMEs can play in the above PPP projects. 
[] (17)
[] (7)
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Table 1.2: PPP projects by sector and sphere of government  
Sector National Provincial Municipalities Total  
Real estate 0 0 5 5 
Prison  1 0 0 1 
Transport 1 0 0 1 
Health 4 14 0 18 
IT 2 0 0 2 
Office 
accommodation 
8 4 1 13 
Education 0 1 0 1 
Nature 9 3 0 12 
Tourism 0 3 5 8 
Communication 1 0 1 2 
Energy 1 1 0 2 
Water/waste 
management 
2 0 11 13 
Total 29 26 23 78 
Source: Republic of South Africa. National Treasury (2013) 
 
Given the number of PPP projects in the country and some others that are not 
recorded by the National Treasury, especially those that are being implemented by 
State-Owned Enterprises (SOE), such as ESKOM and Transnet, present a huge 
opportunity for the country to make an impact in terms of developing a sustainable 
SME sector that would in turn create jobs and reduce poverty levels.  
 
1.7 Why use PPPs to create jobs through SMEs? 
 
The argument for using PPPs to create jobs does not mean that the existing 
initiatives by government are not recommended or should be replaced by the PPP 
approach. However, what this study advocates is that, in addition to the existing 
government initiatives designed to develop the SME sector, countries should also 
take advantage of the growing PPP market that has a potential to develop the SME 
sector while at the same time addressing the challenge of infrastructure backlogs. 
The advantage of using PPPs instead of the traditional infrastructure procurement 
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approach and in addition to other governments’ initiatives to create jobs through the 
development of the SME sector is that: 
 PPPs bring the public and the private sectors together for one purpose, which 
is to deliver an infrastructure asset. Bringing the private and the public sectors 
together is difficult through the traditional approach, as the two parties come 
into the relationship with different interests. Bringing the two parties together 
has some economies of scale for SMEs, the private sector and the public 
sector partner, 
 In some instances, the private sector party or partner/concessionaire/ PPP firm 
in a PPP project funds projects that would have not been funded by the public 
sector due to lack of resources. In this case, the private sector partner makes 
money available for infrastructure projects that would have not been 
constructed had the private sector partner not funded the PPP project, thus 
creating opportunities that would have not been there for SMEs, 
 The private sector partner in a PPP project possesses technological know-how 
and is efficient in the use of limited resources. If SMEs are involved in a PPP 
project, such technological know-how and efficiencies would cross-pollinate 
SMEs; thus improving the competitiveness of SMEs in local and sometimes 
international markets and create even more job opportunities for the 
unemployed in the local economy, and, 
 Involving the private sector in financing infrastructure projects through a PPP 
arrangement increases the available funds for infrastructure projects; thus 
increasing the number of infrastructure projects to be built within a short space 
of time, which may in turn lead to more opportunities for SMEs and job creation 
(Figure 1.1 shows the traditional PPP model). 
 
1.8 Reasons for the research  
 
In justifying this research, it is important to know that a wide search of related topics 
within the current literature did not yield significant results on the participation of 
SMEs in PPP projects. Although the South African government’s PPP regulations 
mention the use of SMEs in PPP projects, this arrangement is informal, as there is 
no policy that compels or forces PPPs to use the services of SMEs other than the 
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requirement that PPP projects must have a BBBEE ownership, which happens in 
most cases to involve SMEs.  
 
Also a search of a number of databases for theses and dissertations did not yield 
results on the topic. No reference to developing countries, in particular to African 
theses and dissertations on the same topic was obtained, and no exact match could 
be found. Most of the research work done on PPPs is on how governments can 
make use of private sector finances and skills to deliver public infrastructure projects 
with minimum project risk carried by the public sector.  
 
1.9 Problem statement 
 
Despite the positive role that SMEs play in an economy and the potential that PPP 
projects have in converting developing countries’ infrastructure backlogs into socio-
economic opportunities such as job creation and reducing inequality, there has been 
not enough effort by developing countries to use PPP projects to develop their SME 
sectors. In countries where there is a high unemployment rate, high infrastructure 
backlogs and low SME penetration rate, PPP models such as the traditional PPP 
model should be developed such that they convert these countries’ infrastructure 
backlogs into job-creating opportunities. One way of doing that is to view 
infrastructure backlog as an opportunity to develop an SME sector that will in turn 
create jobs.  
 
The traditional PPP model focuses mainly on developing infrastructure assets, 
creating good value for money and the transfer of risks to the private party (Republic 
of South Africa. National Treasury, 2004b:4). This model does not give priority to 
other challenges that may be imperative for developing countries, such as SMEs 
development and job creation. Although currently SMEs participate in PPP projects, 
the current South African PPP model does not compel the private sector party to use 
SMEs to provide goods and services to PPP projects, and that undermines the 
potential that PPP projects have in creating jobs and reducing poverty and inequality. 
The private sector party can choose either to use or not to use SMEs in PPPs, and 
there are no consequences or disincentives for the private sector partner for not 
involving SMEs in PPP projects. This is because this requirement plays an 
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insignificant role on whether the private party is awarded a PPP contract or not, as 
there are other requirements that are considered more important than the SMEs’ 
requirement for a PPP project. 
 
1.10 Focus of this study 
 
The focus of this study is on the experts’ component of the PPP model. This is 
because the researcher believes that there are more SME opportunities within this 
component compared to the other components. However, this does not mean that 
there may not be opportunities for SMEs within the financiers and the SPV 
components. Such opportunities can be explored in future research studies. Figure 
1.4 represents the current traditional PPP model and it shows the focus of this study 
as indicated by the red question mark.   
Figure 1.4: Traditional PPP model  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO) (2010:14) and United Nations (2011)  
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Although the current South African PPP model (see Annexure F (a)) mentions the 
use of SMEs in PPPs, it does not fully acknowledge that PPP projects can be used 
by developing countries to address challenges such as unemployment, poverty and 
inequality. Table 1.3 gives a summary of the different functions of each of the role 
players within the traditional PPP model. 
 
Table 1.3: The role players in a traditional PPP model 
Role player Function 
Project 
company (SPV) 
The SPV is a legal entity that enables the coming together of many different 
parties and facilitates the allocation and diversification of risk and financing 
requirements to more than one party. It oversees the implementation of the 
project from the start to the finish. It deals with all contractual agreements 
between the various parties and itself. The SPV is a key feature of PPPs. It is 
normally set up by the private sponsors to represent their interest and those of 
the public sector.  
Government The government's interest in a PPP project is from the fact that government is 
the initiator of the PPP project. As per PPP definitions, PPPs are a partnership 
between the public and the private sector. Therefore, a strong commitment on 
the part of government is key to the success of a PPP. If government has also 
contributed equity to the project in exchange for shares in the SPV, it has equal 
rights and equivalent interests to the asset within the SPV as other 
shareholders. 
Financiers A PPP project is financed from different sources, such as debt and equity, the 
sources and structure of which vary depending on the project. In many cases, 
the equity financing is provided by the private sponsors in exchange for 
ownership in the SPV. If the equity from the private sponsors does not cover all 
the project costs, as is normally the case, the balance is provided using project 
finance. Project financing is based on the financial strength of the project with 
little or no recourse back to the sponsors. In the case where project finance is 
used, the SPV borrows the funds, and the debt is paid back using the cash flow 
generated from the project. 
Experts The structure of the PPP project helps facilitate the cooperation and allocation 
of resources and risks among those who are able to manage it. The SPV may 
ask the private sector to provide different expertise to the development of the 
project. This expertise may range from designing, building, and/or operating a 
project. They may also provide for insurance to the different risks associated 
with the project. 
Customers Customers may include motorists using a toll road, a community benefiting from 
a water project, power plant, etc. It is imperative to identify these groups as 
accurate as possible in order to be able to assess to who will be paying for the 
services, how they are to benefit, and what their success criteria are. 
Escrow Agent An escrow account is an account that is set up, usually at the request of 
financiers and managed by a third party in order to safeguard project revenues 
for the purpose of ensuring that debt service obligations are met. An escrow 
account can also be used to hold a deposit in trust until certain specified 
conditions have been met. 
Source: United Nations (2011) 
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A PPP model that aims at facilitating sustainable development of the SME sector 
should first recognise the above shortcomings of the current PPP model. Therefore 
the study argues that SMEs’ opportunities in PPP projects can be enhanced, 
especially within the experts component of the traditional PPP model. Annexure F 
(a) shows the South African version of the traditional PPP model. All the components 
of the model are the same as explained in Table 1.3 above. The red question marks 
indicate the focus of the study. 
 
1.11  Purpose and objective of the research   
 
The purpose of this research is to utilise available knowledge and insight into 
defining the potential role of PPPs and the concept of innovative PPPs for 
sustainable SMEs development. It also aims at providing an innovative conceptual 
PPP model for sustainable SMEs development that can be utilised by the South 
African public sector with the potential to be used by other developing countries to 
reduce their unemployment, poverty and inequality challenges. The objective of this 
study is to answer the main research question and its sub-question as stated in 
section 1.12 with the aim of developing an innovative conceptual PPP model for 
SMEs development.  
 
1.12 Research objective 
 
The main objective of the study is to develop an innovative conceptual PPP model 
for sustainable SMEs development and to determine the potential role of PPPs in the 
South African economy. 
 
1.13 Research questions  
 
The research question for this study is: “How can the South African government use 
PPP projects to develop its SME sectors?” Hence, the main research sub-questions 
(MRQs) for this study are: 
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Main research sub-questions 
MRQI: How PPP projects in the country have helped SME development? 
MRQII: What are the problems or challenges faced by PPP project firms when 
using SMEs to supply services? 
MRQIII: How can the involvement of SMEs be increased in PPP projects? 
MRQIV: Does an appropriate PPP model for increasing the participation of SMEs in 
PPP projects exist that can respond to the South African economic 
challenges? 
 
1.14 Research methods 
 
The research methodology or approach for this study is a mixed-method research 
approach. The approach followed involved desktop research (literature review), 
questionnaire design, testing of the questionnaire, data collection, data analysis and 
the development of an innovative PPP model for SME development. The information 
collected through the survey was supplemented by other publicly available 
information collected from different secondary sources, e.g. South African PPP case 
studies, published PPP information in the PPP Unit’s website. This allowed for 
triangulation of data from these sources. 
 
1.15 Demarcation of the study 
 
Although the current range of PPP models were used as inputs into the study, the 
study only focused on PPP projects that are within the borders of the Republic of 
South Africa. Its main focus was on infrastructure PPPs implemented in the different 
economic sectors. It excluded other PPPs such as institutional PPP programmes, 
although these types of PPPs are discussed with the view of obtaining information 
on how they can be utilised to support SMEs involved in PPP projects. 
 
The study focused only on PPP projects implemented in the country that had 
operated for at least a year. PPP projects that were in operation for less than one 
year were not included in the sample. This was done in order to allow the researcher 
to collect information based on practical experiences on involving SMEs in PPP 
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projects during the construction/implementation as well as during the 
operational/application phases of PPPs. The data collected covered PPP projects 
from the main sectors that had implemented PPP projects in South Africa, such as 
roads, office blocks, prisons, hospitals, health, water PPP projects and conservation 
PPPs. 
 
1.16 The importance and contribution of the study 
 
The contribution of this research is focused on the development of an innovative 
conceptual PPP model for sustainable development of the SME sector. PPP models 
implemented in both developed and developing countries have overlooked or 
ignored the fact that PPPs have the potential to develop a sustainable SME sector in 
developing countries, thus creating jobs and reducing poverty, which are the biggest 
challenges for these countries. 
 
The outcome of the research could be used by PPP practitioners and government 
agencies involved in PPPs to improve the benefits that PPP projects can render to 
developing countries. Furthermore, the model aims at challenging the traditional PPP 
model being implemented by developing countries and it necessitates PPP policy 
changes that will make SMEs participation in PPP projects mandatory.  
 
1.17 Limitations of the study 
 
There are several limitations to this study, the most significant of which is related to 
the size of the sample used in the investigations, given the fact that, at the time when 
the study was conducted, there were few PPP projects that had reached financial 
closure and had operated for at least a year.  
 
The second limitation of the study relates to the respondents interviewed. Given the 
high rate of staff turnover in the organisations or entities responsible for the 
implementation of PPP projects, some of the potential respondents who were 
involved in the different PPP projects from inception had left their respective 
organisations during the study period, and this resulted in the researcher having to 
collect data from some personnel who joined the entities at a later stage of the 
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implementation of the PPP projects. However, the people who responded on the 
questionnaire had experience in PPP projects, since the majority of them worked in a 
PPP project either in the private or public sector. 
 
The third limitation is the nature of information collected from SMEs, PPP project 
firms and government departments or agencies. In most cases, information on PPP 
projects was confidential, such that some potential respondents refused to 
participate in the survey due to the sensitivity of PPP projects at the time of data 
collection. This was because there were objections on roads PPP projects around 
the country, therefore potential respondents were reluctant to provide some 
information to any person outside their organisations before their current 
employment. 
 
1.18 Chapter overview 
 
Following below is a brief summary of what each chapter covered. 
 
Chapter 1: The first chapter covered the introduction and the definition of public-
private partnership projects, the reason for the study, the problem statement, 
research question(s), the purpose of the study, the study objective, the research 
method, and limitations/demarcations of the study, the importance and contribution 
of the study. 
 
Chapter 2: This chapter (Theory and Practice) consists of two parts. The first part 
covers a discussion on the economics of PPPs and the rationale for PPPs in 
providing public infrastructure. The second part of the chapter discusses the 
institutional arrangement necessary for public-private partnerships.   
 
Chapter 3: This chapter discusses the importance of PPPs in developing a 
sustainable SME sector. It discusses the role of the SME sector in an economy and 
the challenges faced by SMEs in developing countries.. 
 
Chapter 4: The chapter focuses on the research methodology. It sets out to study, 
investigate, measure and analyse all aspects of the research questions and states 
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the research propositions based on the research questions. The demarcation and 
nature of the study is given and the rationale behind the chosen methodology is 
discussed. It discusses different types of models and identifies the type of model 
suitable for this study. 
 
Chapter 5: This chapter presents the research findings presentation. It provides all 
results obtained from the relevant organisations and respondents during the study 
survey. 
 
Chapter 6: This chapter analyses and synthesises the survey findings presented in 
Chapter 5 to establish whether the data respond to the research questions and 
research propositions.   
 
Chapter 7: This chapter focuses on the development of the proposed PPP model for 
a sustainable SME sector. It presents the proposed model developed based on the 
results of the survey as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.  
 
Chapter 8: This chapter gives the study conclusion and recommendations. The 
conclusion is evaluated against the original problem statement–answering research 
questions and research objectives.   
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CHAPTER 2: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 
 
2.1 Introduction   
 
Chapter 1 examined the role of infrastructure in economic development and the new 
developments in financing infrastructure. It discussed the global demands that have 
somewhat compelled governments to engage PPPs in service delivery. It briefly 
discussed the relationship between public-private partnerships (PPPs) and SME 
development. Furthermore, the chapter looked at the main PPP projects 
implemented in South Africa since the inception of the PPP Unit in 2000. 
 
This chapter is therefore divided into two parts. The first part discusses the 
economics of PPPs and the second part discusses the institutional arrangements 
required for a successful implementation of a PPP programme. Since the study is 
about the potential impact of PPPs on SME development, it is therefore imperative to 
first discuss the nature and characteristics of PPPs to have a clear understanding of 
what PPPs are and what the factors are that affect a viable PPP market. A viable 
PPP market is important for SME development because the argument in this study is 
that, for SMEs to create the needed jobs through PPPs, there must be a well-
functioning PPP market that grows over time to create more opportunities for SMEs. 
However, the growth of the PPP market is affected by a number of regulatory 
factors; hence the second part of this chapter discusses the different institutional 
arrangements required for the development of a PPP market. 
 
2.2 Public-private partnerships (PPPs) 
 
The participation of the private sector in infrastructure delivery has been referred to 
in different ways. According to Farrugia and Orr (2008:5), private participation in 
infrastructure is sometimes referred to as “private finance initiative (PFI), public-
private partnerships (PPP), P3, alternative financing and procurement (AFP) or 
performance-based infrastructure”. For the purpose of this study, the term “public-
private partnership” (PPP) is used to encompass all the above different PPP terms. 
According to De Bettignies and Ross (2004:136): 
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“… the term public private partnership is used in slightly different ways with 
the result that a precise definition to which all will agree is elusive”.   
 
The term PPP covers a range of different structures that can be used to deliver a 
project or service. According to Grimsey and Lewis (2005:xiv), PPPs are 
arrangements whereby private parties participate in, or provide support for, the 
provision of infrastructure, and a PPP project results in a contract for a private entity 
to deliver public infrastructure-based services. Arrangements that do not involve any 
major new capital investment or upgrading of assets are not considered to be PPPs 
for the purpose of this study, as such arrangements do not have or create 
opportunities for the participation of SMEs.    
 
Public services can be delivered through a spectrum of partnership models. On the 
one hand, the public sector retains almost all responsibilities in the partnership and 
carries all the risks associated with the project. On the other hand, the private sector 
carries all the risks and responsibilities associated with the project. PPP projects 
therefore fall into the middle of the spectrum, between the public sector and its 
private partner according to their strength and weaknesses. Figure 2.1 below 
illustrates exactly where PPPs fall within the different service delivery mechanisms. 
 
Figure 2.1: Traditional procurement, PPPs and privatisation 
PPPs 
Concessions 
Management Contracts
Joint Venture
Design Build & operate
Part-privatization
Private finance
Build Operate Transfer
PrivatizationTraditional 
Procurement
More private-less public control
 
Source: PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2004:10 
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As shown in Figure 2.1, the further you move right from the traditional procurement, 
the more private involvement or control you see in the project, and PPPs sit right in 
the middle of the figure, that is between traditional or public procurement and 
privatisation. From the above definitions it can be deduced that it is expected of 
PPPs to deliver high-quality services by taking advantage of the fact that in such 
arrangements one can draw from the best of the public and private sectors. Indeed, 
according to Binza (2008:300), at the heart of every successful project is the concept 
that better value for money2 may be achieved through the exploration of private-
sector competencies and the allocation of risk to the party best able to manage it. 
Closer to home and in line with the definition above, the Republic of South Africa’s 
National Treasury (2004a:4) defines a PPP as: 
 
“… a contract between a public-sector institution and/or municipality and a 
private party, in which the private party assumes substantial financial, 
technical and operational risk in the design, financing, building and operation 
of a project”.  
 
This definition is similar to the definitions discussed above. For a project to be called 
a PPP, the National Treasury expects it to meet three conditions, namely (i) it must 
be affordable, (ii) it must provide good value-for-money and (iii) it must transfer 
appropriate technical, operational and financial risk to the private party.   
 
The South African National Treasury (Republic of South Africa. National Treasury, 
2004a:5) refers to two types of PPPs. The first type is whereby the private party 
performs a function usually carried out by government, such as providing water or 
maintaining a road. The second type is whereby the private party acquires the use of 
state property for its own commercial purposes, or a hybrid of the two. Within the first 
type of PPPs, international literature (Yescombe, 2007:13) identifies two different 
forms of PPPs, namely Availability-based PPP and Concession PPP. The 
concession PPP is an arrangement between the public authority and the private 
party whereby the public authority grants the private party the right to design, build, 
                                                          
2
Value for Money will be discussed in later chapters of the document. 
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finance and operate an infrastructure asset owned by the public sector. The private 
party recovers its investment, operating and financing costs and its profit by charging 
members of the public a user charge. The key characteristic of a concession is that 
the private party usually assumes demand risk for use of the asset, in addition to the 
risk of design, finance, construct, and operation. Good examples of concessions in 
South Africa are the N4 and the N3 toll roads. Within the concession model there are 
a number of PPP schemes, as shown in Table 2.1.  
 
The availability-based PPP is similar to a concession in that it involves the private 
party in designing, financing, building or rebuilding, and subsequently operating and 
maintaining the infrastructure. However, in this case, the public authority makes 
payments to the private party for making the public service available to consumers. 
The demand or usage risk remains with the public authority. This type of PPP is 
more common in power generation projects. 
 
Dowdeswell and Heasman (2004:3); Bojovic (2006); Binza (2008:301); Maluleka 
(2008:66) and the German Economic Team (GET) (2007:2) identify a number of 
PPP schemes within the concession PPP type that are commonly used globally. 
Table 2.1 gives a brief description of each of these schemes. 
 
Table 2.1: Public-Private Partnership schemes 
Service contract Modalities 
Service contracts 
  
The private party procures, operates and maintains an 
asset for a short period of time. The public sector bears 
financial and management risks. 
Operation and management 
contract 
The private sector operates and manages a publicly 
owned asset. Revenues for the private party are linked 
to performance targets. The public sector bears the 
financial and investment risks. 
Leasing-type contracts 
 Buy-build-operate (BBO) 
 Lease-develop-operate (LDO) 
 Wrap-around addition (WAA) 
The private sector buys or leases an existing asset from 
the government, renovates, modernises, and/or expands 
it, and then operates the asset, with no obligation to 
transfer ownership back to the government. 
Build-operate-transfer (BOT) 
 Build-own-operate-transfer (BOOT) 
 Build-rent-own-transfer (BROT) 
 Build-lease-operate-transfer(BLOT) 
 Build-operate-transfer (BOT) 
The private sector designs and builds an asset, operates 
it and then transfers it to the government when the 
operating contract ends, or at some other pre-specified 
time. The private partner may subsequently rent or lease 
the asset from the government. 
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Design-build-finance-operate 
(DBFO) 
 Build-own-operate (BOO) 
 Build-develop-operate (BDO) 
 Design-construct-manage-finance 
(DCMF) 
The private sector designs, builds, owns, develops, 
operates, and manages an asset with no obligation to 
transfer ownership to the government. These are 
variants of design-build-finance-operate (DBFO) 
schemes 
Source: Compiled from different sources. 
 
In most cases international literature refers to these types of PPPs as concession 
PPPs. From the definitions above it can be concluded that a PPP is an arrangement 
whereby private parties participate in or provide support for the provision of an 
infrastructure-based service, and a PPP project results in a contract for a private 
entity to deliver a public infrastructure-based service.   
 
2.3 The economics of public-private partnerships 
 
The involvement of the private sector in public infrastructure delivery comes with 
challenges. The challenges result mainly from the conflicting goals or objectives of 
the two parties when entering into a partnership. Those who support the use of PPPs 
to deliver public services argue that PPPs are necessary because  they (1) close the 
gap between what the government can afford and what needs to be provided to the 
citizens, (2) provide services at lower costs compared to the public and (3) transfer 
project risks to the private sector (Allan, 1999:5; Bojovic 2006:305; Hodge and 
Greve, 2005:184). Those who argue against PPPs assert that PPPs are complicated 
and anticompetitive, that they lower standards of employment by converting fulltime 
employments into contracts/temporary employment and reduce staff benefits, to 
mention a few. They further argue that the private sector has a different objective 
than the public sector and that makes it difficult for the public sector to reap the 
potential benefits that PPPs may offer, due to the fact that public sector employees 
lack the necessary skills to manage PPP projects (Corry, 2004:30, Bovaird, 
2004:239, Domberger and Jensen, 1997:76; Fountain, 1980:809).   
 
Below is a discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of contracting-out as 
the foundation of PPPs. 
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2.3.1  Contracting-out: The foundation of PPPs   
 
Traditionally, the construction of any project was a task delegated to the private 
sector while government would retain tasks such as maintenance, repairs and 
operation of the facility (De Bettignies and Ross, 2004:138). This means that the 
private sector has always been involved in the provision of public services in one 
way or another. The only new development that has taken place in recent years is 
that a larger number of tasks (such as operation and maintenance of the 
infrastructure) that used to be the responsibility of the public sector are now bundled 
together and contracted to the private sector under one contract. This is what PPPs 
are all about. Under PPPs the private sector is carrying bigger responsibilities than 
the public sector compared to when the traditional procurement method is used to 
procure infrastructure. Following below is a discussion on the benefits of contracting-
out. 
 
Benefits of contracting out: PPP proponents argue that contracting with the private 
sector results in reduced service costs and provides superior levels of service 
relative to public provision. They give a number of reasons for this argument. Their 
argument is based on ex ante competition, high-powered incentives, optimal risk 
allocation and economies of scale. 
 
(i) Ex ante competition: Economists believe that the key reason behind the 
success of contracting out at reducing costs, particularly in a PPP project, is 
competition (Tirole, 2007:25). This competition refers to competition for the market 
and not in the market. This is because the bidding process forces bidders to lower 
costs, raise quality and increase innovation (Reeves, 2004:381). This is because 
competition for the market disciplines the incumbent firm to be more effective. 
However, this assumes that collusive tendering is prevented, as it may result in high 
prices for the services being outsourced. It is worth noting that ex ante competition 
may not yield the expected results if there is not enough competition for the market. 
For example, in many cases PPP projects are undertaken by a few big construction 
companies that possess the technological know-how and a strong balance sheet 
needed to construct a PPP project (Domberger and Jensen, 1997:71). In many 
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cases, small firms or SMEs are unable to compete with such companies because 
they normally lack both technological know-how and finances to undertake PPP 
projects (Bloomfield, 2006:402). Unbundling of PPP projects to smaller but viable 
projects may assist in increasing participation of construction SMEs in PPP projects, 
thus creating ex ante competition. 
 
(ii) High incentives and optimal risk allocation: Risk allocation is an important 
element in the economics of PPPs. For a project to be regarded as a PPP in South 
Africa and in Ireland, the project should be able to transfer appropriate technical, 
operational and financial risk to the private party (Republic of South Africa. National 
Treasury, 2004a:5; Reeves, 2004:384). The second reason for contracting-out in 
reducing costs is believed to be incentive-related. The incentive to reduce costs 
comes from the fact that the private sector is a profit maximising agent. In order for it 
to make good profit it has to reduce production costs to the lowest level possible. 
This is because the private sector is believed to have the capacity to deliver more 
innovative products more speedily, with more flexibility and at a lower cost because 
of its experience and the fact that it is more productive-efficient than the public sector 
(Schmidt, 1996:4).  
 
An empirical study by Boardman, Laurin, Moore & Vining (2009:59) found that the 
privatisation of the Canadian National Railways generated welfare gains of about 
$15 billion. The Canadian national government captured almost half of these gains 
while the rest were captured by the shareholders. Consumers did not benefit from 
these gains, since prices did not fall as a result of the surplus created. This shows 
that the benefits gained were not enjoyed by consumers and this shows the need for 
an independent regulator that will have consumers’ interest in PPP projects. 
 
Having discussed the benefits of contracting out, the following section discusses in 
detail the economics of delegating design and operation of the project to the private 
contractor when a PPP model is employed. 
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2.3.2 Delegating design and/or operation to the private firm  
 
Private sector firms benefit from economies of scale, scope or learning because they 
are normally more specialised, larger in size and have more experience in the 
construction and operation of a construction business compared to the public sector. 
Under the conventional service delivery the government designs, finances and 
contracts another party to construct the asset on its behalf. Once the asset has been 
constructed the public sector will then operate and maintain it. Under this approach it 
can be argued that the facility can be built so as to require higher or lower 
maintenance, depending on the construction company. It is likely that the 
construction firm bidding to construct the facility will not advocate for more durable 
and expensive construction if it will not be responsible for operation and 
maintenance of the asset once it has been built. This may be motivated by the fact 
that the construction firm would want to appear as providing the construction service 
at a lower cost compared to other competitors, so that it can win the contract to 
construct the facility (International Monetary Fund, 2004:11). 
 
However, in a case where the constructor is also expected to operate the facility 
(PPP model), its behaviour changes. In this case it would have an incentive to 
propose a more durable design of the facility in order to minimise the costs 
associated with providing the service over the full life of the facility or at least the 
length of the contract. As De Bettignies and Ross (2004:144) assert, it is clear that 
there is technological complementarity or economies of scope between building and 
designing, and between building and service provision. These complementarities are 
enhanced by the incentive advantages of combining these tasks. This approach 
forces bidders to focus on the total life costs of the project over the project life cycle 
because those responsible for building the asset would also be responsible for the 
long-term maintenance and operation of the asset. In a case where the constructor is 
also expected to provide services (bundling) it gives a compelling justification for 
combining asset creation and operation, which is the defining feature of a typical 
PPP (International Monetary Fund, 2004b:11). Conventional delivery does not have 
this advantage, and therefore the payment made by government to induce high 
quality may be higher with conventional delivery (De Bettignies and Ross, 2004:144). 
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Fostering the use of SMEs in PPP projects can also benefit the economy, given the 
expertise that the private sector has. The private sector may suggest some 
innovative ways in which SMEs can participate in PPP projects without 
compromising the viability of the project. 
 
The following section discusses the differing views about the costs and benefits of 
the PPP approach to infrastructure procurement.   
   
2.4 The costs and benefits of public-private partnerships 
 
According to Vining and Boardman (2006:3), the rationale for governments to 
undertake PPPs can be summarised into three broad categories, namely: (a) 
minimisation of on-budget government expenditure or desire not to increase current 
government debt (b) to deliver both infrastructure and services at a lower cost due to 
economies of scale, more experience, better incentives and greater ability to 
innovate, and (c) PPPs makes it easy for the public sector to impose user fees, 
resulting in lower net expenditure for government.  
 
Some economists argue against using the private sector to deliver public services. 
Their arguments centre around the fact that PPPs are equal to privatisation, are 
more costly than traditional procurement, are a way for government to avoid 
reporting debt, are weak in accountability and transparency, lead to public-sector 
jobs losses, costly, lack flexibility, lack of control by the state and that private 
companies sacrifice quality for the sake of profits (McDavid and Clemens, 1995:188). 
PPP proponents assert that those who argue against PPPs tend to over-simplify 
matters or tell only part of the story. What follows below is a detailed discussion on 
the costs and benefits of PPP projects.  
 
2.4.1 Do PPPs minimise on-budget government expenditure? 
 
PPP opponents argue that government’s plans in involving the private sector in 
infrastructure delivery is to eliminate upfront capital expenditure and keep capital 
expenditure off the government’s official balance sheet to provide budget stability. 
This often carries some political benefits because government budget will always 
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appear healthy in the face of the voters, while a significant amount of tax is used for 
PPP projects (Vining and Boardman, 2006:3). This may be true in a case where the 
government finances the project, however, many PPP projects are funded by the 
private party and in such a case this argument does not apply. 
 
The risk of not recording PPP projects in government’s balance sheets may be that 
an increase in government’s contribution to the project can also affect other 
government expenditures which are more important than the PPP project, and 
government may not be held accountable for that, as there will be no information 
available to the public that can be used to challenge the increases. A good example 
of this is the increased costs of the Gautrain project which forced the government to 
increase its contribution to about R19 billion in a PPP project of R26 billion. There is 
no doubt that this affected government budget expenditure to a greater extend. For 
accountability purposes all budget expenditures should be reflected on the 
government’s balance sheet. The failure of governments to record PPP projects’ 
liabilities in government balance sheets distorts the representation of government’s 
fiscal health (TD Economics, 2006:14). Vining, Boardman & Poschmann, (2004:34) 
argue that PPPs conceal government debt. The argument here is that PPPs cannot 
be considered for their potential to generate value for money, but merely as a 
remedy for cash-strapped governments. Therefore arguments against PPPs on the 
basis of lack of accountability and transparency are valid only if the PPP projects are 
funded by the state.   
 
A strong argument about engaging the private sector is the desire to avoid up-front 
capital costs, as it is easier to raise private capital than additional tax revenue or 
government loans (Vining et al., 2004:34). If government does not have the money to 
construct the project or provide the service to consumers and the private sector does 
not finance or provide the infrastructure at the time when it is required, there would 
be an opportunity cost involved in the economy as a whole. It makes economic 
sense to have the project or service provided by the private sector rather than not 
having it at all. When the private firm takes responsibility for non-core functions of 
the public sector, it frees up resources and helps government to focus on what 
matters, for example on the effective implementation of public policy. In this case, 
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minimisation of on-budget government expenditure is a weak argument for using 
PPPs while the opportunity cost, intergenerational efficiency and distributional 
arguments make a strong economic case for engaging PPPs. It is worth noting that 
other countries such as South Africa do record all costs related to PPP projects in 
their Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) (Republic of South Africa. 
National Treasury, 2007).  
 
2.4.2 Do PPPs provide services at lower cost?  
 
There are three dimensions to this cost-superiority argument. The first dimension 
refers to the major argument that private-sector firms have economies of scale, 
scope or learning because they are normally more specialised, larger in size and 
have more experience in the construction and operation of a construction business 
compared to the public sector, which normally engages in much more diverse 
projects and usually has less experience with the relevant technology or activity 
(Bloomfield, 2006:401). Larger private firms also engage in more similar projects 
which are global in scope, and this helps them to utilise learning economics, 
specialised knowledge accumulated through learning. This is not the case with most 
governments, especially sub-national governments, which engage in a limited 
number of projects. These projects are also different in nature, thus not allowing 
enough learning and scope economics advantage (Vining et al. 2004:34). Lapre and 
Van Wassenhove (2003:53) articulates that: 
 
 “... early empirical studies showed that the logarithm of unit cost decreased 
with the logarithm of cumulative number of units produced at a uniform rate-
the learning rate”.  
 
This shows that the more a private firm produces a certain service, the more it 
benefits from learning economics.   
 
The second dimension is that the private sector normally has superior incentives to 
minimise costs, holding constant any scale, scope or learning effects. Because of the 
cost-reduction profit incentives, the private sector may have more cost-efficient 
operations, including procurement policies, and better project management skills as 
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well as risk management expertise. It is also likely to have low wage-costs, possibly 
due to hiring non-union labour. The third dimension is that private firms have 
superior incentives (such as share options and bonuses) to engage in cost-reducing 
innovation as a result of continuous research and learning at the same time (Vining 
et al., 2004:34). This dimension relates to the fact that the private sector has a 
greater incentive to invest in cost-reduction measures ex ante in order to provide the 
service at a lower cost that will lead to higher profits. It is worth noting that such cost 
advantages might not be true in all circumstances, as some government 
departments may be more efficient than some private firms. However, SMEs working 
together with PPP firms are more likely to benefit from the private sector’s 
efficiencies, thus developing a competitive SME sector.  
 
Such cost advantages are also more likely to arise as a result of bundling up the 
various components of a project and transferring them to a single contracting party. 
As mentioned earlier, this forces the private firm to focus on the total life-cost of the 
asset over the project life cycle. As a result, the private sector will develop more 
cost-efficient operational approaches, such as good procurement policies and project 
management skills (Gabriel and Head, 2005:29). A literature review of empirical 
analysis carried out by Domberger and Rimmer (1994:69) of about twenty studies 
that looked at competitive tendering and contracting (CTC) supported this view, 
concluding that there is broad consensus that CTC leads to a substantial reduction in 
service costs (Globerman and Vining, 1996:579). Although opponents of CTC argue 
that the observed cost savings are a result of decreased service quality, evidence for 
this argument is far from conclusive. Much of the existing evidence on this issue is 
ambiguous or contradictory (King, 2001:4).   
 
The above argument may be true only if one considers the financial benefits and not 
the overall economic benefits that also take into account project externalities. This is 
true because the efficiencies in operations may lead to a reduction in implementation 
time, leading to lower project costs and higher profits for the private firm. Studies 
conducted in the United Kingdom and Australia for different years confirmed these 
efficiencies. They revealed that the magnitude of costs savings are around 22% on 
average, and approximately 80% of all PPP projects are delivered on time (see 
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Gabriel and Head, 2005:32; Domberger and Jensen, 1997:74, Boardman et al., 
2009:75; King, 2001:3). These studies support the private-sector efficiency argument 
based only on financial benefits. However, recent studies on the cost savings of PPP 
projects have disputed the above findings and pointed out that these studies ignored 
transaction costs in their analysis. When transaction costs are taken into account the 
savings even decrease further (Domberger and Rimmer, 1994:67). These cost 
savings can also decrease further if government’s costs of administering the tender 
are also taken into account.  
 
Many arguments for, or against, PPPs also fail to take into account that once a 
service is provided by a private firm there are a lot of changes that take place, which 
make it difficult to compare efficiencies before and after a private provision of 
services. In line with Domberger and Jensen’s argument (1997:72), public-sector 
accounting methods rarely capture the full economic costs of service provision. 
Moreover, and the fact that contracting brings with it changes in specification of 
service requirements and quality, comparing the price of a new private-sector service 
contract with the historical costs of public provision may be misleading, as similar 
costs are normally not available with the public sector. 
 
2.4.3 Does the public sector borrow at lower costs than the private sector? 
 
PPP opponents argue that PPPs come with a higher price tag compared to 
traditional procurement. However, PPP proponents disagree with this argument and 
assert that such statements are based on three convictions that do not hold water 
when tested against economic principles. The first conviction is that the public sector 
can always borrow at a cheaper rate than the private sector. This is true, given the 
fact that government borrowing is backed by tax revenue and is considered to be risk 
free. This leads to low government borrowing costs compared to private-sector 
borrowing. It is also due to the fact that government bonds carry a lower interest rate 
than corporate bonds (Klein, 1996:3).  
 
This argument is challenged by Currie (2000:15), and he argues that when a project 
is funded by the private sector, investors carry the risk of default and are rewarded 
accordingly. However, when funded by the public sector, taxpayers carry the risk but 
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are not compensated for doing so. In other words, although the public sector can 
borrow cheaper to finance investment project, this imposes a residual risk on tax-
payers in much the same way as private-sector investors but without rewards. This 
liability being imposed on taxpayers is a cost that is not accounted for in any cost-
benefit analysis of a project.   
 
The second conviction is that, from any investment that the private sector makes, it 
requires a rate of return that may be high, thus exacerbating the concerns that the 
financial benefits that accrue to the private sector will be more generous relative to 
the public-funded model, or relative to the benefits that the public derives from the 
project. The last conviction is that PPPs involve high up-front transaction costs 
(bidding costs and lengthy bidding processes) incurred by parties to prepare for the 
bid. The time required to negotiate a commercial agreement and the on-going costs 
of over-sight hinder competition in the PPP market and put a number of private 
players off, especially SMEs. That, in turn, leads to expensive public services if 
provided through PPPs (Corry, 2004:29).  
 
The argument that public financing of projects is cheaper than private financing is not 
convincing. The reason is argued by Currie (2000) that the citizens or the public 
underwrites or acts as a guarantor for government loans and receives nothing in 
return for playing that role. If the costs of underwriting a government loan were to be 
included in the financing costs of a public project, that may lead to public borrowing 
being equal or higher than private borrowing. Klein’s argument (1996:5) that 
government borrowing is cheaper because the public sector can raise money easily 
through taxes should it face financial difficulties, makes more sense only if one 
ignores the cost of underwriting the debt by citizens. Furthermore, if one considers 
governments in countries where there is a high political risk, poor public finance 
management standards and a poor tax collection mechanisms, one would find that 
such countries borrow at a higher interest rate than private-sector firms that have a 
healthy balance sheet.  
 
The argument by De Bettingnies and Ross (2004:147) that it is not always true that 
the government will be able to borrow at a lower cost than the private sector also 
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makes a lot of sense. This is because a full evaluation of relative costs has to be 
done before one can argue that the public sector can borrow at a lower cost than the 
private sector. These costs should consider factors such as (a) the credibility of the 
private borrower and the protection offered in its contract with the public-sector 
partner, (b) the extent to which tax savings may come from other levels of 
government; and (c) the degree to which the supply of funds to the public sector is 
upward sloping. 
 
2.4.4 Do private firms sacrifice quality for profits in a PPP?  
 
One of the concerns that the public or trade unions have about PPPs is the apparent 
excess profits that the private sector makes from PPP projects. The public is also 
concerned about that the private sector will always trade-off quality of service for the 
sake of profits once a private company is awarded a PPP contract (Corry, 2004:31; 
Dudkin and Valila, 2005:5).  
 
This argument is not supported by international studies conducted on service quality 
issues after a private firm has been awarded a contract to provide a service. As 
mentioned earlier in the chapter, international studies have found that it is difficult to 
make comparison on service quality after and before a service is contracted out 
because of non-availability of data on service quality prior to contracts being let. A 
study by Domberger and Rimmer (1994) that examined the quality argument in a 
sample of 61 cleaning contracts, concluded that while competition lowered contract 
prices by between 35 to 50 per cent, cleaning performance was maintained and 
even enhanced in some instances. An empirical analysis by (Alcazar, Nakasone & 
Torero, 2007:36) that evaluated the impact of private versus public provision of 
electricity in Peru using data from a 2005 survey found that management of 
electricity by the private sector led to a significant improvement in the quality of the 
provision of electricity. 
 
Domberger and Jensen (1997:74) summarised a number of studies based on 40 
English local authorities and concluded that contracting had led to major changes in 
the monitoring of services by government, with explicit inspection processes being 
introduced and a clear emphasis on performance standards. This implies that if 
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quality deteriorates following contracting, that could be a problem of contract design 
or implementation, which is not associated with PPPs and can be prevented by 
applying appropriate output specification measures to address that challenge. 
Quality shading can happen if the public sector fails on its responsibility of 
performing its oversight functions as it has been reported in other studies (Monga, 
Mahta & Ranja, 2009:87).  
 
Domberger and Rimmer (1994:69) summarised findings from ten studies that looked 
at the impact of contracting out on service quality and concluded that there is no 
consensus about the impact of contracting out on service quality and concluded that 
all these studies suffered from data availability and quality problems and more 
research is needed to resolve how CTC affects service quality. Therefore, the 
argument about quality shading is a matter that needs further research. In contrast, 
King (2001:4) argues that a decline in quality accompanied by a fall in price may be 
socially desirable, particularly if the quality of the service being provided by the public 
sector was unnecessarily high for the recipients in question. 
 
It is clear from the above arguments that the problem of quality shading can only 
happen if the private sector operates in a guaranteed monopolistic environment and 
without proper public sector monitoring of service quality. Therefore, it is imperative 
to note that the problem of quality shading is not as a result of a PPP but that of poor 
government management of the private firm and failure by government to introduce 
competition in the industry, which is not the responsibility of the private sector. 
 
2.4.5 Does the PPP model manage risks better?  
 
One of the most important benefits of PPPs advocated by PPP proponents is that 
PPPs enable governments to shift project risks from the backs of taxpayers to the 
private firm. The argument regarding risk shifting is that the public sector can reduce 
the risk associated with its financial exposure to construction costs, maintenance 
costs and demand risk by employing PPPs (Yescombe, 2007:18). PPP proponents 
and governments articulate that the private sector has the advantage and ability to 
spread risk of a particular project over a number of other similar projects because it 
normally engages in many similar projects simultaneously. However, this does not 
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mean that the private sector simultaneously runs more projects than the public 
sector; it means that, given the same number of projects, the private sector can 
manage risks much better than the public sector, given the experience it has in 
project management, construction and operation (Gabriel and Head, 2005:30).   
 
The above arguments can be rejected if tested against economic reasoning. An 
economic activity that makes economic sense is the one that maximises the welfare 
of citizens, not the one that shifts or spreads risks from one economic agent to 
another. Such an argument cannot be used as an economic justification to use PPPs 
as an alternative to the traditional procurement method. When the risk is spread over 
a number of projects the overall risk in the economy is not reduced, but only 
transferred or spread more broadly in the economy or to different sectors or projects 
within a sector. As Allen (2001:28) asserts, the goal of risk-sharing is not to 
maximise the amount of risk transferred from one party to another because that does 
not reduce the overall risk and thus does not improve the welfare of society. This 
implies that risk is simply shifted from the tax payers to the private sector with no net 
economic benefits.   
 
The main argument the public sector can put forward for using PPPs is that using the 
private sector to deliver public services is cheaper because the private sector has 
highly skilled risk managers compared to the public sector. The best risk 
management expertise and tools possessed by the private sector can help to reduce 
the overall risk of the project, thus resulting in a positive net social welfare 
(International Monetary Fund, 2004a:11, European Commission, 2003:52; Sadka, 
2007:8). The reason why the private sector has an incentive to reduce project risks is 
because, should the risk eventuate, its profits will be reduced. It can therefore be 
argued that the low cost and price of services provided through PPPs is due to better 
risk management and optimal risk allocation rather than risk shifting from the public 
to the private sector.  
 
2.4.6 Do PPPs hinder accountability? 
 
Operating the asset and providing the service is the public face of a PPP project. 
This is the highly visible attributes to which people most frequently respond. The 
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concern by government about giving a private firm the responsibility of providing a 
public service is about the loss of control associated with giving the private party 
certain contractual rights and the fact that a perfect contract between the 
government and the private firm can never be written and that performance can 
never be perfectly monitored (De Bettignies and Ross, 2004:144). As a result, day-
to-day democratic control and accountability, as well as the ability of government to 
be flexible and respond quickly to new situations and public needs can be lost if the 
asset is under the private sector’s control, thus hindering flexibility and agility (Fourie 
and Burger, 2000:308). 
 
Even though the public sector can monitor the performance of the PPP, it will need 
to first discuss it with the private partner before it can take the necessary actions to 
correct any development that the government is not comfortable with in the provision 
of the service. This may take a long time before the two parties agree on the 
necessary steps that need to be taken. By the time they agree, one would find that 
the damage has already been done and the image of the government might have 
already been tainted. 
  
PPP opponents assert that, once a private partner takes over the responsibility of 
delivering a public service that was traditionally delivered by the public sector, 
accountability to elected public officials and the public is lost (TD Economics, 
2006:15). This is due to the fact that some business practices are geared towards 
the private sector’s profitability objectives, which could be in conflict with 
government’s goal of a high level of public accountability. In most cases the public 
expect government to be transparent and open to public scrutiny in order to gain 
public confidence. However, this does not bode well with the private sector whose 
objective is to remain competitive. In this case, the private sector would want to keep 
its operating strategies confidential, which is in conflict with public expectations. 
 
This concern stems largely from the confusion over the difference between 
responsibility and accountability. The two are different: when a public sector 
transfers some responsibilities to the private sector, it does not relinquish 
accountability. Accountability will always remain the responsibility of the public sector 
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or the government agency, regardless of the method used to deliver the service. This 
is because the decision to use the private sector to deliver the service is made by the 
government on behalf of its citizens; therefore the private sector is accountable to 
the public sector and the public sector is accountable to its citizens. The government 
agency must therefore remain accountable for the efficient performance of the 
functions delegated to it by the government.  
 
According to Domberger and Jensen (1997:76), contracting can actually enhance 
accountability in three different ways, namely (a) by prompting reviews of standards 
and service specifications; (b) by introducing rigorous performance monitoring; and 
(c) by setting up mechanisms for redress in cases individuals or organisations have 
suffered loss or damage. The findings by Ellman (2006:20) appear to be relating to 
lack of government effectiveness to deal with the private firm and responding to 
public pressure. Accountability does not change, however effectiveness does, due to 
the indirect control that the government has on the service being provided. 
 
2.4.7 Do PPPs make it politically feasible to impose user fees? 
 
According to Vining and Boardman (2006:7): 
 
“... governments believe or at least want to believe that private-sector 
operations makes it politically more feasible to impose user fees, resulting in 
lower net expenditures for governments”.  
 
The argument stems from the fact that users (or potential voters) would not have a 
problem paying for services provided by the private sector because of the 
understanding that the private firm needs revenue to cover its costs, repay its debt or 
make a profit. However, they will not accept a public sector charging them for 
services that, according to their understanding, should be provided by the public 
sector for free. As Vining and Boardman (2006:7) argue, this argument does have 
economic justification, especially when there are marginal social costs from public 
use, for example when highways are tolled to prevent overuse.  
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However, the public can still refuse to pay for the services as it happened with the 
Gauteng road improvement project3, where the public complained about the toll 
being too high and challenged them through the courts, such that the implementation 
of the toll collection was postponed by a few months while the minister of transport 
was investigating the feasibility of the tolls and their impact on the provincial 
economy (Serrao and Flanagan. 2011:1). This also happened in Australia, where the 
West Gate Bridge was tolled, but due to public pressure the tolls were removed 
(United States of America. Department of Transportation, 2007:78). Brits (2010:42) 
articulated clearly that some of the resistance by the public to pay for the tolls was 
due to lack of information about the concession agreement and that impacts 
negatively on user perceptions about PPPs. This implies that improving transparency 
as well as information availability and accessibility about PPP agreements to 
potential users is imperative for PPPs to succeed. Information about PPPs’ 
contribution to socio-economic issues like development of SMEs and employment 
created by PPPs can help ease the resistance by the public to pay tolls. 
 
From the above discussion on the possible economic costs and benefits of PPPs it is 
clear that there are differing views about the benefits that PPPs may render to the 
public. The discussion on these arguments will continue for a while until enough 
independent empirical research around this area is conducted. Having discussed the 
different views about the economic costs and benefits of PPPs, the next section 
examines these costs and benefits further by unpacking the efficiency perception of 
the private-sector in provision of public services. It aims at showing how these 
efficiencies arise.   
 
2.5 The efficiency notion of the private sector  
 
It is generally assumed that the private sector is more efficient than the public sector 
in the use of limited resources; therefore the use of PPPs will result in increased 
efficiency in service delivery, thus leading to improved social and economic welfare 
(Schmidt, 1996:2). According to De Bettignies and Ross (2004:142), Schmidt (1996) 
                                                          
3
 The Gauteng roads improvement project is a project that is aimed at improving the conditions of all National 
roads around the Gauteng Province using the PPP model. 
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was the first person to investigate the trade-offs between public and private provision 
of services in an incomplete contract framework. The outcome of the study found 
that it does not matter whether services are provided by the private or the public 
sector, there are advantages and disadvantages associated with each sector’s 
provision of services and the only difference is the extent of these advantages or 
disadvantages. 
 
2.5.1 Private sector efficiency versus public sector inefficiency 
 
Fourie and Burger (2000:309) assert that the assumption of private firms being more 
efficient than governments is based on two notions. The first notion is that the pursuit 
of profits and the promise of personal financial rewards for owners and managers 
create powerful incentives to push the production and marketing processes to their 
most efficient and cost-minimising limits via good management. Secondly, in a 
market environment the pressure of competition from existing competitors and 
potential entrants into the market acts as a powerful disciplining force on firms to be 
efficient in order to survive. 
 
However, Schmidt (1996:16) argues that these ideas assume the presence of 
multiple sellers of the product or service, which is not always the case with services 
delivered through PPPs. The point that Schmidt is missing is that these efficiencies 
are inherent in the private sector’s operations; the private sector does not develop 
these attributes once it is involved in a PPP project but it comes naturally with them 
from its previous operational environment (free market environment) where it had 
been exposed to competition. Schmidt’s argument appears to refer to continuous 
improvement in efficiencies after the contract has been awarded. He fails to take into 
account that the ex ante competition is influenced by multiple sellers and efficiencies 
of those sellers.   
 
Although there are few empirical studies that researched the efficiency of PPPs 
compared to the public sector in service delivery, an empirical study by Alcazar et 
al., (2007:37) that assessed the impact of privatising the electricity sector in rural 
Peru found that there was improvement in the quality of the provision of electricity 
and efficiency gains in terms of the time allocation of the working labour force that 
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could be directly linked to the use of electricity. Case studies conducted by different 
international institutions concluded that private provision of water and electricity in 
rural areas led to increased access, efficient and more reliable services than those 
provided by government (Centre for Civil Society, 2005:21).  
 
Although one supports the above assertion, firstly one needs to be aware that, 
although the government puts a lot of effort to ensure high competition for the market 
in almost all PPP projects, there is no guarantee that there will be competition during 
the bidding process, because the complexity and high transaction costs involved in 
PPP projects hinder small contractors from competing fairly for PPP contracts. 
Secondly, once a contract has been awarded to the winning bidder, the winning 
bidder becomes a monopoly in the market. Should there be enough competition in 
the market as PPP proponents assume, the competition would force the winning 
bidder to operate more efficiently and innovatively if it is to make a profit from the 
PPP deal (Hurst and Reeves, 2004:381).  
 
It is important to note that it is not only competition that forces the private sector to 
be more efficient; the desire to make profit plays a very significant role. Therefore it 
can be concluded that the efficiency of the private firm is not necessarily a result of 
competition in the market alone, but is also motivated by its profit maximisation 
behaviour, as inefficiencies would result in increased operational costs, thus 
resulting in reduced profits.   
 
On the other hand the public sector is assumed to be inefficient in the use of limited 
resources compared to the private sector. The inefficiency of the public sector has to 
do with the nature of incentives in government and the bureaucratic structure of 
government’s ministries or departments. The inefficiency may be a result of the fact 
that government officials may be motivated not only by their duties towards 
government’s business, but also by their own aspirations and value systems. These 
may cause a misallocation of resources and an oversupply of public goods or 
services, resulting in inefficiencies (Fourie and Burger, 2000:307). It is worth noting 
that these inefficiencies may also happen in big private companies, but it can easily 
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be detected and addressed immediately because private companies have effective 
measures in place to address inefficiencies should they arise. 
 
However, there are some public sector entities that have built checks and balances 
into their operations and may operate as efficient as some private sector (African 
Development Bank, 2009b:2). The Malaysian government is a classic example of a 
government that has put in place checks and balances aimed at improving efficiency 
of the public sector. Such checks and balances include amongst other things: client’s 
charter, process simplification, electronic data interchange, technology upgrade, 
efficiency and effectiveness measurement, performance reporting, financial 
management, asset management (United Nations,1995:5). It also highlights the 
benefits of implementing these checks and balances. 
 
2.5.2 Trade-off between public- and private-sector provision of services 
 
The trade-off facing government in its endeavour to provide a particular service is 
between quality and efficiency. That is, lower cost may lead to lowering the quality of 
service provided (International Monetary Fund, 2004:10). Hart (2003:71) argued that, 
while private provision may be efficient compared to public provision, private 
provision encourages quality shading in the process. According to Hart and Moore 
(1990:1121), this argument is based on two assumptions, namely (i) incomplete 
contracts and (ii) a positive relationship between quality and cost of service 
provision. The assumption about a positive relationship between cost of service 
provision and service quality implies that lowering cost has a negative effect on the 
quality of the service provided. If the service is provided by the private sector, the 
private sector will have a greater incentive to invest in cost reduction measures ex 
ante, and an equilibrium service will be provided at a lower cost by the private sector 
(De Bettignies and Ross, 2004:142). This is due to the fact that the private sector 
fails to internalise the negative effect that cost reduction has on service quality, and 
therefore has too much incentives to reduce costs, to the detriment of service quality.   
 
According to Domberger and Jensen (1997:71), the incentive for the private sector to 
cut corners is due to the fact that certain aspects of service quality are non-
contractible and because it can be difficult for the state to establish that the private 
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contractor is not providing the level of service stipulated in the contract specification. 
As a result, the contractor’s incentives to reduce costs tend to override the incentive 
to maintain or improve service level. This behaviour is referred to as “quality-shading 
hypothesis” and this may increase the case against using PPPs for those who 
oppose private provision of public services.  
 
The quality-shading hypothesis may be true if the public sector has not clearly 
stipulated the service quality level in the contract and on the assumption that the 
private sector does not care about future business from the public sector. Firms that 
want to brand themselves may worry a great deal about quality, since high quality 
tends to bring repeated business or business based on the word of previous clients. 
Studies on the relationship between costs and service quality indicate that there is 
no consensus about the impact of outsourcing public services and service quality, as 
different studies conclude differently on this matter (Domberger and Rimmer, 
1994:449).  
 
Furthermore, in a PPP project where the private sector is expected to design, 
construct, operate and maintain the asset, it will not make economic sense for the 
private sector to compromise the project quality because there is technological 
complementarity or economies of scope between building and service provision. The 
private sector will always want to decrease operational cost during the service 
provision period, thus minimising operational expenses while maximising profit on 
the other hand. Therefore it will be more inclined to design and construct a high-
quality asset, thus providing a high quality service (De Bettignies and Ross, 
2004:144).  
 
Although PPP proponents support using PPPs to deliver public infrastructure, the 
above discussion shows that this type of a relationship has its own challenges that 
the public sector needs to take into account when dealing with the private sector. 
One of the main challenges is the incompleteness of contracts. According to Tirole 
(2007:20): 
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“... Contract incompleteness refers to the fact that it is impossible to write a 
contract that incorporates every contingency that is likely to arise during the 
life of the contract or every dimension of the service” 
 
Contract incompleteness possesses a huge risk for PPP projects because, even if it 
was possible to write a complete contract, the cost of negotiating and enforcing it 
would be too high compared to the potential benefits of having a complete contract 
(Hart, 2003:70). Challenges like this one needs to be taken into account when 
entering into a PPP contract with a private sector party because they may affect the 
effectiveness of the PPP project. The following section discusses the institutional 
and regulatory requirements for PPP projects. 
 
2.6 Institutional and regulatory requirements for PPPs 
 
For SMEs to participate in PPP projects, there are requirements that need to be in 
place. Firstly, there must be PPP projects that are being implemented in the country. 
Secondly, the PPP market must grow over time. If the two requirements are not met 
it would be difficult to create jobs through SMEs’ participation in PPP projects. 
Therefore, for the PPP market to grow, there are certain conditions/requirements that 
need to be in place. These requirements include institutional and regulatory 
environments conducive for a viable PPP market. 
 
The main issue is to ensure that the roles and responsibilities of all parties 
(government and the private sector) are clearly defined and also to make certain that 
an effective system is in place to regulate and monitor PPPs in order to derive the 
desired value for money4 (European Commission, 2003:41). For a PPP market to 
support the development of the SMEs sector it needs to be supported by a strong 
institutional and regulatory framework that safeguards both the interests of the public 
and the private sector. The development of SMEs through PPPs is dependent on 
good functioning of the PPP market, as it is the market to which SMEs would sell 
their goods and services.  
                                                          
4
 According to the definition of the Republic of South African National Treasury (2004a:17), Value for Money (VfM) means that 
“the provision of the institutional function or the use of the state property by a private party in terms of the PPP agreement 
results in a net benefit to the institution defined in terms of cost, price, quality, quantity, risk transfer or a combination thereof”.. 
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The following sections discuss the different regulatory and institutional requirements 
that are necessary for a viable PPP market that would in turn support the 
development of the SMEs sector 
 
2.7 Institutional requirements for PPPs 
 
Infrastructure projects are characterised by large sunk costs, low mobility, area 
specificity and high risk of opportunistic behaviour. These characteristics increase 
investment risks on the part of the private investor. This means that before a private 
investor decides to invest in an infrastructure project, certain institutional conditions 
should have been met by the host country (Banerjee, Oetzel, & Ranangathan, 
2006:179). These requirements by private investors are legitimate, given the fact that 
once a private investor has invested in a country’s infrastructure project, it loses its 
bargaining power and the government can change the rules of the game as it wishes 
if there are no legal or regulatory frameworks that protect the interests of the private 
firm. 
 
The theory of obsolescing bargain suggests that at the outset a foreign firm may 
receive favourable concessions and benefits for locating in the host country. After 
the firm has made the investment, the host country may be able to renegotiate the 
initial terms of the investment. This is likely to happen when the investment is 
characterised by a low mobility and heavy sunk costs, as is the case with PPP 
projects.   
 
Over and above the obsolescing bargain theory Wildridge, Childs, Cawthra, & 
Madge (2004:8) also discuss other factors that are critical for the success of PPP. 
These factors include factors such as a regulatory environment and strong legal 
system. All these factors point towards a need for a well-established institutional 
environment that will protect the interests of the government, the consumer and the 
investor, while indirectly protecting those of the SME sector if PPPs were to be used 
to develop the SME sector (Ramamurti and Doh, 2004:166). 
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Below is a discussion of the main institutional requirements for PPP projects that 
private investors consider before deciding to invest in infrastructure projects in a 
country. These institutional requirements range from a regulatory environment, 
strong legal system to economic factors that can affect the development of a PPP 
market. 
 
2.7.1 Legal environment 
 
As mentioned earlier, infrastructure investments are vulnerable to opportunistic 
behaviour because of their nature. For the private sector to protect itself against 
these opportunistic risks, investors rely heavily on contracts which, in turn, are 
dependent on the legal and the institutional environment within which they operate. 
Therefore, the legal environment governing contracts, contract enforcement, 
property rights protection and the rule of law are important factors that investors 
consider before making a decision to invest. Therefore, strengthening these 
institutions is imperative (Ramamurti and Doh, 2004:166). It does not matter how 
well a PPP contract has been drafted, if there are weak institutional arrangements 
the interests of the parties involved in the partnership will be vulnerable to 
opportunistic behaviour.  
 
Uncertainty in the legal system results in high transaction costs which, in turn, affect 
competition for the market (Scully, 1988:653). Empirical evidence by the 
International Monetary Fund (2006:17) supports this assertion, particularly in the 
telecommunication sector. This may be true because when the laws are uncertain in 
a country, corruption becomes prevalent. Furthermore, given the fact that contracts 
are incomplete, a robust legal framework is essential if the regulatory policy and 
contract arrangements prove inadequate to address PPP requirements and possible 
conflicts between parties (OECD, 2008:127; Fitch-Ratings 2003:3). 
 
Banerjee et al., (2006:179) assert that the rule of law that leads to transparent and 
honest economic transactions improves the overall returns on investment. This 
assertion may be true because transparent and fair procurement processes are likely 
to result in low transaction costs. International experience based on empirical 
analysis concludes that politically open societies that subscribe to the rule of law and 
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private property rights grow at three times the rate of societies in which such 
freedoms are abridged, and are two and a half times more economically efficient 
(Scully, 1988).   
 
The development of a legal framework is imperative for facilitating a healthy 
investment climate for potential infrastructure investors. A weak legal environment 
creates uncertainties about the quality of regulations and therefore increases the risk 
of the country, thus decreasing incentives for investors to participate in PPP 
infrastructure investment. An empirical analysis by Banerjee et al., (2006:189) 
supports the view that a stable rule of law is an integral factor in attracting private 
infrastructure investment. Economies with a stable legal system and a low risk of 
expropriation provide a haven for private investors. 
 
2.7.2 Regulatory environment 
 
Equally important for infrastructure investment is the regulatory environment. 
Countries with well-established regulatory institutions tend to experience a higher 
volume of infrastructure investment than those that have poorly developed regulatory 
systems. Critical to this are sound, transparent and honest infrastructure investment 
procedures that attract private investors (Rodrik, 1990:230; Tam, 1999:381).  
 
Case studies conducted by Cook (1999:549) show that regulation rather than 
privatisation achieved the largest social and economic gains for consumers, the 
public and the private sectors. The main benefit that had accrued to consumers is 
the establishment of competition. Cook (1999) also identifies two criteria that are 
normally used to judge a good system of regulation, namely; one that enables the 
regulated entity to raise finance for investment at acceptable costs, and one that 
provides incentives for efficiency in operation, pricing, investment and innovation. 
Accordingly, regulatory methodologies should seek to introduce efficiency in the 
operation of the regulated entities.  
 
Regulatory risk can also be mitigated. In South Korea, for example, the project 
selection process involves representatives of all government ministries that will be 
involved with the project over its lifespan. The advantage of involving all affected 
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ministries from the beginning of the project is that regulatory risk is mitigated upfront, 
since a concession agreement would take into account the concerns and agendas of 
the various government ministries that would be involved in the project. This gives 
the private operator an opportunity to adapt its concession expectations to an 
onerous regulatory environment (Fitch-Ratings, 2003:4). Although this approach 
makes sense, it is however likely to introduce a lot of delays in finalising the project 
negotiation stage, since a large number of affected parties become involved in all 
stages of the project. The delays may lead to increased transaction costs. However, 
trying to avoid this long process of consulting line ministries may also result in other 
problems during the implementation stage of the project. The project might get 
delayed during construction should it get challenged by some stakeholders if they 
were not involved from the beginning of the process. This might lead to litigations 
which may be much more costly than spending time upfront with all affected line 
ministries and other stakeholders such as the public that will be affected directly by 
the project. It is important that regulatory agencies are effective. Carino (2008:64) 
argues that, if a regulatory agency is to be effective, it should have an understanding 
of the political and technical intricacies of the industry and the demands on the public 
interests, as this can reduce regulatory risk significantly.  
 
Characteristics of a good regulation system are as important as regulatory principles 
to guide day-to-day regulatory operations. The Australian Department of Treasury 
and Finance (2007) of the State of Victoria and the United Kingdom Better 
Regulation Task Force (n.d.) for example, detailed characteristics of a good 
regulatory system and also proposed principles to guide day-to-day regulatory 
operations. The following are the regulatory principles or practices that emerge 
consistently from the Victorian guide, the United Kingdom and from an international 
review of literature such as the Victoria Consumer Affairs (2008:4) and the University 
of Cape Town’s Development Policy Research Unit (2008:54). These are: (i) 
Effectiveness and targeting: meaning regulation should achieve its objective with 
minimal side effects, (ii) Transparency: meaning regulations should be designed in 
a transparent and consultative manner, (iii) Proportionality: meaning regulatory 
interventions should be proportional to the problem or risk that they seek to address, 
(iv) Consistency and predictability: meaning regulatory design processes and 
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decisions should be consistent with other policies, laws and agreements affecting 
regulated parties, and (v) Accountability: meaning regulators must be accountable 
for their decisions and subject to public scrutiny.   
 
Consistently adhering to regulatory principles helps reduce regulatory uncertainty 
and risks which might affect the development of the PPP market, thus affecting the 
participation of SMEs in PPP projects. 
 
2.7.3 Domestic debt market requirement 
 
Funding projects from domestic financial sources has economic merits. The 
development of a vibrant domestic debt market is important for encouraging SMEs to 
participate in PPP projects as it increases potential sources of funds (Banerjee et al., 
2006:182). A domestic debt market is important for attracting both foreign and local 
investors to PPP projects. A well-developed domestic debt market has the potential 
to increase access to finance for PPP projects, even to small local contractors that 
may not qualify for funds in international debt markets. If projects are financed by 
foreign banks, the cost of capital is likely to be high, given the fact that foreign banks 
would want to charge a higher interest rate because of the risks they expose 
themselves to and not clearly understanding the environment to which they would be 
exposed (Asian Development Bank, 1999:12). Another advantage of using local 
banks is that the profit generated by the project is not repatriated to overseas 
countries, but can be used to finance other development projects in the local 
economy that may involve the participation of SMEs. 
 
However, the availability of long-term debt maturities is a challenge for both 
developing and developed economies. The challenge is the absence of long-term 
debt maturities needed by infrastructure projects. This challenge is more pronounced 
in developing countries than in developed economies. Most of the available debts 
are short and medium-term debt maturities that fail to accommodate long-term 
investments such as PPP projects (Fitch-Ratings, 2003:4; Asian Development Bank, 
1999:12). This problem can be overcome by developing a vibrant domestic debt 
market and by creating a conducive regulatory environment.  
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2.7.4 Corruption and unethical activities 
 
Corruption and unethical activities hinder private sector investment in infrastructure 
projects. Corruption is a result of poor governance, and poor governance directly 
affects the level and nature of private investment in a country. It detracts investors, 
reduces the productivity of public expenditure, distorts the allocation of resources 
and lowers economic growth. Political corruption, which involves the abuse of power 
by politicians for private benefits, is one of the main deterrents to private investment 
in both infrastructure and non-infrastructure projects. The amount of money paid as 
bribes by the private sector to government officials is much less than what can be 
gained from proper allocation of public funds (Emery, 2003:1). Corruption may 
trigger political instability, which may finally result in poor economic growth and 
development (Economic Commission for Africa, 2005:62). Private investors tend to 
avoid corrupt investment environments in order to minimise inefficiencies and the 
added costs of doing business (Fjeldstad, Kolstad & Nygaard, 2006:8). 
 
Corruption lowers private investment. Empirical studies by Mauro (1995:683) using 
data from 1980–1983 from a cross section of countries found that corruption lowers 
private investment substantially, reduces government expenditure and lowers life 
expectancy, thereby reducing economic growth. Corruption has the potential to 
diminish competition for the market in PPPs and may result in costly services. This is 
due to the fact that in PPPs competition for the market is the only tool that the public 
sector uses to ensure services are provided at reasonable prices.  
 
Strong control over corruption protects investors’ interests. An empirical study 
conducted by the International Monetary Fund (2003:18) using data collected from 
different African between1970 and 1998, found that a common law system tends to 
secure investors’ rights and protects the private sector better. Similarly, strong 
control over corruption protects investors from possible opportunistic behaviour 
associated with corrupt government officials. Such controls include the strict 
enforcement of legislation. An example of such measures in South Africa include the 
Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) of 1999 and Regulation 16 of the PFMA 
which aims at regulating PPPs at both national and provincial level to ensure that 
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PPP projects procurement processes are transparent, equitable and fair. Countries 
that do not have such legislative mechanisms can emphasise on transparency 
during the tender process and make clear to the public the advantages of using 
PPPs instead of the traditional method of procurement. This can help reduce 
opportunities for corrupt activities and increase the participation of SMEs in a 
growing PPP market.   
 
Corruption has a negative impact on foreign direct investments (FDIs). A study by 
Wei (2000) on foreign direct investment and corruption using data for various years 
from 12 source countries and 45 host countries mainly OECD countries, found that in 
14 out of 45 host countries corruption indeed reduced the inward flow of investment. 
Even when corruption does not deter investment, it may have an impact on 
thenature and composition of FDIs and on a firm’s market entry strategy. The study 
by Wei (2000) also found that private participation tends to be lower in markets 
characterised by high levels of corruption because of the added costs and other risks 
associated with corrupt markets. Cumbersome and dishonest bureaucracies may 
delay the distribution of permits and licences, thereby slowing down the process 
through which technological advances become embodied in new equipment or new 
productive processes (Mauro, 1995:681). Corruption can also affect the development 
of SMEs in that small firms may not have the required money to bribe officials, and 
that may hinder their participation in businesses such as in PPP projects.   
 
2.7.5 Transparency and easy access to information  
 
Transparency is crucial for the development of a PPP market and the participation of 
SMEs in PPP projects. Easy access to information by civil society, the public and 
potential PPP investors at all stages of PPP procurement assists both the public and 
the private-sector partners in planning for a new PPP project. It also improves 
accountability and the management of projects. Transparency is a core element 
contributing to regulatory quality (Pongsiri, 2002:490).  
 
In the United Kingdom, for example (Allan, 1999:29), the government has made it a 
condition that information on the following should be made available to the public, 
namely (i) record of future payments contracted for each PPP scheme; (ii) capital 
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value of contracts signed to date and in procurement; (iii) record of completed 
projects and their performance against expectations; (iv) performance evaluation of 
on-going projects and (v) return on equity actually achieved by private-sector 
investors. The Australian government requires that all public authorities make public 
their PPP contract information within three months of signing a contract. The 
information is expected to include (i) a brief summary of the contract content, (ii) a 
report on value for money (iii) details on the assets to be transferred to the private 
sector; (iv) total cost and basis for future changes in price; (v) contract renegotiation 
provision; (vi) risk-sharing details in the construction and operational stages; (vii) 
guarantees made by both parties; and (viii) details of the public sector comparator 
(OECD, 2008:126). Disclosure of PPP information should also include publishing 
detailed information on guarantees, as guarantees are likely sources of corruption 
(OECD, 2008:126). 
 
Publishing information on PPPs can go a long way towards improving transparency 
in the procurement process of PPP projects, thus encouraging private-sector 
participation in infrastructure projects and, in doing so, opening more opportunities 
for SMEs participation in PPP projects. 
 
2.7.6 Political institutions 
 
Stable and reliable political institutions are necessary for foreign investors, 
particularly those that invest in infrastructure projects. If PPP projects are not 
supported by the political elite of a country they have a minimal chance to succeed. 
Weak political institutions are a deterrent to foreign investment and increase political 
risks5 (United Kingdom. Department of International Development, 2007:56; Attila, 
2008:9; Gerring and Thacker, 2004:325). Countries with weak political institutions 
are more likely to result in war, civil strife or ethnic tension, and the inability of foreign 
firms to repatriate profits can compromise a firm’s profitability and even survival 
(Banerjee et al., 2006:181).  
 
                                                          
5
 Political risks are defined as risks that are primarily the result of forces that are external to the firm and which 
involve host government action or inaction (United Kingdom. Department of International Development, 
2007:56). 
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Weak political institutions may result in increased project transaction costs, arbitrary 
changes to a country’s investment policies and expropriation of assets (Bergara, 
Henisz & Spiller, 1998:19). Decisions made by the public sector, such as the 
enactment of laws, policies and regulations affect the allocation of public and private-
sector expenditures. It is therefore imperative for the private sector to know how 
these decisions are determined, given the fact that these decisions depend mainly 
on the political intuitions of the country (Isham, Kaufmann & Pritchett, 1997:219). A 
trusted and effective bureaucratic institution enhances private investors’ willingness 
to participate in infrastructure investment (Bergara et al., 1998:19).   
 
According to Dethier, Ghanem & Zoli (1999:6), democracies are more conducive to 
private enterprises than other forms of government. It is mainly argued that 
democracies facilitate the adoption of market-oriented reforms and checks and 
balances implicit in the democratic system. These checks and balances help to give 
comfort to the private investor. Empirical work by Isham et al. (1997:237) and Dethier 
et al. (1999:4) using data from high, medium and low income countries from 1974 – 
1987, supports this finding by concluding that countries with the strongest civil 
liberties have projects with an economic rate of return that averages between 8 and 
22 percentage points higher than those with the weakest civil liberties. This finding 
suggests that increasing citizen’s voice can lead to greater efficiency in government 
actions. 
 
Civil rights are also important for foreign direct investments. Empirical evidence by 
Banerjee et al. (2006:193) using longitudinal data (1990–2000) from 40 developing 
countries, found that the effect of political institutions on investment is important, but 
only significant for total flow and not for their disaggregation components or the 
frequency of projects. It also revealed that political rights hardly matter in total private 
flows, but civil rights6 adversely affect private flows. The finding that political rights 
                                                          
6
 Civil rights include ensuring of people’s physical integrity and safety, protection from discrimination on 
grounds such as physical or mental disability, gender, religion, race and national origin. Political rights include 
natural justice (procedural fairness) in law, such as the rights of the accused, including the right to a fair trial; 
due process; the right to seek redress or a legal remedy and rights of participation in civil society and politics 
such as freedom of association. 
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hardly matter on private investment is supported by Alesina and Weder (1999:19) 
empirical finding using data from 1982 covering a number of counties, which found 
that there is no evidence indicating that less corrupt countries receive more FDIs, 
which also supports the notion that private investors are not deterred by corruption 
and political instability, especially in resource-rich countries.  
 
2.7.7 Economic and financial institutions 
 
Countries that aim at developing a vibrant PPP market need to develop strong 
economic and financial institutions. Strong economic stability is one of the important 
factors that private investors consider when deciding on locating their businesses. A 
high level of economic and financial instability is associated with greater institutional 
and investment risks for private investors. Financial and economic risks are 
associated with currency volatility, which may in turn result in poor functioning of 
capital markets. Furthermore, a high inflation rate has a negative effect on private 
investment, particularly in emerging economies. Currency volatility and a high 
inflation rate can affect the value of a company’s investment in infrastructure, as well 
as consumers’ ability to pay for services (Mwilima, 2003:38). The three main factors 
here are: stable macroeconomic system, market size and reforms of the fiscal 
system.   
 
An empirical analysis by Banerjee et al. (2006:194) found that a higher exchange 
rate affects private investment flow negatively as it makes the local economy 
uncompetitive. Another empirical work by Osinubi and Amaghionyeodiwe (2009:103) 
based on Nigerian firms’ data from 1970 -2004, confirms this finding by concluding 
that the depreciation of a local currency has a positive impact on FDI inflows. 
However, a number of studies have given mixed results on the effect of an exchange 
rate on FDIs. Some of these studies are summarised in Osinubi and 
Amaghionyeodiwe’s work (2009). These authors miss the point: the issue is not 
about a weaker exchange rate, but about exchange rate volatility that has a greater 
negative impact on investment. With regards to the market size: the bigger the 
market, the better for private investment. This is because a big market size means 
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there will be enough consumers to consume the produced product or service. The 
private sector will always prefer to invest in a country that has a reasonable market 
size for its product. An empirical study by Botric and Skuflic (2005:15) conducted for 
South Eastern Europe countries, analysing geographical and sector distribution of 
FDIs between 1980–2003, found that GDP per capita and the size of the market as 
measured by the population size have a significant impact on private infrastructure 
flows. These inflows not only increase investment in PPP projects, but also increase 
opportunities for the SME sector. Reforms of the fiscal system are equally important 
for a viable PPPP market. Countries that wish to attract PPPs must establish stable 
macroeconomic conditions, adequate tariff regimes, a track record of honouring 
commitments and reasonable economic policies such as inflation targeting, tax 
reforms and medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF) or its version as was 
adopted by a number of African countries, including Zambia, Kenya and Namibia. 
The South African government adopted the MTEF in 1998 as part of a wide package 
of budget reforms that included the intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act of 1997 
(IGFRA) (Republic of South Africa. National Treasury, 2007:3; Economic 
Commission for Africa 2005:57). Since then the South African national budget has 
included three-year spending plans, and investors’ perception about the 
macroeconomic and fiscal management has since improved. This is indicated by the 
increase in total investment as a percentage of GDP, which increased from 18, 1% in 
2004 to 22,% in 2010 (International Monetary Fund, 2010:76). 
 
2.8 Regulation and public-private partnerships 
 
As mentioned earlier, a regulatory environment is imperative for the private sector to 
invest in infrastructure. This section therefore focuses on the relationship between 
regulation and PPP projects by discussing both the advantages and disadvantages 
of regulation on PPPs.   
 
The successful implementation of public-private partnerships depends, to a large 
extent, on sound regulatory frameworks, agreements and contracts that clearly 
define the relationship between government agencies and private firms. In the 
absence of a well-developed regulatory framework for PPPs, disputes are likely to 
occur and as a result projects can be delayed or even terminated.  
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The objective of a regulatory framework is to reduce opportunistic tendencies and to 
align the interests of the parties involved (Pongsiri, 2002:489). Regulations should be 
based on laws and should make it difficult for politically motivated influences to 
disrupt the smooth implementation of PPP projects. This calls for independent 
regulatory agencies to ensure decision-making autonomy. These agencies need to 
be accountable and should make regular public reporting a priority (Scandizzo, 
2007:12).  
 
Below is a brief discussion on the importance of PPP regulations and the 
disadvantages of over-regulating the PPP market. 
 
2.8.1 The advantages of regulations in PPPs 
 
As mentioned in the above section, regulation in PPPs is a useful tool for protecting 
the interests of the private investor by preventing direct or indirect expropriation of 
investment capital. It ought to satisfy the demands of both the public and private 
sectors, which can at times be conflicting (Hirchhausen, Beckers & Brenck, 
2004:207). 
 
An ideal framework for PPP regulation is the one that strikes a balance between 
establishing a system of regulations and ensures accountability of partners and 
avoids over-regulation. Over-regulation can stifle innovation, while at the same time, 
failing to protect the legitimate interests of all stakeholders in fostering partnerships 
and introducing unintended consequences into the system can also create problems 
(Scandizzo, 2007:12).  
 
A properly regulated PPP market is beneficial to the general public. Without proper 
regulation the poor can be the victims of PPP projects through high prices and low 
service quality (Parker and Hartely, 2002:308). An empirical assessment of the 
importance of the regulatory framework as a determinant for private-sector 
investment in infrastructure by Pargal (2003:23) covering the water, 
telecommunications, railroads and road sectors in 9 Latin American countries using 
data from 1980-1998, found that the most significant determinant of private 
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investment is the passage of legislation liberalising the investment regime. This 
indicates that the legal basis for reform is more critical in determining the quality of 
the investment climate. Regulations also reduce the chances of renegotiating a PPP 
contract. Renegotiation can create the potential for opportunistic behaviour by both 
the government and the private investor (Harris, 2003:10). 
 
Regulation benefits the consumer, the private investor and the government. It 
protects the private sector and the government from opportunistic behaviour that 
may harm the proper implementation of projects. It also increases access to services 
by the consumer at affordable prices, as it protects consumers from being exploited 
by service providers. 
 
2.8.2 Over- or poor regulation of PPPs 
 
Although regulation is imperative for the development of a viable environment for 
PPPs to operate, it is important to add that over-regulation and contractual 
safeguards can also restrain economic growth and hinder the ability of the private 
sector to remain competitive in the market. The operational costs of the regulated 
entity can increase drastically due to unnecessary additional compliance 
requirements. Employees’ time might be taken up by complying with regulations, and 
companies may pay exorbitant professional fees in seeking advice on legal actions 
as a result of alleged non-compliance by regulatory authorities (Emery, 2003:9). This 
can happen if the regulators are over-concerned with the welfare of the consumer at 
the expense of the private firm. 
 
Empirical work on the impact of regulations on small businesses found that 
regulation distorts market signals and reduces the rewards of business ownership, 
dis-incentivises market entry, investment, innovation and business growth, all of 
which lead to the sub-optimal level of economic activity from which businesses, 
workers and consumers suffer (Kingston University, 2005:3). This means that 
regulators need to take into account the interests of both the consumer and the 
private firm when making regulatory decisions to avoid the negative impact of 
regulation on regulated firms. Although this finding refers only to small firms, it might 
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however even be relevant for big construction firms depending on the extent of 
regulation imposed on them. 
 
Poor regulation7 can lead to projects that were once operational becoming financially 
and operationally unviable. If regulation is unable to balance the financial viability of 
the private firm, consumer or government interests, then it can turn a viable project 
into becoming financially unviable (Kintanar, 2009:8). As a result of poor regulation, 
a number of PPP projects went wrong in Australia. For instance, the Australian 
government’s lack of transparency, disregard of commercial warnings related to 
project viability and ill-managed public relations in the first decade of the 21st century 
led to the failure of these projects (Dahdal, 2010:7). 
 
Having discussed the advantages and disadvantages of regulation for PPPs, the 
following section discusses the required institutional framework necessary for a 
viable PPP market. 
 
2.9 Institutional framework for public-private partnerships 
 
A clear legislative framework specifying the roles of the public and private sectors, 
their relationships and the areas for co-operation is essential for building sustainable 
partnerships. International experience suggests that identifying and establishing 
clear and unambiguous institutional functions in relation to PPPs at the onset of a 
country’s PPP programme can greatly assist in successful PPP implementation. 
Furthermore, it is imperative to have a degree of flexibility in the early years of a 
country’s PPP programme in order to encourage experimentation and innovation to 
ensure that public bodies that have the capacity are not delayed while institutional 
capacities are being developed (Pongsiri, 2002:488).  
 
This section therefore discusses the different elements that make up an effective 
institutional framework for PPPs. These elements include: political commitment and 
good governance, the development of an appropriate legal framework, the 
development of PPP expertise within the public sector, the refinement of project 
                                                          
7
 Poor regulation may mean either over-regulation or under-regulation. 
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appraisal and prioritisation criteria, reforms on public sector procurement 
requirements; contractual compliance and enforcement effectiveness and PPP 
monitoring framework. 
 
2.9.1 Development of an appropriate legal framework  
 
A well-developed legal framework provides reassurance to the private sector that 
contracts will be honoured. In some cases this may require changes or additions to 
existing laws. In order to succeed in developing a viable PPP market, governments 
need to introduce and manage the politics of reforms. All stakeholders likely to be 
affected by the reforms need to be treated fairly (Harris, 2003:41). The 
incompleteness of PPP contracts necessitates a strong legal system that the public 
can trust. Although a strong legal system will not completely eradicate the risks 
involved in PPPs, it will reduce them through a competitively chosen PPP partner 
working within a robust regulatory framework, which is properly monitored and which 
can ultimately deliver quality public services efficiently and equitably  
 
A good example of countries that revamped their legal frameworks in order to 
facilitate private participation in infrastructure investment includes Italy and Spain. In 
both countries new laws also sought to secure creditors’ rights. This has also been 
emphasised in Brazil and Chile, where the governments assured investors that they 
would honour their future commitments (OECD, 2006a:120). The legal framework 
should be accompanied by clear, credible and efficient dispute resolution 
mechanisms that may be used to address disagreement between parties, should a 
dispute arise during the project implementation stage.  
 
2.9.2 Dispute resolution mechanisms in infrastructure projects 
 
There are several methods that can be used to resolve disagreements between two 
parties. The most commonly used and most important one is through the courts. The 
advantage of this method is that it results in a binding decision that is imposed upon 
the parties in a dispute, while other mechanisms merely suggest solutions that the 
parties are not bound to accept (Biukovic, 2008:261). It works well if both parties 
belong to the same country. When the dispute arises between two parties from 
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different countries there is difficulty in dealing with their disputes due to the 
differences in the law systems (common law or civil law system) of their respective 
countries. Other difficulties include the absence of a treaty for the enforcement of 
foreign judgements in any other jurisdiction, the availability of assets of the defended 
in that jurisdiction, and claim for sovereign immunity cannot be ignored. 
 
Due to the above-mentioned difficulties in dealing with a dispute through the courts, 
many countries prefer to use other methods, called alternative dispute resolution 
methods, to settle disputes between two parties coming from different jurisdictions. 
Many long-term contracts specify how disputes are going to be dealt with and which 
dispute resolution method is going to be used should a dispute arises. Table 2.2 
gives a summary of different dispute resolution mechanisms that can be employed to 
deal with disputes in PPP projects. It is not the intention of this paper to go into a 
detailed discussion on the different dispute mechanisms which are normally 
employed by different parties. 
 
Table 2.2: Different disputes resolution mechanisms 
Method Description 
Arbitration Is the oldest method and has existed in one form or another in every 
country at all times. 
Fast-track  
arbitration 
 
This is time-bound arbitration and is similar to the common arbitration. 
Governments can promulgate fast-track arbitration rules and appoint an 
arbitrator. 
Conciliation or 
mediation 
One or more independent persons are selected by the parties to an 
agreement by mutual consent either at the time of making the agreement or 
after the agreement has been made to bring about a settlement of their 
dispute through consensus by employing persuasive techniques.  
Mini-trial Here senior management of the parties involved in the dispute meet in the 
presence of a neutral adviser. The adviser will study the dispute and then 
tell the senior management personnel of the relevant companies about the 
strengths and weakness of the case so that the parties can take the 
appropriate decision about their dispute going forward. 
Expert assessment 
(engineers) 
Parties involved in long-term contracts such as construction projects appoint 
experts for the resolution of disputes that may arise during the course of the 
contract. In most instances, the experts are construction or civil engineers 
who are normally available on the construction site to deal with disputes as 
they arise. 
Dispute Review 
Board 
Dispute Review Boards are established immediately after the contract is 
made. Disputes through these boards are fast, inexpensive and avoid 
disruption of construction work. 
African customary 
system of dispute 
resolution 
Customary law is generally known to be the accepted norm of usage in any 
community. A community can accept certain customs as binding on them. 
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Negotiation  This is a voluntary and informal process by which the disputing parties 
reach a mutually acceptable agreement. 
Early neutral 
evaluation/fact 
finding 
Here the disputants select a third party to investigate the issue in dispute 
and submit a report or give evidence at another forum like a court or 
arbitration. The outcome of the fact finding is not binding but the result is 
admissible for use in a trial or other forum.  
Source: Owasanoye (2000) 
 
An equitable legal system is essential to assure investors that any disputes can be 
resolved quickly through litigation or other means, and it gives comfort in that both 
parties will respect the contract (Tam, 1999:381).  
 
An independent judicial system is an important prerequisite to government’s ability to 
credibly commit to contract terms. An empirical analysis by Bergara et al. (1998:28) 
that analysed the relationship between an independent judicial system and private 
investment across 91 countries using different data sources, concluded that an 
independent and respected judiciary with a track record of successfully ruling against 
government is an important prerequisite to government’s ability to credibly commit to 
contract terms. This normally happen in democratic environments. The presence of 
democracy is therefore the meta-institution for the existence of other non-market 
institutions that penalises self-interested politicians and hence limits rent-seeking 
opportunities.   
 
2.9.3 Development of PPP expertise within the public sector 
 
Investment in PPP skills development is imperative for the success of PPP 
programmes. This of course covers the full range of skills and competencies 
required to manage a PPP programme such as bidding and contracting skills. These 
skills must exist both in the public and the private sectors for mutually beneficial 
partnerships (Adei, 2009:4). Good procurement skills can help reduce bidding costs 
and deliver more effective projects. Such skills are vital for delivering quality 
investment on time and in a way that secures value for money for the public sector 
(United Kingdom. Her Majesty Treasury, 2003:5). Skills that are a must within the 
public sector are regulatory skills (United Kingdom. Department of International 
Development, 2007:58). Therefore, development of expertise within the public sector 
is critical. 
   69 
 
 
In the United Kingdom (UK), a review of the PPP institutional framework revealed 
that the complexity of PPP projects requires a certain level of commercial knowledge 
and experience that is normally not available within government and its agencies. 
Such skills include financial, legal and technical advice and contract negotiations and 
procurement. The availability of such skills has the potential to speed up the process 
of implementing PPPs (Allan, 1999:30). If the government and the private sector fail 
to work together properly because of the lack of such skills, that may affect the SME 
sector as well, given the fact that its survival would be dependent on the proper 
functioning of the PPP project. 
 
According to Adei (2009:4), many African governments still lack the necessary skills 
to develop the requisite capacities needed to implement policies and programmes for 
sustainable development. They also lack the ability to develop human capacity in 
terms of supply of professional and technical personnel. An empirical analysis by 
Youssef, Noorbakhsh and Alberto (2001:1602) found that FDIs are a function of 
human capital. Therefore, as competition for investments increases, developing 
countries are to improve on local skills availability and build up their human 
resources capabilities to raise not only the volume but also the quality and meet the 
sophistication requirements of both local investors and FDIs. 
 
2.9.4 Refinement of project appraisal and prioritisation criteria 
 
It is important to have project appraisal and prioritisation criteria that maximise the 
use of the PPP procurement method in order to achieve value for money. A number 
of countries have adopted good procurement and prioritisation approaches to 
improve PPP project identification. Such countries include South Africa, the United 
Kingdom, Mauritius, Chile, Portugal and South Korea, to name a few (Orissa, 
2007:4). They have also created PPP units that are responsible for surveying public-
private relationships for collecting, analysing, drafting PPP appraisal guidelines, 
legislation, and disseminating information on PPPs. These units provide detailed 
guidance and technical assistance to line ministries and government agencies in 
relation to the selection, feasibility and management of PPP projects (Orissa, 
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2007:4). They also ensure that future fiscal implications of PPPs are aligned with 
medium-term debt sustainability.   
 
By contrast, some countries allow the private sector to propose projects to be 
undertaken as PPPs. This approach is likely to introduce bias in the identification of 
PPP projects. PPP projects identified or proposed by the private sector are likely to 
overlook the economic and social benefits of the project that will accrue to the 
citizens. It is important that benefits of proposed projects are weighed against wider 
economic costs and benefits that take into account the project impacts to the welfare 
of the society including their impacts to SME development.  
 
2.9.5 Reforms on public-sector procurement requirements 
 
Once a policy has been adopted by the government to use PPPs to deliver public 
services it is of the essence that the government introduces reforms in the 
procurement requirements. For example, an innovative PPP contract with a 
company to finance, design, build and operate a public facility over a 20-year period 
may be impossible to accommodate within the existing government procurement 
policies. To accommodate the unique structure of PPP projects will necessitate 
some adjustments to the procurement policies to ensure that PPPs are not affected 
by the huge number of government regulations (Bloomfield, 2006:401). This may 
require that PPPs are exempted from some government procurement rules and for 
governments to be flexible as PPPs are introduced into the market.  
 
Other countries group small projects into one in order to reduce transaction costs for 
potential bidders and to allow big and experienced bidders to bid for the projects. 
However, grouping small projects can have negative implications for small 
contractors (SMEs) who cannot afford to bid for big projects due to their limited 
financial resources and technical expertise. This can affect the development of small 
businesses, thus affecting competition for the market for PPPs in the long term. The 
development of small firms is essential for economic development and job creation. 
Any policy that overlooks the development of small firms should not be encouraged. 
In the long term the increased number of small businesses can result in increased 
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competition in the PPP market, thus increasing value for money for PPP projects 
while addressing the issue of unemployment facing developing countries. 
 
Governments should also consider refunding bidders their bidding costs should the 
government decide not to proceed with a project if the decision not to continue is not 
related to the viability of the tenders received (Allan, 1999:31). This is a good idea, 
since refunding a bidder in this case helps to keep competition high for PPP projects 
if potential firms know that they will be refunded their bidding costs if the government 
decides not to continue with the project. Cancelling a project without compensating 
bidders may result in a low response rate for projects’ adverts in future and that may 
have negative implications for competition. 
 
Preparing the public for user charges is necessary in PPP projects. There is a need 
for governments to prepare the public for user charges and fees for any service 
provided through PPPs. Governments have to reform themselves and teach the 
public that the era of free services is coming to an end in order to increase public 
acceptability of PPP projects (Allan, 1999:33). One of the difficulties faced by the 
private sector in most African countries is that tariffs for services are too low to 
recover investment costs from a PPP project, especially in the water sector 
(Kintanar, 2009:8).   
 
2.9.6 PPP monitoring framework 
 
The importance of a PPP monitoring framework is to create an environment 
conducive for the PPP market. One of the reasons why the United Kingdom together 
with other developed countries such as New Zealand, Australia and the Netherlands 
have achieved success on the PPP front is that they took action early to put in place 
all-important building blocks of (i) a standardised assessment and selection process, 
(ii) a higher level of expertise across the public sector (ii) an open, transparent and 
accountable environment, and (iv) a strong commitment behind the process. All 
these building blocks enable easy monitoring of PPP projects. 
 
However, many developing and emerging economies do not have the expertise to 
develop such frameworks as has been discussed. The establishment of a 
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transparent and sound contract monitoring framework is a necessary precursor to 
private-sector participation in public-private partnerships. Therefore, countries that 
have embraced the PPP model have no choice but to develop monitoring expertise if 
they are to compete effectively for FDIs in PPP projects. The public sector needs to 
ensure that PPPs operate efficiently and that they meet the minimum service level 
agreement and operate in line with the broader policy objectives, ranging from social 
to environmental policies (Pongsiri, 2002:490). In support of Pongsiri, the 
development of such frameworks can help as a safeguard for the public sector to 
ensure that the services delivered through PPPs indeed meet the quality and service 
level agreed upon.   
 
A successful PPP depends, to a large extent, on the capacity of the government to 
keep the contract on track via proper contract monitoring. Contract compliance can 
be monitored either by an independent regulator, by independent auditors or by 
government itself by creating a unit responsible for contract monitoring and 
compliance (OECD, 2008:130).  
 
Having discussed the instructional arrangement necessary for PPP projects the 
following section discusses the South African PPP institutional developments. 
 
2.10 The South African PPP institutional developments 
 
As part of establishing the required institutional governance structure for PPPs, the 
South African government provided for the establishment of a PPP Unit within the 
South African National Treasury in 2000, as discussed in the first chapter. The first 
objective of the PPP Unit is to regulate PPPs in accordance with constitutional and 
statutory requirements for transparent, competitive and equitable distribution of PPP 
projects at national, provincial and local government levels. The second objective of 
the PPP Unit is to create a centre of knowledge and expertise that can provide 
individual departments with technical assistance during the development of a PPP 
project and keep a watchful eye on departments through its regulatory approval 
mechanisms (Burger, 2006:5). Since the government decided to implement PPPs, a 
number of regulatory policies have been developed in order to create an 
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environment conducive for the development of a PPP market. Table 2.3 gives a 
summary of the core legislation applicable to PPPs in South Africa. 
 
Table 2.3: Developments of PPP institutional framework in South Africa 
Date Action Purpose 
1997 Cabinet approved the appointment 
of an interdepartmental task team 
(not a legislation) 
To develop policy, legislation, and institutional 
reforms to enable the use of PPPs 
1999 Public Finance Management Act 
(PFMA) was enacted 
To create a good governance structure for the 
procurement of goods and services, including 
PPPs, by the public sector 
Mid 2000 PPP unit was formed  To create policy and regulatory framework for 
PPPs in the country 
2004 Regulation 16 of the PFMA was 
issued  
To regulate PPPs at both national and 
provincial level to ensure that such projects 
are transparent, equitable, and fair 
2004 PPP manual was issued To guide both governments departments and 
provinces through PPP project life cycle 
2005 Municipal PPP regulation was 
issued in terms of the Municipal 
Finance management Act of 2003 
It defines the elements of a municipal PPP and 
set out the stages and approval it will have to 
go through 
Source: Fourie (2006) and Furrugia and Orr (2008) 
 
From the table above it can be seen that the South African government has laid 
down the necessary foundation for an environment conducive for PPP projects. A 
study done by the support programme for infrastructure development (SPAID, 
2007:12) on PPP challenges in South Africa found that the private sector feels the 
policy framework for PPPs emphasises the regulation of PPPs when what South 
Africa needs is the promotion of PPPs, the facilitation of PPPs and capacity-building 
for implementing agencies. The private sector concurs that the rules for PPP 
procurement are generally acceptable. Table 2.4 below summarises the different 
views about the South African PPP institutional framework. The responses were 
compiled by SPAID after interviewing different private-sector PPP partners, 
government departments and agencies responsible for PPP projects. 
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Table 2.4: Views about South African PPP institutional framework 
Topic  Private sector Implementing 
Agencies 
Government Agencies 
responsible for PPP 
policy  
Legal 
environment 
 Rules for procuring PPPs 
are broadly acceptable at 
the national and provincial 
level, but better suited for 
higher value transactions 
and more developed PPP 
markets 
 
 PPP unit micro-manage 
transactions  
 
 BEE/SMME thresholds 
included in PPP guidelines 
are not necessarily in line 
with sector charter 
 
 Rules do not work at the 
municipal level 
 Treasury or other 
legal rules for 
procuring PPPs 
are too onerous or 
confusing 
 
 
 Rules for procuring PPPs 
are good, but there is a 
need to streamline for 
smaller value projects 
 
 PPP unit has already 
developed, and will develop 
more, streamlined 
processes for smaller value 
projects, or projects in 
more familiar sectors 
(example, small cap, 
ecotourism projects) 
Role of the 
PPP unit 
PPP unit does too much regulation, and too little 
promotion and facilitation of PPPs within 
implementation agencies 
PPP unit spends as much 
time as it can promoting 
and facilitating PPPs 
Source: SPAID (2007) 
 
The general feeling by the private sector is that the PPP legal environment is 
acceptable at both national and provincial levels; however, it needs a few 
adjustments at the municipal level. This confirms that the South African government 
has gone a long way towards preparing the PPP environment and adopting best 
practice in developing a feasible regulatory and legal environment for PPPs to 
flourish.  
 
2.11 Chapter summary  
 
The chapter has looked at both the economics and institutional requirements for 
PPPs. It discussed the conflicting goals of the private and the public sector when 
entering into a PPP relationship. It concluded that both parties have different 
objective functions and therefore these differences in their objective functions could 
result in conflicts between them. The public sector’s objective is to maximise 
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economic welfare and reduce current budget debt, whereas the private sector’s 
objective is to maximise risk adjusted profits. The research found that, for the private 
firm to maximise profit it has to compromise service quality taking advantage of 
contract incompleteness and the positive relationship between quality and costs of 
service provision. However, studies on the relationship between costs and service 
quality indicate that there is no consensus about the impact of outsourcing public 
services and service quality because of poor data availability prior to services being 
outsourced. 
 
The chapter went on to discuss the economic benefits and costs of PPPs and 
concluded that those who argue against PPPs normally tell part of the story about 
the real costs of PPPs. The chapter revealed that it is not the cost, but the net benefit 
that is the most relevant benchmark in considering which alternative is better and, on 
this count, PPPs have the potential to provide significant value for money.  
 
It also found that the main argument for engaging the private sector to provide public 
services is that, if government does not have the money to construct the public 
project or provide the service to consumers and the private sector does not finance 
or provide the infrastructure at the time when it is required, there would be 
opportunity cost involved in the economy as a whole. Therefore it makes economic 
sense to have the project or service provided by the private sector than not having it 
at all, and this frees limited government’s budget and allows government to focus on 
other services using the money saved by engaging the private sector. 
 
The chapter also revealed that PPPs may be a solution to financially constrained 
governments with increasing demand for services, however involving the private 
sector in providing public services requires a comprehensive monitoring system with 
clear performance measures or indicators, and this is normally lacking in most public 
sector monitoring departments. Governments need to establish well-capacitated 
monitoring units or departments if they intend to involve the private sector in 
infrastructure provision in order to ensure that public funds are used efficiently. 
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It went on to look at the institutional arrangements necessary for the success of 
PPPs. The objective had been to identify and define the relevant statutory, regulatory 
and institutional factors that affect successful implementation of PPP projects. It 
found that government has a responsibility to establish the necessary legal 
framework, including competition policy and entry and exit laws in order to promote a 
prosperous PPP market. 
 
It also found that the successful implementation of PPPs is, to a large extent, 
dependent on a sound regulatory framework and that, although regulation is 
imperative for the development of PPP projects, over-regulation can be the greatest 
deterrent to private-sector participation in infrastructure investment. This happens 
when regulations are limited in scope, unclear in operation and inclined towards 
micro-management. 
 
Lastly, it analysed the developments of the South African PPP institutional and 
regulatory frameworks. It concluded by giving different views of both the private and 
the public sector about the South African PPP institutional and regulatory 
frameworks. In general it has been found that the South African institutional and 
legal requirements for PPPs have developed to an acceptable international standard. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE ROLE OF PPPS IN DEVELOPING AN SME SECTOR 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 2 defined PPPs and discussed their economics and their institutional, 
regulatory and legal frameworks. It found that strong institutional, regulatory and 
legal frameworks are imperative for a PPP programme to succeed. It showed that to 
have a viable PPP market that can support SMEs development, there need to be a 
well-functioning legal, regulatory and institutional framework that will protect the 
interests of consumers, the private and the public sectors. This shows that without 
strong legal, regulatory and institutional frameworks, it can be difficult to develop a 
viable SME sector through PPP projects, since a viable PPP market is a necessary 
condition for SMEs to participate in PPP projects. This chapter therefore discusses 
the role PPP projects can play to develop a sustainable SMEs sector, especially for 
developing countries. 
 
SMEs differ from large organisations in many ways. SMEs differ from big enterprises 
in resource limitations, in their informal strategies and flexible structure. As a result, 
SMEs have a higher failure rate compared to large firms. This causes a slow growth 
of SMEs, especially in developing countries (Hussain et al., 2012:1582). The lack of 
key resources, such as human capital, finance and technology affects their growth. 
The question that one can ask is: can PPPs address these challenges? The answer 
is: not all SME challenges can be addressed through PPPs. However; PPPs can 
improve the sustainability of SMEs through subcontracting them to provide certain 
goods and services. In that way the challenge of access to markets for SME goods 
and services would have been mitigated to a certain extent, as SMEs would have a 
guaranteed market for their products and a sustainable income as long as the PPP 
project continues to operate. This means that more PPP projects in a country can 
result in more opportunities for SMEs. This can happen only if the PPP market is 
supported by a well-functioning legal, regulatory and institutional system that 
supports the growth of the PPP market, thus opening more opportunities for SMEs to 
sell their goods and services to the growing PPP market. This also requires a policy 
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that would force PPP projects to use SMEs as suppliers of their (PPPs) goods and 
services. 
 
As mentioned in the first chapter, the main objective for using PPPs is to provide 
public infrastructure services to citizens, as many governments around the world 
struggle to provide more and better services due to limited budgets (De Bettignies 
and Ross, 2004:135). Although the lack of public infrastructure to provide public 
services is seen as a problem by many governments, it presents an opportunity for 
the development of a sustainable SMEs sector for both developed and developing 
countries. The bigger the infrastructure backlog, the bigger the opportunity for 
countries to develop a viable SMEs sector that has the potential to create jobs and 
alleviate poverty, while at the same time addressing the challenge of inequality.   
 
The advantages of addressing these triple challenges (unemployment, poverty and 
inequalities) through SMEs compared to large companies is that SMEs create new 
jobs through small investments opportunities that may not be attractive to large 
companies, thus maximising local economic opportunities; SMEs use local raw 
materials that would otherwise be neglected, they offer people with little income and 
little education opportunities to develop and contribute meaningfully to the economy, 
they provide a route through which previously disadvantaged persons can own and 
control a larger percentage of the economy, and more SMEs means more of the 
wealth generated by them stays within the country to be used further to generate 
even more opportunities compared to large firms which normally repatriate their 
profits to their country of origin (Mutsigwa, 2009:81; Fatoki and Odeyemi , 2010:128). 
Compared to larger firms, SMEs tend to use less capital per worker, as most SME 
activities are more labour-intensive compared to big firms. A study in countries such 
as Ghana, Colombia and Malaysia found that small firms have significantly higher 
value added to fixed assets ratio (Hussain, 2000:2).   
 
It is projected that South Africa’s infrastructure may not meet future demand for 
infrastructure needs (NEPAD Business Foundation, 2012). This has already been 
experienced with power supply shortages in 2008. South Africa’s infrastructure 
deficit was estimated at R1,5 trillion in 2012 (NEPAD Business Foundation, 2012). In 
   79 
 
the 2012 budget speech, the Finance Minister, Pravin Gordhan announced that 
R850 billion would be allocated to infrastructure investment over the next two years. 
The projected cost of the South African government’s infrastructure programme over 
the next 30 years is estimated to be R4,3 trillion (Paton, 2013). This backlog cannot 
be automatically converted into opportunities for SMEs and the country as a whole 
without government intervention. The high number of unemployment in the country 
of approximately 24,3% in 2014 (South Africa. Statistics South Africa, 2014a) and 
the high level of poverty, which is estimated to be about 45,5% of the population 
living on less than R620 per month in 2011, and high inequality levels as indicated 
by a Gini-coefficient of 0,65 in 2011, present a big challenge for the country 
(Republic of South Africa. Statistics South Africa. 2014b). The infrastructure backlog 
presents an opportunity for the country to effectively address these triple challenges 
of unemployment, poverty and inequality. What the government needs to do is to find 
a way of changing its infrastructure backlog problems into opportunities for job 
creation and poverty alleviation and developing a policy that will encourage or force 
companies involved in PPP projects to use SMEs as their suppliers of intermediate 
goods and services. 
 
The objective of this chapter is therefore to show how PPPs, especially during both 
construction and operational phases, can be used to develop a sustainable SME 
sector and address the triple problem of unemployment, poverty and inequality. This 
chapter is organised as follows: the second section discusses the role of SMEs in 
economic development. The third section discusses challenges facing the SME 
sector in general and in South Africa, followed by a discussion on the potential role 
that PPP projects may have in developing a sustainable SME sector in Section 4, 
while the fifth section discusses South African government’s initiatives to support 
SMEs.  
 
3.2 The role of SMEs in economic development 
 
Before discussing the role of SMEs in economic development, it is imperative to first 
define SMEs in order to ensure that all readers of this thesis have the same 
definition of SMEs, as the term SMEs is defined differently from jurisdiction to 
another.   
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There is still no universally accepted definition of SME as is the case with the 
definition of PPPs. SMEs differ in their levels of capitalisation, sales/productivity and 
employment. If SMEs were defined based on measures such as number of 
employees, turnover, profitability and net worth, this may lead to firms being 
classified as small, whereas, when the same size definition is applied to a different 
sector it might result in all firms being defined as large. Even though SMEs constitute 
the central pillar of all economies, there is still no single definition in the literature on 
SMEs for which global consensus is assured. Although the South African National 
Small Business Act of 1996, amended in 2003 and 2004 (Republic of South Africa. 
Department of Trade and Industry, 2004), gives an official definition for SMEs in 
South Africa, different agencies and research institutions do not use this definition 
consistently and that makes it difficult to benchmark different studies and data on 
SMEs (Republic of South Africa. National Credit Regulator, 2011:26). The many 
definitions of SMEs are based on many factors, such as the level of industrialisation, 
economic level, technology employed, number of machinery, workbench, size of the 
market, the business line of operation, to mention but a few. The most common 
definition of SMEs is based on the number of employees that a firm may have or the 
turnover that the company generates in a year. 
 
According to the National Small Business Act of 1996, as amended in 2004 
(Republic of South Africa. Department of Trade and Industry, 2004), an SME is 
defined as: 
“... a separate and distinct business entity, including co-operative enterprises 
and nongovernmental organisations, managed by one owner or which, 
including its branches or subsidiaries, if any, is predominantly carried on in 
any sector or sub-sector of the economy mentioned in Column 1 of the 
schedule...”  
  
The National Small Business Act of 1996, as amended in 2004, also distinguishes 
between survivalist, micro, very small, small and medium enterprises; hence the use 
of the word SMMEs. However, the term SMMEs and SMEs are used 
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interchangeably in South Africa. Even for the purpose of this study the two terms are 
used interchangeably. The broad definition of SME in SA is summarised in Table 
3.1. 
 
Table 3.1: Broad definition of SMMEs in the SA National Small Business Act 
Enterprise Number of 
employees 
Annual turnover 
(Rands) 
Gross assets, 
excluding fixed 
property 
Medium Fewer than 100 to 200 
depending on industry 
Between R4 million 
and R50 million 
depending on industry 
Between R2 millin 
andR18 million 
depending on 
industry 
Small Fewer than 50 Between R2 million 
and R25 million 
depending on industry 
Between R2 million 
and R4 million 
depending on 
industry 
Very small Fewer than 10 to 20 
depending on industry 
Between R200 000 and 
R500 000 depending 
on industry 
Between R150 000 
and R500 000 
depending on 
industry 
Micro Fewer than 5 Less than R150 000 Less than R100 000 
Source: Falkena, Abedian, Blottnitz, Coovadia, Davel & Madungandaba (2000). 
 
As mentioned earlier, SMEs face challenges that make them vulnerable and prevent 
them from attaining growth, especially when they have to participate in PPP projects. 
These problems range from lack of human resources development, technological 
capability, access to markets and finance. If left alone SMEs would always find it 
difficult to penetrate local PPP markets. Having defined SMEs, the following 
discussion is on the role of SMEs in economic development.  
 
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are vital for the development of the economy 
of any country, especially in the developing world. SME contribution to economic 
development is through job creation and poverty reduction (Hussain et al., 
2012:1582). They provide the potential for women and other traditionally 
disadvantaged groups to gain access to work under better conditions, to be 
productive, sustainable and have access to quality employment opportunities (Al-
Dairi, McQuaid and Adams, 2012:181). Sometimes it is not feasible for large firms to 
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produce the goods and services they need as inputs in their production process. The 
fact that SMEs manufacture these products makes them vital for any economy, as 
they function as suppliers of intermediate inputs to local firms. It is worth noting that 
SMEs are faced with the need to overcome significant challenges such as access to 
finance, skill development and access to markets; however their strategic importance 
cannot be over emphasised. According to Al-Mubaraki and Aruna (2013:157), the 
following are some of the roles that SMEs play in an economy: (a) they are 
responsible for growing employment at a faster rate than large organisations (b) they 
increase the competitive intensity of the market and reduce the monopolistic 
positions of large organisations; and (c) they encourage the deployment of 
entrepreneurial skills and innovation. SMEs are therefore effective job creators and 
are sources of income for a big proportion of a country’s population. They provide on 
the job training opportunities and important basic services for disadvantaged people 
(UNIDO, 2007). SMEs are a primary vehicle through which new entrepreneurs 
provide economies with a continuous supply of innovative ideas and skills. According 
to Hussain et al. (2012:1581), the main reason why governments worldwide support 
SMEs is because SMEs are believed to be making substantial contributions to 
aggregate economic growth.   
 
The contribution of SMEs to economic growth and development is significant. For 
example, a study by the Economic Survey of Pakistan 2007–2009 found that in 
Pakistan, SMEs account for more than 95% of the total number of businesses, and 
80% of employment outside agriculture. In Bangladesh, SMEs are estimated to 
contribute about 50% of industrial GDP and provide employment to about 82% of 
total industrial sector employment. In Nepal, 98% of industrial establishments are 
SMEs, while in India they contribute 30% of GDP (Hussain et al., 2012:1581). In 
Chile, SMEs contribute about 20% of GDP and about 60% of employment. In 
Malaysia they contribute about 31% to GDP and 58% to employment (Timm, 
2012:2). In Turkey SMEs account for 95,5% of businesses operating in the 
manufacturing sector and provide 66,1% on employment. In Ghana SMEs represent 
about 92% of businesses and contribute about 70% to GDP (Abor and Quartey, 
2010:223). In Malawi they contribute about 38% in employment. In China SMEs are 
responsible for about 60% of China’s output and 75% of employment (Akugri, Bagah 
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& Wulifan, 2015:262). In Africa and Asia (excluding China) SMEs are estimated to be 
responsible for about 90% of both rural and urban enterprises (Akugri et al., 
2015:262).  
 
A regression analysis by Banerjee (2014:8) which used World Bank’s Business 
Environment Survey (WBES) data collected between 1999 and 2000 in advanced 
economies, found that employment growth is around 9% greater for SMEs compared 
to large firms, even after controlling for firm age. The study also found that the 
employment growth for young firms less than five years old was estimated to be 
around 18% higher than that of older firms. Although this last point refers to firm age, 
however, in many cases young firms are more likely to be SMEs. Another study that 
analysed the employment potential of SMEs using Pakistan’s census of 
manufacturing industries data for the fiscal year 2005/2006, was conducted by 
Batool and Zulfiqar (2011:442). The study found that the elasticity of substitution 
between labour and capital was 1,1137, showing that capital and labour are strong 
and very good substitutes in the production process of SME sector in Pakistan, 
meaning that, if the price of capital increases while the price of labour remains 
constant, the quantity of labour will be substituted for capital, and employment may 
be generated by SMEs in Pakistan. Another study by Criscuolo, Gal & Menon 
(2014:40) further supported the above findings about employment creation by small 
firms, analysing data from 18 countries with developed economies covering the 
period 2001–211. The study found that young and small firms created far more jobs 
compared to big and old firms for all 18 countries included in the study. The above 
findings further confirm the employment generation potential of SMEs. 
 
According to available statistics, in South Africa, SMEs contribute between 27% and 
34% of GDP and about 55% of all employment (Timm, 2012:2; Joubert, Schoeman, 
& Blignaut, 1999:26). Table 3.2 shows the contribution of SMEs in the South African 
economy. The table shows that the number of SME establishments is high (99,35%); 
however, their contribution to GDP is low as shown in the table below. The reason 
for their small contribution to GDP may be that most SMEs operate at the survivalist 
and micro level thus their contribution to GDP is small. Linking SMEs to PPPs may 
improve their contribution to GDP and to gross capital formation as this has the 
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potential of moving SMEs from micro level to at least medium size enterprises and 
that can change SMEs investment behaviour to reflect their contribution to GDP. 
 
Table 3.2: Contribution of SMEs in the South African economy8 (2004) 
Contribution to Percentages 
GDP 34 
Employment 54 
Number of firms 99.3 
Falkena, Hawkins, Llewellyn, Luus & Masilela. (2004) 
 
A recent study by Abor and Quartey (2010) estimated that about 91% of formal 
business entities in South Africa are SMEs and these SMEs contribute about 52 to 
57% of GDP and about 61% of employment. As mentioned earlier data on SMEs in 
South Africa is not consistent from one Author to another and that makes it difficult to 
know the exact SME figures in the country.  
 
A First National Bank study on total entrepreneurship activity (TEA) in SA9, showed 
that South Africa’s TEA in 2008 stood at 7,8% compared to Brazil, 12%, India, 
11,5%, Colombia, 24,5%, and Mexico, 13,1% (First National Bank, 2010:6). This is 
an indication that a lot still needs to be done in South Africa to promote 
entrepreneurship. As already alluded, one way of promoting entrepreneurship is 
linking small businesses to PPP projects to provide them with sustainable business 
opportunities. As discussed in the first chapter, SMEs can provide services such as 
cleaning services, facility management, laundry, IT, maintenance, catering and other 
services depending on the nature of the PPP project. In terms of fostering successful 
new businesses, South Africa is far behind a number of countries like Ghana, Brazil, 
Zambia and Chile and ranks 35 out of 54 countries that participated in a Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor survey of 2010 (J.P. Morgan, 2012). Table 3.3 shows 
selected countries' ability to foster successful new businesses. 
                                                          
8
 Statistics on South African SMEs is very old as currently there is no organisation that collects SMEs’ data at 
national level. 
9
 Measured by a Total Entrepreneurship Activity (TEA) index which looks at the percentage of the active 
population, people between 25 and 64 years who are entrepreneurs in a given country. 
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Table 3.3: Ability to foster successful new businesses (2010 figures) 
 South Africa Ghana Zambia Brazil Chile  
Start up 5 11 17 6 11 
New businesses 4 25 17 12 6 
Established 
businesses 
2 25 13 15 6 
Source: J.P Morgan (2010)  
 
Given the fact that South Africa has implemented a number of PPP projects in the 
past decade and that many more PPP projects are still in the pipeline, South Africa 
needs to take advantage of these PPP projects and use them to develop its SMEs 
sector in order to address its triple challenges of unemployment, poverty and 
inequality. SMEs development through PPP projects will not happen without support 
from the public sector and that is why linking PPP projects to SMEs development is 
vital and it needs to be made a government policy. In the absence of a government 
policy that will compel PPP projects firms to use SMEs in providing them with 
intermediate goods and services it will be difficult to achieve a reasonable number of 
SMEs’ participation in PPP projects. The following section discusses common 
challenges faced by the SME sector around the world. 
 
3.3 Challenges facing SMEs  
 
Due to their size SMEs face problems that make them vulnerable to macroeconomic 
changes and prevent them from attaining growth, as many business opportunities 
accrue to big firms, because they enjoy economies of scale and scope. International 
literature identifies lack of; access to finance, human resources, access to markets 
and access to technology as the main constraints that hinder SMEs development in 
many developing countries (OECD, 2006b:4; Ayyagari, Demirgὒҁ-kunt, and Vojislav, 
2008:498; Subrahmanya, 2012:298). If left alone, SMEs will always find it difficult to 
participate effectively in PPP projects. Therefore, using PPPs to support SMEs 
development is imperative, given their potential contribution to economic growth and 
development. Following below is a discussion on the different challenges facing the 
SMEs sector both in developed and developing countries. 
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3.3.1 Lack of finance 
 
The importance of access to finance for SMEs, especially in developing countries 
cannot be over-emphasised. Adequate financing is required to help SMEs set up and 
expand their operations, develop new products and invest in new staff or production 
facilities (OECD, 2006b:4). Finance is needed by SMEs so they can exploit growth 
and investment opportunities and acquire more efficient productive assets. An 
empirical work by Fjose, Grunfeld & Green (2010:20) shows that about 48% of SMEs 
in sub-Saharan Africa identify access to finance as one of the major constraints to 
their expansion. SMEs find it extremely difficult to obtain financing from banks, 
capital markets or suppliers of credit compared to large firms (Hussain et al., 
2012:1583). A number of studies have also found that access to finance is a major 
constrain for the development of the SME sector in many developing countries. Such 
studies include Fjose et al., (2010), Republic of South Africa. The South African 
National Credit Regulator, (2011) and Falkena et al, (2004).   
 
Access to financial institutions is important for SMEs. A survey undertaken on 
financial constraints of the sector in Fiji found that a bank loan was important for 
SMEs. This was confirmed by the number of SMEs that would have loved to take a 
bank loan for business expansion. Of those SMEs interviewed and were without a 
bank loan, 77% indicated that they would borrow from a bank if they could in order to 
expand their operations. However, an adverse perception regarding loan 
requirements, costs structures and lack of collateral appeared to keep them away 
from the banks (Sharma and Gounder, 2012:63; African Development Bank, 2012). 
A study conducted by SEDA on the needs, stage and performance of SMEs in 
agriculture, manufacturing, ICT and tourism in South Africa also confirmed that lack 
of access to finance was one of the main obstacles to SME growth (SEDA, 2012:ii). 
In sub-Saharan Africa this problem is exacerbated by poorly developed financial 
markets. The limited financial resources available to SMEs limit their ability to meet a 
variety of operational and investment needs (AL-Mubaraki and Aruna, 2013:159). A 
study by Ayyagari et al. (2008:498) identified finance as one of the major constraints 
that limit the growth of the SME sector in several countries that participated in the 
survey. This finding is supported by Fatoki and Odeyemi (2010), who posit that, out 
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of 445 SMEs interviewed in South Africa, 406 applied for a bank loan, but only 27% 
were successful. This shows that access to finance is a problem with many SMEs.   
 
3.3.2 Human resources 
 
Human resources consist of education and training provided to employees. 
Educated employees are not only efficient and productive, but are also innovative. 
Human resources are a critical feature in the success of any business (Kumar, 
2012:116). As Lall (1992:177) asserts:  
 
“... technical competence of an industrial workforce is improved by education 
imparted by various formal training systems and by in-firm training”.  
 
SMEs that employ highly skilled employees are likely to be more efficient, as they 
may increase productivity by producing a higher level of output or by producing 
output of greater value (Cooke, 2000:10). The fact that SMEs operate in a constantly 
changing environment due to globalisation requires a workforce that has attained a 
certain level of education (Al-Dairi et al., 2012:182).   
 
A number of studies have recognised the lack of human resources as a major 
constraint in SME development, especially in developing economies (Salleh, 
Kasolang & Jaffar, 2012:2291; SEDA, 2012:iv). Human capital is the main factor that 
affects productivity through the use of technology. For SMEs to effectively use 
technology, they must have skilled employees (Lall, 1992:166). An empirical study 
by Salleh et al. (2012:343) conducted in 2012 on total quality management in 
Malaysia, found that the ability to perform work is supported by training and 
development programmes, job and placement, systematic job development and 
career planning. In many circumstances SMEs do not have the resources to provide 
such skills, as they are operating at a smaller scale compared to big businesses that 
benefit from economies of scale and scope. Another empirical study by Tan and 
Batra (1996:16) of the World Bank, which analysed the relationship between firm 
size and its likelihood to provide training to its employees, found that larger firms are 
more likely to provide training to their employees compared to small businesses. The 
same study also looked at mean years of education of the workforce and the 
   88 
 
proportion of the workforce that is skilled. The results showed that an educated 
workforce is more likely to receive training than a less educated one. This shows the 
difficulties that SMEs are facing in terms of up-skilling their workforce.  
 
The lack of resources by SMEs forces them to employ a less skilled workforce, as 
the educated and highly skilled employees are easily absorbed by big businesses. 
SMEs struggle to incentivise their workforce to go for further training in order to 
improve their workforce skill base and education level. A poorly skilled labour force 
hampers technological diffusion. An empirical work by Lee (2001:127) on developing 
countries between 1990 and 1996 found that human capacity is a critical factor 
necessary for global technologies to be effective as a tool of economic growth in 
developing countries. However, full exploitation of global technologies often requires 
a highly-trained workforce, which is lacking with many SMEs.  
 
The areas in which SMEs lack the required human resources are in terms of their 
knowledge and skills of market analysis, marketing and product innovation, as well 
as business planning and financial management. This calls for governments to 
develop capacity building programmes aimed at improving entrepreneurial and 
business management skills to enhance the effectiveness of SMEs to participate in 
PPP projects (Hussain et al., 2012:1583). However, an empirical study by Heilbrunn, 
Rozens & Vitner (2011:339) conducted in 2006, based on a survey of 248 
businesses, found that efficient SMEs owners did not invest in marketing activities, 
while the less efficient ones did. Their marketing strategies relied on crisis 
management rather than being based on a long-term strategy. Although this finding 
may be true, it is however possible that those efficient SMEs that did not invest in 
skills development may had been in the business for a long time and as a result had 
gained substantive experience about the market within which their businesses 
operate, while the ones that needed training most may be new players in the market. 
 
In order to facilitate the participation of SMEs in PPP projects, human development 
should be an important factor for SMEs, as nowadays PPP projects involve the use 
of advanced technologies with which local SMEs may not be familiar. For SMEs to 
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participate fully in PPP projects they must have the know-how of the latest 
technologies. 
 
3.3.3 Low technological capabilities  
 
Technological capabilities are imperative for SMEs competitiveness. Technological 
innovation is regarded as a tool for strengthening the competitiveness of a nation, as 
it helps in improving productivity (Lee, 2001:115). The increase in the amount of 
goods and services produced can be achieved through the use of new technologies 
that reduce production input costs while increasing output per unit of input employed 
(Tan and Batra, 1996:17). Improving technological capabilities by SMEs can go a 
long way in improving their profits which are imperative for the future expansion of 
any business. Technological capabilities benefit SMEs in several ways, namely by 
enhancing SMEs efficiency, reducing costs, allowing speedy communication with 
customers, eliminating traditional supply constraints, and broadening market reach, 
both locally and internationally (Subrahmanya, 2012:298; Hussain et al., 2012:1583).  
 
The knowledge and capabilities of SMEs to adopt technological innovation is limited 
due to the fact that financial institutions and governments are less supportive to 
SMEs (AL-Mubaraki and Aruna, 2013:156). An empirical work by Pitt and Lee 
(1980:55) showed that larger firms are more efficient than small firms. This is a clear 
indication that, as SMEs are small by nature, they suffer from inefficiencies in their 
production processes and this may limit their potential to make profits. Absence of 
technological capabilities hinders and discourages SMEs from fully grabbing the 
benefits of new technologies, including, among others, lack of knowledge, resources 
and training. Collaboration between SMEs and PPPs can play a critical role in 
addressing these constraints, as technological capabilities can be transferred from a 
PPP’s workforce to SME employees involved in PPP projects. This can happen 
because PPPs can set service standards for SMES. For SMEs to meet these 
standards, they will need to improve their technological know-how. 
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3.3.4 Access to markets 
 
Access to markets by SMEs is one of the major constraints that hinders the 
development of the SME sector in developing countries (Hussain et al., 2012:1584). 
Even if SMEs can have all the right human capital, access to finance and 
technological know-how, they can still fail if they do not have access to markets. 
Large firms and the public sector are reluctant to deal with small businesses that do 
not have a track record of meeting clients’ expectations; as a result SMEs are 
reluctant to participate in public tenders because they are normally unsuccessful. For 
example, a study conducted in 2007 to evaluate SMEs’ access to public 
procurement markets in the European Union, revealed that SMEs, in particular 
micro- and small enterprises, are on average under-represented in public 
procurement. The amount of public contracts awarded to SMEs does not reflect 
SMEs’ overall weight in the EU economies (European Commission. DG Enterprise 
and Industry. 2010).   
 
SMEs are often unable to take advantage of market opportunities that require large 
volumes of production, broad product range and regular supply, because they 
normally produce at a very small scale. For a firm to penetrate a market, it needs to 
have information about the market it wants to penetrate and also marketing skills, 
which are normally lacking with most SMEs (UNIDO, 2007:3). The other challenge 
for SMEs is that, when they try to participate in bigger markets, they get exposed to 
a more complex and risky business environment compared to larger firms. This is 
because SMEs are unprepared and less well-resourced compared to big firms 
(OECD, 2004:7). According to AL-Mubaraki and Aruna (2013:158), as SMEs are 
becoming more and more exposed to international markets, they are faced with 
greater external competition and the need to expand their market share. However, 
their limited international marketing experience, poor quality control and product 
standardisation and little access to international partners continue to impede their 
expansion into international markets. If SMEs were to be given an opportunity to 
work with PPPs, they will gradually improve their efficiencies and develop to bigger 
firms that can effectively compete in both local and international markets.  
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Most of the challenges that are faced by SMEs emanate from the availability of 
infrastructure, macroeconomic conditions and regulatory institutions. These include, 
but are not limited to, competition policy, legislative and regulatory frameworks, 
telecommunication infrastructure, research and education policy. SMEs are not well 
equipped to address these challenges, as most of these challenges are better 
addressed by the state (AL-Mubaraki and Aruna, 2013:157). 
 
The question that one can ask is: Can PPPs address these SMEs challenges 
mentioned above? The answer to this question is that PPPs can address these 
problems but cannot eliminate them completely, as SMEs and government will also 
need to play their respective roles to deal with these problems. However, PPPs have 
the potential to make SMEs attractive to banking institutions and financial markets, 
as PPPs can provide a constant market for the goods and services produced by 
SMEs, thus creating a sustainable revenue stream. PPPs can contribute to 
technological skill transfer to SMEs employees involved in PPP projects. Involving 
SMEs in PPP projects can put SMEs in a better position to expand their operations 
to other sectors of the economy, as they may have the resources required to get 
involved in other ventures.  
 
3.4 The potential role of PPPs in addressing the challenges of SMEs 
 
In general, PPPs represent cooperation between the public and the private sector 
with the intention to develop infrastructure networks and at the same time provide 
public services. As mentioned in Chapter 2, so far there is no agreed upon definition 
for PPPs concerning the SME sector, and research on the involvement of SMEs in 
PPP projects is currently limited, as this area has not been researched in the past. 
However, Hussain et al, (2012:1584) define PPPs for SMEs as: 
 
“... an approach to addressing SME growth problems through the combined 
efforts of public, private, and developmental organisations.’  
 
Hussain et al, (2012) also identify three types of PPPs, namely concession PPPs; 
the contractual PPPs and the institutional PPPs. The concession and contractual 
PPPs are more common in the PPP market. The institutional PPPs are more 
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common within non-governmental organisations (NGO), as these are programme 
types of collaboration between the public and private sectors and NGOs or other 
organisations such as community trusts working together to help SME development.   
 
PPPs can be the main users of goods and services produced by SMEs. As SBP 
(2009) asserts; 
 
“... one of the most obvious and surprising untapped ways that companies can 
support development objectives in countries and communities in which they 
operate is through spreading economic opportunities through a variety of 
small enterprises development, training and business linkage initiative.”   
 
This is the role large PPP projects should play in economies of developing countries. 
PPPs should use SMEs to provide them with the services they need, while at the 
same time supporting SMEs with the necessary skills. Many PPP models for 
developed and developing countries do not mention the use of SMEs as potential 
suppliers of PPP goods and services and they do not embed SMEs into their PPP 
project structure. One of the reasons may be that, SMEs lack the technical, financial 
and technological ability to deliver services required by PPPs, as these services may 
be required at a larger scale. This may be true if the services required by PPPs are 
bundled. In a case where these services are unbundled SMEs have the potential to 
respond to PPPs’ requirements. Another reason could be that involving an SME in a 
PPP is time-consuming and at the end it can increase the PPP project 
implementation costs, as this may involve a complex restructuring of the project.  
 
The problem with involving a lot of stakeholders in a project is that it may complicate 
the allocation of responsibilities such as who does what, what is the role of the state 
officials, what is the role of the SME and what is the role of the private sector partner 
in the PPP (Ansell and Gash, 2007:556). This is one of the risks that the state and 
the private partner may need to manage so that it does not negatively affect the 
private partner involved in a PPP project. 
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In many cases a PPP is only formed by a private firm and the public agency 
responsible for the development of an infrastructure asset. Although the South 
African PPP regulations do not prescribe the size of the private sector partner, in 
most cases if not all, the private partner is one of the big local or international 
construction companies. This model has overlooked the potential that PPP projects 
can have in developing a sustainable SME sector that can create jobs for the 
unemployed and generate income for the poor, while at the same time addressing 
the challenge of infrastructure backlog. The role of PPPs in developing the SME 
sector is also acknowledged by Paolo (1992:232). As Paolo asserts, although having 
SMEs as subcontractors in big PPP projects is understood as an area of potential 
growth for developing countries, there is yet no discussion about SME involvement in 
PPP projects in many countries.  
 
PPPs have the potential to contribute to the development of the SMEs sector. What 
is needed is a policy that will enforce strong partnerships between government, 
PPPs and SMEs to the benefit of all parties. For example, when the expanded public 
work programme (EPWP) started in 2004 its target was to create one million jobs 
and 3000 SMEs by March 2009. The EPWP exceeded its target by creating 1,617 
million jobs, and created 4325 SMEs by the end of March 2009 (Republic of South 
Africa. Department of Public Works, 2009:110). The infrastructure sector exceeded 
its target and achieved 127%. It out-performed all sectors involved in the EPWP 
programme. This is an indication that, if the private sector works together with the 
public sector to create jobs, a lot can be achieved.  
 
However, it is worth noting that creating jobs through infrastructure using SMEs has 
its own challenges. These challenges are due to the fact that jobs created through 
infrastructure projects are short-term in nature, especially during the construction 
phase of the projects. However, during the operational phase of a PPP project, a 
number of jobs remain long-term. The other challenge is that SMEs are more likely 
to utilise labour-extensive production methods and such methods are slow and 
produce poor quality work compared to capital intensive methods used by big firms. 
There is also a high risk of projects captured for patronage purposes, as it was 
detected during the first and second phases of the EPWP. During the 
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implementation of the first two phases of the EPWP, there were accusations that the 
selection of EPWP participants was hijacked by politicians for patronage purposes 
(Republic of South Africa. Department of Public Works. 2014:2). This may happen 
when SMEs are used to create jobs through participating in PPP projects. One may 
find that only SMEs that have a strong link with politicians get opportunities to 
participate in PPP projects. There is also a high possibility of fronting, in the sense 
that big PPP firms may create their own small companies that will participate in PPP 
projects as SMEs. If not addressed properly, this can sabotage the whole idea of 
using PPP projects to develop sustainable SMEs that would create jobs, alleviate 
poverty and reduce inequality. 
 
Most debates in the PPP arena are about finding the best way of using the private 
sector to deliver public infrastructure, but little has been said about using PPPs to 
develop SMEs and create jobs for the poor. This is the missing link that governments 
can use to boost job creation through SME development. The advantages of PPPs 
have been advocated only to be in the transfer of financial and non-financial risks to 
the private party, costs savings, enhanced asset quality and service levels provided 
to the public, freeing up fiscal funds for other areas of public expenditure etc. 
(Republic of South Africa. National Treasury, 2004a:4). The development of the SME 
sector using PPP projects has been ignored by the traditional PPP model followed 
by most developing countries. 
 
As Hussain et al. (2012:1584) assert, PPPs are a source of developing businesses 
in developing countries. They can be used to achieve developing countries’ socio-
economic challenges. This calls for a change in the way developing countries see 
PPP projects. PPPs should be structured in such a way that they benefit (a) the 
public in general through job creation or development of the SMEs sector, (b) the 
public sector through the provision of the required infrastructure and (c) the private 
sector through the continuous business opportunities provided by the long-term 
nature of PPP contracts. Quite often the general public do not feel or think they 
benefit much from PPP projects as the current PPP model tend to favour the private 
sector partner more than the public as a key stakeholder of a PPP project.  
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In order to ensure that PPPs benefit a wider group of beneficiaries, there is therefore 
a need for developing countries to develop their own PPP model that will talk or 
respond to their economic, political and social challenges. The current practice of 
many developing countries is such that they model their PPP projects based on the 
PPPs of developed countries. As mentioned in Chapter 1 the reason for this practice 
is due to the fact that in most cases developing countries structure their PPP projects 
based on PPP models of developed economies. These models fail to take into 
account the socio-economic conditions of developing countries. As mentioned in 
Chapter 1, any PPP model that is to address developing countries’ challenges 
should at least seek to address the triple challenges of developing countries, namely 
unemployment, poverty and inequality.  
 
The question is how can PPPs assist in developing a sustainable SME sector for 
developing countries. This can happen when the public and the private sectors jointly 
bring funding and other resources to implement PPP projects through a Special 
Purpose Vehicle (SPV). The SPV can then contract SMEs to provide it with the 
necessary services required by the PPP projects. In this case the SME is guaranteed 
of a market for its products and a continuous income for the duration of the PPP 
concession. As mentioned in Chapter 1 the current practice in the South African PPP 
market is such that the SPV should meet the country’s BBBEE requirements. 
Although small businesses participation in a PPP project is mentioned in the National 
Treasury PPP Manual, the main emphasis, however, is on black ownership of the 
SPV (Republic of South Africa. National Treasury, 2004a:291). A PPP collaboration 
that brings together the public sector, private sector and the SME sector has a better 
chance of being more effective in fighting poverty, unemployment and inequalities 
which are most worrying challenges of many developing countries. 
 
PPP projects normally involve big international organisations who possess the know-
how of project and business management. SMEs, on the other hand, are small 
business operations with limited resources such as human capital, technological 
know-how and access to finance as mentioned earlier. Linking SMEs with PPP 
projects that involve international organisations can provide other opportunities for 
SMEs, such as technological transfer, better human capital formation, deeper 
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international trade integration, and more competitive local SME firms (Klein and 
Hadjimichael, 2001:2; UNECA, 2009:105). International studies, such as the ones by 
Elibariki (2007:12) and the World Bank (2004) found that organisations that involve 
foreign firms as FDIs have a positive impact on productivity and efficiency, therefore 
on poverty. FDIs do not only bring extra capital but also lead to technological 
transfer, better human capital formation, deeper international trade integration, a 
more competitive business environment and increased tax revenue, to name just a 
few (Klein et al., 2001:2; UNECA, 2009:105). All these add to poverty reduction 
strategies through increased private consumption. 
 
Having discussed the potential role of PPPs in addressing SMEs challenges, the 
following section discusses different South African government initiatives to support 
SME development. 
 
3.5 South African governmental initiatives to support the development of 
SMEs 
The South African government has implemented a number of institutional initiatives 
that are aimed at supporting the development of the SME sector. The government 
established SME support Agencies such as Ntsika, which then became Small 
Business Development Agency (SEDA) and Khula Enterprise Finance to provide 
funding to SMEs. It also created the Apex fund that provides microfinance loans of 
less than R10 000. It passed the Small Business Act in 1996, while the broad-based 
black economic empowerment (BBBEE) codes also stipulates how SMEs should be 
addressed by big companies (SBP, 2009). Other initiatives include the establishment 
of the Umsobovu Youth Fund, which now is part of the Youth Development Fund, 
tasked with promoting job creation, entrepreneurship and skills development for the 
South African youth. The Industrial Development Cooperation (IDC) also provides 
funding to SMEs, although its main focus is developing big industrial projects. All 
these initiatives have not yet yielded the expected national outcome of increasing 
employment and reducing poverty and inequalities. Since they were implemented, 
the country’s SMEs sector’s development is still lagging behind in terms of its 
contribution to GDP and employment compared with the SMEs sectors of other 
developing countries. In South Africa, SMEs contribute between 27% and 34% of 
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GDP and about 55% of all employment, while in other countries like Pakistan, SMEs 
account for more than 95% of the total number of businesses, and 80% of 
employment outside agriculture (Timm, 2012:2). 
 
The main agencies and funds of the South African government supporting SMEs are 
found in five different national departments as listed in Table 3.4 below. The table 
summarises South African policies and institutional frameworks for SME support, 
showing the responsible government department or agency and the mandate of the 
department or agency. The idea of linking SMEs to PPP projects that is being 
advocated in this research study is expected to build on top of these other 
government initiatives, as these initiatives aim to address other SMEs challenges 
that cannot be fully addressed by PPP projects.  
 
Table 3.4: SA Policy and institutional framework for SME support 
Department Agency Mandate  
 
 
Department of Trade and 
Industry 
Small Enterprise 
Development Agency 
(SEDA) 
To support small business 
development 
National Empowerment 
Fund 
To fund black-owned businesses 
and empower both small and big 
businesses 
National Small Business 
Advisory Council 
To advise the Minister on ways to 
boost support for small businesses 
 
 
 
Department of Economic 
Development  
 
 
Khula Finance Limited 
To supply funding to small 
businesses.  
To bridge the funding gap in the 
SME market not addressed by 
commercial financial institutions 
Industrial Development 
Cooperation 
To fund industrial projects, but 
small businesses funding forms a 
bigger part of its mandate. 
SA Micro-finance Apex 
Fund (Samaf) 
To facilitate the provision of 
affordable access to finance by 
micro, small and survivalist 
businesses 
Department of Science and 
Technology  
Technology Innovation 
Agency (TIA) 
To fund innovation for big and small 
businesses 
The Presidency National Youth 
Development Fund 
To assist the youth with career 
skills and to help start their own 
businesses. 
Department of Agriculture  
 
Micro-Agricultural Financial 
Institute of South Africa 
To help the working poor’s ability to 
run existing agriculture businesses, 
to start new ones and be able to 
develop these into fully commercial 
operations. 
Sources: Republic of South Africa. National Credit Regulator (2011)  
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As can be seen from the above table, there is currently no support for SMEs that 
comes from the National Treasury PPP Unit. PPPs have a role to play in supporting 
small business development. The government needs to make it mandatory for PPP 
firms to use SMEs in their projects.  
 
It is worth noting that, although linking SMEs with PPP projects is necessary, it is not 
sufficient for the development of the SME sector. To develop a sustainable SME 
sector requires other interventions, such as the promotion of an entrepreneurship 
culture and the development of social capital and networks, the reduction of red tape 
and the creation of a more enabling environment, including political will to implement 
policy and improve public sector capacity to respond to the need of the SMEs, and 
the reduction of crime and corruption (OECD, 2006b:5). Although a number of 
different interventions have been implemented in South Africa, what may be lacking 
is a cohesive approach to deal with SMEs challenges. 
 
3.6 Chapter summary 
 
The chapter has defined SMEs and discussed the importance of PPPs in developing 
a sustainable SME sector. It discussed the role of the SME sector in an economy 
and the challenges faced by SMEs in developing countries and found that SMEs 
face four main challenges, namely lack of finance, limited human resources, low 
technological capabilities and lack of access to markets. It has found that linking 
SMEs to PPP projects may address some of these challenges to a certain extent, 
especially if SMEs provide services to PPP projects during the operational phase of 
the projects, where the services provided will be required for the duration of the PPP 
project concession. 
 
The chapter also discussed the different South African government’s initiatives to 
support SMEs and found that there are a lot of institutional frameworks that have 
been put in place to support the development of the SME sector. However, what is 
needed is a cohesive approach that links all these initiatives together and ensures 
that they support each other. It has also found that PPPs have not yet been identified 
by the South African government as one of the initiatives that can facilitate SME 
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development. Most of the focus on PPP projects is only on ensuring that they include 
ownership by the previously disadvantaged South Africans. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The objective of the second chapter was to discuss the economics of PPPs by 
focusing on both costs and benefits of the PPP model and also to discuss the 
institutional requirements and the regulatory framework for PPPs, which are 
preconditions for the successful implementation of any PPP programme. The focus 
of Chapter 3 was to show how PPPs/well-functioning PPP programmes can be used 
to develop a sustainable SME sector and contribute towards addressing the 
threefold problem of unemployment, poverty and inequality. Chapter 3 also showed 
that infrastructure backlog should be viewed as opportunities for the development of 
a PPP programme that would facilitate the creation of jobs, reduction of poverty and 
inequality through the development of a sustainable SME sector. The chapter 
reviewed PPP models for SMEs and could not find any PPP model that was aimed 
at developing or enhancing the participation of SMEs in PPP projects; however, it 
identified a number of PPP models meant to develop or provide SMEs with soft 
skills. These PPP models are called institutional PPP models for SMEs development 
(Annexure D). 
 
The objective of this chapter is therefore twofold. The first objective is to define the 
methodology followed for the study. The second objective is to identify the most 
suitable model to be adopted or used for this study. The chapter also discusses the 
survey design and the population and sample used in conducting the study. It further 
discusses the instrument used to collect data, methods implemented to maintain 
validity and reliability of the data collection instrument and the validity of the 
outcomes of the survey itself. The last part provides a ‘theory and practice’ review of 
different constructs on models – specifically searching for a flexible and more 
encompassing type of a model for a PPP environment in developing countries but 
specifically for South Africa.  
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4.2. Theoretical overview of a research framework 
 
A research framework encompasses a number of steps from the choice of the 
research topic and methodology to the analysis of data and interpretation of the 
results. The most important things that a researcher needs to be clear about before 
embarking on the research itself, is the understanding of the theory behind the 
research question and the research methodology to be used to answer the question. 
An appropriate choice of the research methodology or approach has a high 
likelihood of producing a good quality research. The main factors that influence the 
choice of a research methodology is the research question as it determines the 
research approach to be followed (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 1997:860). 
Following below is a discussion on the different components of the research 
framework. 
  
4.2.1 Two types of theorising in research 
 
There are two types of theorising, namely deductive and inductive (Collis and 
Hussey, 2003:15), and they are found within the hypothetico-deductive research 
method. According to Sekaran and Bougie (2010:24), the hypothetico-deductive 
method pursues a step-by-step, logical and rigorous method to find a solution to a 
phenomenon. As Murnane and Willett (2011:15) assert, theory is imperative in 
research in that it guides research by providing guidance about the questions to ask, 
the key constructs to measure and the hypothesised relationships among these 
constructs. According to Sekaran and Bougie (2010:28), the deductive reasoning, 
starts with a general theory and then applies this theory to a specific case. 
Hypothesis testing is deductive in nature because the researcher tests whether a 
general theory is capable of explaining a particular problem. This is in contrast to 
inductive reasoning, in which the researcher observes a specific phenomenon and 
on this basis arrives at a general conclusion. 
 
This research therefore follows the deductive theoretical testing approach, as the 
aim of the study is to develop an innovative PPP model for the development of SMEs 
in South Africa that could be adopted in other developing countries too. The research 
   102 
 
starts with a general theory and then applies this theory to test whether PPP projects 
indeed have the potential to contribute to the development of a sustainable SME 
sector in South Africa.   
 
4.2.2 Research methodologies 
 
Before discussing the different research methodologies, it is imperative to start by 
defining the word “research”. According to Polonsky and Waller (2011:3), research 
is: 
 “... the process of thoroughly examining and analyzing the situational factors 
 surrounding a given problem in order to seek out a solution or alternative 
 solutions to it.”   
 
This definition is supported by Mahlangu (1987:3), who defines a research 
methodology as the study of the logic or rationale underlying the implementation of 
the scientific approach to the study of reality. A research methodology tells us how 
we know what we know other than telling us what we know. 
 
There are mainly two main types of research methodologies, namely quantitative 
and qualitative methods. Both methods have advantages and disadvantages as they 
have trade-offs between breadth and depth, and between generalisability and 
targeting a specific population. Born out of these two research methodologies is the 
mixed-research method, which combines both the quantitative and the qualitative 
methods in a single study. Below is a brief discussion of these three methods and 
showing how and when they are applied in research in general, with the aim of 
eventually choosing one method to be followed in conducting the research for this 
study. 
 
4.2.2.1 The quantitative method 
 
Quantitative research is defined as a formal, objective, systematic process to 
describe and test relationships and examine cause and effect interactions among 
variables. The distinguishing feature of a quantitative research is the collection of 
numerical data that can be subjected to statistical analysis. This data may be 
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collected through surveys (for primary data) or by using historical data kept in a 
database (for secondary data) (Jonassen, 2001:18; Walker, 2005:572). Data such as 
sample surveys, collected through the quantitative method, are believed to yield 
representative and broadly generalisable information about a certain phenomenon of 
interest (National Science Foundation, 2002:43). As Sale, Lohfeld & Brazil (2002:43) 
assert, the quantitative approach or paradigm is based on positivism in that it 
assumes all phenomena can be reduced to empirical indicators which represent the 
truth. It further assumes that there is only one truth, an objective reality that exists 
independent of human perception. It is based on the belief that the investigator and 
the investigated are separate independent entities, such that the investigator can 
study a phenomenon without influencing it or being influenced by it. This approach is 
dependent on using large sample sizes compared to the qualitative method to 
ensure that samples are representatives of the target population (Sale et al., 
2002:43). Information collected through the quantitative method is believed to yield 
more objective and accurate results because it is normally collected using 
standardised methods of data collection which can be replicated and analysed using 
sophisticated statistical techniques (National Science Foundation, 2002:43).   
 
4.2.2.2 The qualitative method 
 
On the other hand, information collected using qualitative methods such as group 
interviews collected from small groups may provide many more clues about the 
differences in the characteristics of the target population. The disadvantage with this 
method is that it is limited in the extent to which findings can be generalised beyond 
the specific individuals included in the group, (National Science Foundation, 
2002:43). In short, qualitative methods are most suitable for formative evaluation, 
whereas summative evaluation requires hard data in the form of numbers. It is worth 
noting that sometimes the use of both the quantitative and the qualitative 
approaches is important in better understanding a phenomenon (Warren and Karner, 
2010:5). Some researchers view qualitative research results as less reliable than 
those based on quantitative research. By the same token qualitative researchers 
believe that figures do not offer enough insight into the issues at hand, because the 
figures cannot reveal the information underlying them (Verhoeven, 2011:30). This 
shows that there is no research method that is superior to any other; hence the 
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combination of both approaches may yield better results than relying too much on 
just one approach.  
 
The latest development in research is the use of mixed methods that combines both 
the qualitative and the quantitative method in one study (Sale et al. 
2002:43;Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998:3). Below is a discussion of the mixed-
method research. 
 
4.2.2.3 Mixed-method research 
 
The mixed-method research, which combines both the quantitative and the 
qualitative method in a single study is widely practiced and accepted in many areas 
of research. As stated in Sale et al. (2002:43), the arguments for using the mixed 
method in a single study are based on the understanding that (i) the two methods 
can be combined because they share the same goal of understanding the world in 
which we live, (ii) they share commitment to understanding and improving human 
conditions, a common goal of disseminating knowledge for practical use, and a 
commitment for rigor, conscientiousness, and critique in the research process, (iii) 
because in some areas the complexity of a phenomenon requires data from a large 
number of perspectives, and (iv) researchers should not be pre-occupied with the 
quantitative-qualitative debate because it will not be resolved in the near future and 
epistemological purity does not get research done. 
 
There are those who argue against using mixed methods in a single study; the 
argument is based on the paradigmatic assumptions of the two methods, which 
indicate that the two methods do not study the same phenomena. Their argument is 
that quantitative methods cannot assess some of the phenomena that a researcher 
may be interested in, such as lived experiences as a patient, social interactions, and 
the patients' perspective of doctor-patient interactions (Sale et al., 2002:43). It is 
further argued that some of these phenomena cannot be fully quantified and reduced 
to statistical indicators. Sale et al. (2002:43) further assert that “the investigator and 
the object of study are interlinked so that findings are mutually created within the 
context of the significance of the situation which shapes the inquiry”. What this says 
is that combining the two methods can yield some benefits to the researcher, 
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provided the research question being answered warrants the use of both qualitative 
and quantitative approaches.  
 
The three methods discussed above can be affected by at least four factors, namely 
credibility of findings, staff skills, costs and time constraints associated with data 
collection (National Science Foundation (2002:43).   
 
According to Leedy and Ormrod (2005:106), the following criteria as summarised in 
Table 4.1 should be used to select the appropriate research approach to be followed 
for a particular study.   
 
Table 4.1: Criteria for selecting quantitative or qualitative approach  
Use this approach If Quantitative Qualitative Choice for this 
study 
You believe that there is an objective 
reality that can be 
measured 
there are multiple 
objective realities 
constructed by 
different individuals 
Qualitative  
Your audience is familiar or supportive of 
quantitative studies 
familiar or supportive 
of qualitative studies 
Both 
Your research 
question is 
confirmatory or 
predictive 
exploratory or 
interpretive 
Qualitative 
The available literature 
is 
relatively large limited  Both 
Your research focus  covers a lot of depth involve in-depth study Qualitative  
The time available is relatively short relatively long  
Your ability or desire 
to work with people is 
medium to low High Both 
Your desire for 
structure is 
High Low Both 
You have skills in the 
area of 
deductive reasoning and 
statistics 
inductive reasoning 
and attention to 
details 
 Both 
Your writing skills are 
strong in the area of  
technical, scientific 
writing 
literary, narrative 
writing 
Both 
Source: Leedy and Ormrod (2005:106) 
 
Based on the information contained in the last column of the table above, the 
research approach adopted for this study is biased towards the mixed-method 
approach. This is because out of the nine cases, only three are qualitative. The rest 
of the choices can either be qualitative or quantitative. Secondly, if one reviews the 
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research problem and questions as stated in Chapter 1 and compare them to the 
criteria in Table 4.1 above, it is clear that the study focuses on the exploratory and 
descriptive roles that SMEs can play in PPP projects. The research question and the 
sub-questions focus on the ‘what’ and ‘how’ the meaningful participation of SMEs in 
PPP projects can be improved in order for the country to receive the full benefits 
PPP projects can offer. Based on the information contained in Table 4.2, it is clear 
that this research is geared towards both inductive reasoning with a lot of attention to 
details and deductive reasoning with the use of quantitative information. The 
deciding factor in this case is availability of literature on the study topic. As 
established in the literature review there is limited literature on the participation of 
SMEs in PPP projects. However, there is relatively large literature on PPP projects 
and SMEs in general. Based on these characteristics of the study, it is clear that it 
lands itself very well to the mixed-method research. 
 
4.3 The research approach and design for the study 
 
The approach followed in this study is the mixed research approach as just 
discussed above. Unlike the quantitative approach, which requires a large data set 
collected from a large sample, the qualitative approach does not require a large 
amount of data to have meaningful research results, (Choy, 2014:102). The mixed 
method is capable of balancing the requirements of both the quantitative and the 
qualitative approaches and produce meaningful results. A population of 29 PPP 
projects was not large enough to warrant a quantitative research approach, and the 
available literature on the role of PPP projects in developing an SME sector is also 
limited. However, there is enough literature on PPP projects and SMEs in general 
and the research is based mainly on a survey with a number of open-ended 
questions and that makes the research approach followed for this study to be a 
mixed method. 
 
Data for the study was collected through a survey of PPP-operating companies (PPP 
firms or the private partners), SMEs supplying services to PPP projects and 
government departments or agencies responsible for the PPP projects included in 
the research sample. Some secondary data on the growth and employment of SMEs 
was collected from the Construction Industry Development Board (CIDB), PPP Unit 
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within the National Treasury and SBP case studies on South African SMEs. The 
data-collection method employed for this study is a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative data-collection approaches. Employing both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches for data collection for a mixed-method research study is supported by a 
number of researchers, as they argue that “there is now virtually no major problem 
area that is studied exclusively within one research method as most major areas of 
research in the social and behavioural sciences now use multiple methods as a 
matter of course” (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998:5). The reason for adopting this 
approach of data collection was that the targeted respondents were vastly spread 
across the country, which made conducting face-to-face interviews with some of 
them difficult or even impossible, given the amount of time and travelling would had 
been required to reach all the targeted respondents. As a result, a survey was used 
with a number of open-ended questions as part of the survey instrument to collect 
primary data from the target population. A survey obtains information from a sample 
of people by means of self-report, that is, the people respond to a series of questions 
posed by the investigator or the researcher (Polit and Hungler, 1993:148). The target 
population comprised of companies operating PPP projects, SMEs and government 
departments and agencies administering PPP projects. Information was mainly 
collected through a questionnaire (see Annexure B) distributed electronically to the 
subjects via a computer assisted-questionnaire by the researcher. This was done to 
minimise the costs associated with data collection and also to improve the response 
rate given the fact that the target subjects were distributed all over the country. Some 
information was collected through face-to-face interviews and some through 
telephonic interviews. 
 
According to Sekaran and Bougie (2010:103), there are two basic purposes of 
research, namely, exploratory and descriptive. Exploratory research is undertaken 
when not much is known about a phenomenon and more information is needed to 
develop a viable theoretical framework at a later stage. Descriptive research is 
undertaken in order to ascertain and be able to describe the characteristics of the 
variable of interest in a situation. A descriptive research provides an accurate 
portrayal or account of the characteristics, for example behaviour, opinions, beliefs, 
and knowledge of a particular individual, situation or group, as it is aimed at 
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discovering new meanings, describing what exists, determining the frequency with 
which something occurs and categorising information according to the researcher's 
interest (Walker, 2005:572).    
 
For the purpose of this study, both descriptive and exploratory research methods 
were used because it was able to provide answers to the main research question 
which is "How can the South African government use PPP projects to develop its 
SME sector to create jobs and alleviate poverty?” The study is both descriptive and 
exploratory in the sense that not much is known about the participation of SMEs in 
PPP projects and their contribution to job creation. 
 
4.4 Research question 
 
The focus of this study is on sustainable development of the SME sector in South 
Africa through the use of PPP projects and the important role that SMEs play in the 
economy. This research therefore seeks to find an innovative conceptual PPP model 
that has a potential to support the development of the SME sector in South Africa. 
 
4.4.1 Main research question and propositions 
 
As discussed in Section 1.12 of Chapter 1, the main research question that this 
study seeks to answer is: “How can the South African government use PPP projects 
to develop its SME sector?” Hence the main research sub-questions (MRQs) are: 
 
MRQI:  How have PPP projects in the country helped SME development? 
MRQII: What are the problems or challenges faced by PPP project firms when 
using SMEs to supply services? 
MRQIII: How can the involvement of SMEs be increased in PPP projects? 
MRQIV: Does an appropriate PPP model for increasing the participation of SMEs in 
PPP projects exist that will respond to the South African economic 
challenges? 
 
The above research sub-questions take us to the research propositions. Below is a 
presentation of the research propositions for this study.  
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4.4.2 The research propositions  
 
A research proposition is a single potentially testable theory. Building on the main 
and sub-research questions above, the research seeks to prove or disprove the 
following research propositions: 
 
 Proposition one (P 1): Contracting SMEs to provide certain services to PPP 
firms has contributed to the development of SMEs in the country. 
 
 Proposition two (P 2): PPP firms face different problems when using SMEs 
to supply goods and services, and lack of skills is the root cause of most of 
the problems. 
 
 Proposition three (P 3): There are a number of ways in which the 
involvement of SMEs in PPP projects can be enhanced. 
 
 Proposition four (P 4): There is an appropriate model for sustainable SMEs 
development that can respond to the South African economic challenges.  
 
4.5 Research setting 
 
The study covered all PPP projects operating within the country. The respondents 
were divided into three categories, namely those involved with the PPP projects from 
the government side, those that supplied services to PPP projects (SMEs) and those 
involved with PPP projects from the private sector side (PPP-operating companies or 
PPP firms which were responsible for the implementation and operation of the PPP 
projects). Hypothetically, the expected number of respondents would equal the total 
number of PPP projects multiplied by two if only two respondents were to be 
targeted per each PPP project, plus the number of SMEs involved in PPPs. This is 
based on the assumption that the number of PPP-operating companies equals the 
number of the PPP projects, which equals the number of government departments 
responsible for the projects. However, this was not the case, given the fact that in 
some instances one PPP company managed and operated more than one PPP 
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project. The same applied to government departments or agencies. The government 
departments or agencies and SMEs were also included in the sample because the 
researcher needed to get their perspective on the participation of SMEs in PPP 
projects. 
 
The government agencies included the National Treasury PPP Unit, which facilitates 
the development of the South African PPP market and SANRAL and other 
government departments responsible for PPP projects. 
 
4.6 The study population and the sampling criteria  
 
This section discusses the study population and sampling criteria used to select the 
population from which the sample was drawn. It also discusses the sampling 
technique used to drawn the final sample for the study. 
 
4.6.1 The sampling criteria 
 
Subjects included in the sample were selected to meet specific criteria. The PPP 
projects targeted to be part of the sample had to meet the following criteria: 
 must be an economic infrastructure PPP project as defined in Chapter 2, 
 the contract duration of the project must be not less than ten years, 
 the PPP project should have reached financial closure, 
 the PPP project should have been operating for at least a year, 
 
The reason for using the above selection of criteria is the fact that PPP projects that 
have a potential to create jobs through SMEs are infrastructure PPPs that operate 
for more than ten years continuously providing employment to different individuals. In 
order to receive meaningful information about the participation of SMEs in PPP 
projects, the PPP projects must have operated at least a year. This is important, 
because any PPP project that had not operated for at least a year might not have 
experienced enough challenges related to operating a PPP project, and that would 
had compromised the quality of data collected to be used in this study. The same 
applies to a PPP project that had not reached financial closure, data collected from 
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such a project would had lacked the required experience of using SMEs in PPP 
projects. 
 
The government departments or agencies had to meet the following criteria to be 
included in the sample. 
 
They should have been: 
 administering at least one PPP project that was under operation for at least a 
year, 
 involved in PPP projects in different capacities; e.g. facilitating the development of 
the PPP market or a public partner in the PPP project.  
 
The SMEs had to meet the following criteria: 
 should have been supplying goods or services to a PPP project. Only SMEs 
supplying services to PPP projects that had experience of the challenges faced 
when dealing with PPPs; and, 
 should have supplied PPP projects with services during the construction phase of 
the PPP. 
 
4.6.2 The study population and sampling technique 
 
According to Burns and Grove (1993:779), a population is defined as all elements 
(individuals, objects and events) that meet the sample criteria for inclusion in a study. 
The population for this study consisted of all PPP projects, from the first PPP project 
in South Africa to the last PPP project that has been in operation for at least a year. 
These PPP projects covered different sectors of the economy. 
 
According to the PPP unit, there were 22 PPP projects that had reached financial 
closure and were in operational phase during the course of the study. However, this 
figure excluded all transport (highways), water and prison PPP projects, as these 
projects were procured and managed by other government departments and 
agencies. For example, roads PPPs are procured by SANRAL, while prison PPPs 
are procured and monitored by the Department of Correctional Services. According 
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to the department of Correctional Services there are only two prison PPPs in the 
country, while, according to SANRAL, there are only three road concessions (PPPs: 
N1, N3 and N4) that fall under its ambit. However, SANRAL also manages other 
roads projects, referred to as hybrid PPPs, which are also covered by the study. The 
researcher is aware of only two water PPPs that were operating during the course of 
this study. There are other PPP projects that are not concessions. For the purpose of 
this study, these PPP projects are referred to as hybrid PPP projects. They are 
hybrid in the sense that their procurement and financing is done by the public agent 
who raises money from the capital markets. Once the project has been completed, it 
is then handed over to a private party to operate and maintain for a specified period 
of time. These types of PPPs have become popular in the South African PPP 
market, especially with roads PPPs. 
 
Through research of related literature, the researcher identified seven more PPP 
projects, which brought the total number of PPP projects operating during the course 
of this study to 29 projects. Some of the projects did not qualify to be included in the 
sample because they did not meet all the conditions stated above. After applying the 
sampling criteria, only a total of 21 (N) PPP projects cutting across different 
economic sectors were considered for the study. It is worth noting that there may be 
other PPP projects that were in operation during the course of this study of which the 
researcher was unaware of due to the fact that not all PPP projects were registered 
with or included in the National Treasury's database for PPPs.   
 
From the 21 PPP projects constituting the target population (N), a stratified random 
sampling approach was conducted. According to Sekaran and Bougie (2010:267), a 
stratified random sampling" 
 
 “... involves a process of stratification or segregation, followed by random 
 selection of subjects from each stratum.”  
 
A stratum is a group of mutually exclusive groups of subjects that are relevant, 
appropriate and meaningful in the context of the study. In a stratum, subjects are 
grouped according to certain characteristics (Vogt, Gardner & Haeffele, 2012:125). 
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In this case, the PPP projects were grouped according to economic sectors. This 
sample approach was necessary to ensure that all sectors covered by the PPP 
projects were included in the final sample. Mouton (1996:132) defines a sample as 
elements selected with the intention of finding out something about the total 
population from which they are taken. 
 
Therefore, six stratified samples were created from the target population of 21 PPP 
projects. These six strata were equal to the number of sectors in which the PPP 
projects operated. The 21 projects fell under the management of 18 PPP private 
sector operating companies and under the supervision of 14 different government 
departments and agencies. Table 4.2 below shows the number of PPP projects per 
sector and the number of private companies operating the PPP projects and the 
government departments or agencies responsible for the projects. 
 
A target of three projects was randomly selected from each stratum using simple 
random selection, especially those that had at least more than three projects in 
them. For those stratums which had only one, two or three projects in them, all the 
projects were included in the sample. Therefore, a total of 14 projects constituted the 
project sample size (n) for the study (see Table 4.2 below). The reason for sampling 
three projects from each stratum was to allow a good representation of each sector 
in the sample and avoid a situation whereby the majority of the projects come from 
one sector and find that other sectors are under or not represented at all.  
 
The reason for having fewer governments departments or agencies and PPP-
operating companies than the number of PPP projects is because some PPP-
operating companies and government departments or agencies operated and or 
managed more than one PPP project. 
 
In order to get a balanced view on the participation of SMEs in PPP projects, three 
individuals per PPP project were approached to answer the questionnaire. The 
targeted individuals played different roles in the operation of the PPP projects. Their 
selection was based on the management structure of the project as per each 
project's governance structure. This made the number of expected respondents from 
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the private sector companies operating the PPP projects to be 42. Initially, the study 
targeted to collect data only from the public sector and the PPP firms and later 
expanded the targets to also include SMEs. Below is a table showing the population, 
the sample used to collect data from the public and the private sector side of PPP 
projects. 
 
Table 4.2: PPP projects by sector, private operator and government 
department  
Sector Number 
of 
projects 
Number of 
private 
companies 
operating the 
PPP projects 
Number of 
government 
departments or 
agencies 
responsible for 
PPP projects 
Number 
of 
projects 
included 
in the 
sample 
Number of 
private 
companies  
Respondents 
targeted 
Number of 
government 
targeted 
respondents  
Transport 
(road and 
rail) 
5 5 2 3 3 2 
Nature 
conservatio
n 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
Water 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Prison 2 2 1 2 2 1 
Hospital 7 4 4 3 3 3 
Office 
accommoda
tion 
4 4 4 3 3 3 
Total 21 18 14 14 14x3=42 12 
Source: Compiled from different sources and Author’s analysis.  
 
As shown in the above table, the PPP projects population consisted of 21 projects 
(N) and a sample of 14 PPP projects (n) was drawn from the population. It can also 
be seen that these 14 PPP projects that made up the sample (n), were managed by 
14 PPP private companies (m1) and 12 government departments or agencies (m2). 
 
Therefore, N = 21, n = 14, m1 = 42, m2 = 12 and, Where: N = population size, n = 
sample size (number of projects), m1= number of expected respondents from the 
private companies operating the PPP projects, m2 = number of expected 
respondents from the government departments responsible for the well-functioning 
of the PPP projects. 
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The total number of respondents coming from both the private and the public sectors 
involved in the PPP projects were 54= 42+12 + 14 (m1 + m2). Therefore, a total of 54 
questionnaires were sent to these target subjects. The sample size of 14 operational 
PPP projects, 42 private sector individuals involved in PPP operation, and 12 
government officials were the total number of private sector and public sector 
subjects who met the sampling criteria during the period of data collection which took 
place from 27 February 2015 to 15 April 2015. In addition to the data collected 
through the survey, a complementary questionnaire was also developed to collect 
information from SMEs and from specific public sector organisations involved in PPP 
projects. This was done in order to enhance the quality of data to be used to analyse 
current practice in using SMEs by PPP project companies. This data was collected 
from 18 April 2015 to 30 April 2015 (see Annexure C for the second questionnaire). 
The second survey was aimed at collecting information from five public-sector 
managers responsible for PPP projects and at least 12 SMEs which were providing 
services to PPP projects. The five public sector personnel members were targeted 
because, during the first survey the researcher received few responses from the 
public sector and the five organisations targeted in the second survey did not 
respond to the initial questionnaire; these were the organisations which were 
responsible for major PPP projects in the country. The target was to collect data from 
at least two SMEs from each PPP sector. The number of SME responses was 13; 
however, there were some SMEs from other sectors that did not respond to the 
questionnaire, due to confidentiality concerns about their information. These sectors 
are conservation and water. SMEs from some sectors gave more than two 
responses, thus the total number of SMEs responded to the questionnaire was 13.  
 
4.7 Data-collection techniques 
 
The focus of this section is on discussing and comparing the most commonly used 
quantitative and qualitative data collection techniques in research, namely; surveys, 
in-depth interviews, focus groups, observations and tests, to name just the main 
ones. It also gives their respective advantages and disadvantages and a choice of 
data collection technique for this study is also made. Below is a brief discussion of 
each of the methodologies. 
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Surveys: Surveys are more popular form of data collection, especially when 
collecting data from a large population. They consist of two components, namely 
questions and responses. The questions are written in a questionnaire which is used 
as a tool to collect the required information, which can either be mailed to the 
respondents or collected through face-to-face interviews with the investigator 
(National Science Foundation, 2002:49).   
 
Interviews: Interviews can either be face-to-face or telephone interviews. They are 
used when interpersonal contact is important and when opportunities for follow-up of 
interesting comments are desired (Sekaran and Bougie, 2010:193). Interviews are 
mainly used under the assumption that the participants’ perspectives are meaningful, 
knowledgeable, and can be made explicit, and that their perspectives affect the 
success of the investigation (National Science Foundation, 2002:49). 
 
Case studies: Case studies are largely descriptive examinations, usually of a small 
number of the target population. Case studies may involve searching available 
documents, holding formal and informal conversation with informants, observe on-
going activities, and develop an analysis of both individual and cross-case findings 
According to Eriksson and Kovalainen (2011:117) and Stake (2006:vi), case studies 
are aimed at accommodating diversity and complexity and therefore avoid overly 
simplistic research designs.  
 
Focus groups: Focus groups combine elements of both interviewing and participant 
observation. Focus groups are gatherings of 8 to 12 people who share some 
characteristics relevant to the matter being investigated. The purpose is to capitalise 
on individuals’ dynamics and allow discussions and comments, from personal 
experience on the topic that is the subject of the research (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 
2011:172).   
 
Observations: Data collected through observational techniques are first-hand data 
on behaviours being studied. The technique provides researchers with an 
opportunity to collect data on a wide range of behaviours, to capture a great variety 
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of interactions and to openly explore the subject matter in depth (National Science 
Foundation, 2002:49). 
 
Tests: Tests are normally used in educational research to provide a way to assess 
subjects’ knowledge and capacity to apply this knowledge to a new situation. Tests 
provide information on how the target performs against a reference group or 
normative population. Other tests aim at determining whether or not the target has 
attained mastery of a skill or knowledge area (National Science Foundation, 
2002:55).  
 
Table 4.3 gives both advantages and disadvantages of the different data-collection 
techniques discussed above. 
Table 4.3: Pros and cons of different data-collection techniques  
Techniques Advantages Disadvantages 
 
Surveys good for gathering descriptive data, can 
cover a wide range of topics, are 
relatively inexpensive, can be analysed 
using a variety of existing software 
Self-report may lead to biased 
reporting, data may provide a general 
picture but lack depth; may not 
provide adequate information on 
context. 
Interviews usually yield richer data, permit face-to-
face contact with the respondent, 
provide opportunity to explore questions 
in depth, allow interviewer to experience 
the affective as well as cognitive 
aspects of responses, allow interviewer 
to be flexible in administering interview 
to particular individuals or in particular 
circumstances. 
expensive and time-consuming, need 
well-qualified, highly trained 
interviews, respondents may distort 
information through recall error, 
selective perceptions, desire to 
please interviewer, flexibility can 
result in inconsistencies across 
interviews, volume of information very 
large, and may be difficult to 
transcribe and reduce to meaningful 
information. 
Case studies provide a rich picture of what is 
happening, as seen through the eyes of 
many individuals, allow a thorough 
exploration of interactions between 
treatment and contextual factors, can 
help explain changes or facilitating 
factors that might otherwise not emerge 
from the data collected. 
require a sophisticated and well-
trained data collection and reporting 
team, can be costly in terms of the 
demands on time and resources, 
individual cases may be over-
interpreted or over-generalised. 
Focus group provide richer response or new and 
valuable thoughts, depth of individual 
responses, an acceptable number of 
target respondents can be assembled in 
one location, quick way of collecting 
information 
the volume of issues to cover is not 
extensive, need highly skilled staff to 
control and manage groups, a single 
subject area is being examined in 
depth and strings of behaviours are 
less relevant 
Observations provide direct information about 
behaviour of individuals and groups, 
allows evaluator to enter into and 
expensive and time consuming, need 
well qualified, highly trained 
observers or experts, may affect 
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understand situation/context, provide 
good opportunities for identifying 
unanticipated outcomes, exist in natural, 
unstructured, and flexible setting. 
behaviour of participants, selective 
perception of observer may distort 
data, behaviours observed may be 
atypical. 
Tests provide objective information on what 
the test taker knows and can do, can be 
constructed to match a given 
circumstance, can be scored in a 
straightforward way, are accepted by 
the public as a credible indicator 
may be over-simplified, may be very 
time-consuming, may be biased 
against some groups of test takers, 
may be subject to corruption via 
coaching or cheating  
Source: National Science Foundation (2002:49) and Sekaran and Bougie (2010:187). 
 
These data-collection methods or techniques can be applied either in quantitative or 
qualitative research. However, most of them are mostly used in qualitative research, 
except the survey approach, which is used mainly in a quantitative or descriptive 
research method. However, this does not mean that the survey approach cannot be 
applied to a qualitative research approach method as is the case in this study.  
 
4.8 Data-collection method and procedure used for the study 
 
Generalisation about a population from data collected using any sample is based on 
probability. The larger the sample size, the lower the likelihood of error of 
generalising findings to the larger population. Therefore, the final sample size is a 
matter of judgement rather than calculation (Saunders Lewis and Thornhill, 
1997:127). As a rule of thumb, a sample size of 30 is considered a minimum for 
statistical analyses, provided a random sample technique is applied in the sampling 
process (Saunders et al., 1997:128). If the population is less than 30 and you wish to 
undertake a detailed statistical analysis, one should collect data from all members of 
that population.  
 
Following is a discussion on the data-collection method and procedure followed for 
this study and a discussion on the questionnaire design and the type of information 
collected through the questionnaire. 
 
4.8.1 Data-collection method and procedure 
 
As discussed earlier, the study was based on primary data collected from officials 
working for government departments or agencies, SMEs and officials working for 
PPP-operating companies included in the research sample using a questionnaire. 
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There are, in fact, two types of data, namely primary and secondary data. Sekaran 
and Bougie (2010:185) refer to primary data as information obtained first-hand by the 
researcher on the variables of interest for the specific purpose of the study and to 
secondary data, as data gathered from sources that already exist.   
 
One form of a data-collection instrument was used for this study, namely a 
questionnaire. According to Sekaran and Bougie (2010:197), a questionnaire is a: 
 
 "... reformulated written set of questions to which respondents record their 
 answers, usually within rather closely defined alternatives.”   
 
A questionnaire can be administered personally, mailed to the respondents or 
electronically distributed. The advantage of a personally administered (face-to-face) 
questionnaire is that the researcher can collect all the complicated responses within 
a short space of time as he/she can explain complicated questions to the 
respondents. Although personal interviews (face-to-face interviews) offer the 
opportunity to use multiple methods of data collection, such as observations and 
visual cues (Fowler, 1993), they require more persons’ time and travel, and that may 
make it more costly compared to mailed/electronic questionnaires. In addition, 
certain populations are more difficult to reach due to physical factors and other 
constraints (Fowler, 1993). For the purpose of this study, a mailed questionnaire was 
used. The advantage with mailed or emailed questionnaires is that it can reach or 
cover a wide geographical area in the survey which addresses one of the challenges 
of this study's. One disadvantage with mailed/emailed questionnaire is that any 
doubt that may be encountered by respondents may be difficult to clarify within a 
short space of time. In this case valuable information may be lost, as answers may 
be too brief (Saunders et al., 1997:245; Burns and Grove, 1993:370). When 
collecting data using mailed/emailed questionnaires, a 30% response rate is 
normally considered acceptable (Sekaran and Bougie 2010:197). However, the 
response rate can be improved by notifying the potential respondents in advance 
about the questionnaire or survey to take place. 
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In this study, the potential respondents were notified in advance during a telephonic 
discussion with the target organisations. The discussion was about identifying the 
relevant persons within each of these organisations that could answer the 
questionnaire. During this consultation process, the researcher discussed the study 
objectives with the potential respondents, notifying them that a questionnaire would 
be sent to them immediately to gather information on the potential role that can be 
played by SMEs in PPP projects. This process was also followed for the 
supplementary questionnaire. 
 
Although face-to-face interviews produce a better return rate than mailed 
questionnaires, nonetheless face-to-face interviews were not suitable for this study, 
given the geographical location factors of the subjects. It would have been difficult 
and costly to reach all the targeted subjects, in view of the fact that the study 
covered all PPP projects in the country. The concern of using mailed questionnaires 
to collect data was also mitigated by the fact that most of the questions in the 
questionnaire were closed-ended questions, as respondents were asked to select 
from a range of predetermined answers, and that reduced the possibility of 
respondents giving brief answers.   
 
The questions in the questionnaire were divided into close-ended and open-ended 
questions. Open-ended questions do not suggest answers to the respondent as they 
call for the respondent's free response in his/her own words. In closed-ended 
questions a list of suggested or possible responses is provided. In these types of 
questions the researcher must make provision for responses which might not be 
anticipated. Closed-ended questions are easy to fill, take little time, keep the 
respondent on the subject, are relatively objective and easy to tabulate (Burns and 
Grove, 1993:370; Mahlangu, 1987:79). The first questionnaire of this study included 
mainly close-ended questions and only four open-ended questions. In the open-
ended questions the respondents were required to respond in greater detail giving 
their opinions about their understanding of the subject matter, whereas in the closed-
ended questions respondents had options which were determined by the researcher. 
However, in the supplementary questionnaire (second questionnaire) all questions 
were open-ended questions (see Annexure C). This was done in order to get more 
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information on specific issues affecting SMEs in PPP projects to close the 
information gap identified in the first questionnaire.  
  
4.8.2 The design of the measuring instrument 
 
This section describes the design of the measurement instrument, which is the 
questionnaire. Researchers have highlighted important attributes that a measuring 
instrument should have, including showing clearly what it seeks to obtain from 
respondents, how it should be structured and how the flow of questions should be 
maintained. Proctor (2000) noted that generally measuring questions seek to obtain 
the following information: (i) facts and knowledge represented by beliefs and 
perceptions, (ii) opinions about an object of study and its properties, (iii) motive of 
e.g. action, behaviour or choice, and (iv) past and future behaviour, decisions or 
actions. When constructing a questionnaire, Saunders et al. (1997:263) emphasise 
the importance of ensuring that the flow and order of the questions is properly 
considered and that they should be logical to the respondent rather than following 
the order of your data requirements. The inclusion of filter questions is normally 
recommended in improving the flow of the questions. Filter questions help identify 
those respondents for whom the following question or questions are not applicable, 
so they can skip those questions. According to Saunders et al. (1997:264), the order 
of the questions should be such that the first questions of the questionnaire are 
straightforward questions and the ones that respondents will enjoy answering. Such 
questions should be those that deal with the respondents’ attributes and behaviour 
rather than attitudes and beliefs, which may be difficult to answer. The middle part of 
the questionnaire should deal with more complex questions and topics. Saunders et 
al. (1997:264) argue that at this stage most respondents should be completing the 
survey with more confidence but not yet bored or tired. The last part of the 
questionnaire, or towards the end, the questionnaire can introduce personal and 
sensitive questions. However their purpose should be clearly explained, as 
respondents may refuse to answer such questions (Mahlangu, 1987:81). The 
researcher should also ensure that all the questions in the questionnaire are grouped 
into obvious sections which will make sense to the respondent. This approach is 
referred to as section layout approach. The other approach is called funnel 
approach, where measuring questions move from being general to specific (or wide 
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to narrow). In any research it is possible to combine the two approaches, while 
maintaining a dominant approach. The dominant approach adopted in the design of 
the questionnaire used for this study is the sections layout approach. The layout of 
the questionnaire is discussed below, beginning with the introductory letter to the 
instrument and then the description of the instrument/questionnaire.  
 
4.8.3 The introductory letter and the questionnaire 
 
Self-administered questionnaires should be accompanied by a covering letter which 
explains the purpose of the survey. The covering letter forms the first part of the 
questionnaire that a respondent should look at and decide whether or not to answer 
the accompanying questionnaire. It is important to carefully choose the right wording 
for the covering letter, as a poorly-worded letter can negatively affect the response 
rate (Saunders et al., 1997: 266). The first main purpose of the covering letter is to 
introduce the researcher to the participants. Secondly, it describes in detail the 
purpose of the study in clear and simple manner in order to place the respondent in 
the right frame of mind before starting to answer the questions in the questionnaire. 
Thirdly, it explains why and how the respondents were selected, for example in this 
case they were selected based on their experience in PPP projects. Such 
explanation instils confidence in the respondents and avoids a perception of being 
targeted for some sinister motives, especially if the study subject matter is a 
sensitive one. Fourthly, it is civil and ethically correct to ask for their participation in 
completing the questionnaire and to request for compliance with the instructions. 
Saunders et al. (1997:266) also emphasise the importance of explaining to the 
respondent why they are important and how long it will take to complete the 
questionnaire. The cover letter should also ensure confidentiality of the collected 
information, and contain information on how the results will be used and whom to 
contact if there are any queries. 
 
Confidentially means that, although the respondent may be known to the researcher, 
the names and hence the responses are not divulged to a third party. The cover 
letter should also indicate to the respondent what to do with the questionnaire once 
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answered, for example, post or email it to wait for the collection of the instrument 
(see Annexure A for the cover letter). 
 
The questionnaire: The questionnaire is the measuring instrument used to collect 
data for this study. It consisted of three main sections, namely; classification, current 
industry practice and the respondent's opinion regarding SMEs participation in PPP 
projects. Each section focused on obtaining information on a particular issue of the 
research questions (see Annexure B). Below is a discussion on each of the sections 
of the questionnaire. 
 
Section A: Classification questions (Questions 1–7): All the questions in Section 
A were aimed at obtaining information on the level of experience that the 
respondents had on PPP projects and also to identify those who had experience in 
both the public- and the private-sector side of a PPP project. This information helped 
the researcher to assess the quality of information collected from the respondents. 
Highly skilled and experienced respondents are more likely to give high quality 
information compared to the less experienced ones. 
 
Section B: Current industry practice (Questions 8-37): Section B questions 
focused mainly on obtaining information on whether small enterprises (SMEs) 
currently play a role in PPP projects in South Africa or not. It also seeked to collect 
information on the types of services SMEs provide to PPPs and challenges faced by 
SMEs working with PPP firms. This information was necessary, because it answered 
the first main research sub-question: “How have PPP projects in the country helped 
SME growth?” After analysing the information collected under this section of the 
questionnaire the researcher was in a position to answer the third research question 
of the study which is “How can the involvement of SMEs be encouraged in PPP 
projects?” 
 
Section C: Respondent's opinion regarding SME participation in PPP projects 
(Questions 38 – 39): Section C questions (the open ended questions) focused 
mainly on obtaining data on the respondents' opinions regarding the participation of 
SMEs in PPP projects. This introduces another approach to the data collection 
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instruments, as open-ended questions are mainly used for qualitative research. As 
Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998:95) assert, combining both data collection approaches 
should be encouraged in research because each of these approaches alone may be 
insufficient to collect the required data; thus using both approaches provided richer 
data than either approach. In this case the information collected through the open-
ended questions was important because it was aimed at soliciting unrestricted 
information from the respondents, with the aim of addressing the second main 
research sub-question: “What are the problems or challenges faced by PPP project 
firms when using SMEs to supply services to PPP projects?” 
 
The analysis of the information obtained in Sections A, B and C of the questionnaire 
showed clearly where the weaknesses of the traditional PPP model and the current 
South African PPP model were and that helped the researcher to answer the third 
research question, which is “How can the involvement of SMEs be encouraged in 
PPP projects?” The answer to the third research question formed a base for the 
development of the appropriate PPP model for sustainable SME development that 
will respond to the South African economic challenges of unemployment, poverty 
and inequality.  
 
The questionnaires were distributed to the target sample using a computer-assisted 
program called survey-monkey, designed to collect data through an electronic 
questionnaire. The questionnaire was written only in English. The researcher also 
gave assurances to the respondents that their answers would not be linked to them 
at the stage of data analysis, therefore ensuring anonymity.  
 
4.8.4 Data-collection procedure 
 
The data-collection process took place between 27 February 2015 and 31 April 
2015. The questionnaire was first developed by the researcher and evaluated by a 
statistician and signed-off by the supervisor. Contact details of potential respondents 
were searched through the internet and websites of the organisations, while others 
were collected from the National Treasury's PPP Unit website. A research sample 
was then determined, as discussed in Section 4.6.2. Phone calls were made to the 
PPP-operating companies, SMEs and the different government departments 
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responsible for the PPP projects to identify the relevant persons within the respective 
organisations that would respond to the questionnaire. After the relevant 
respondents were identified and confirmed, the researcher then made direct contact 
with the relevant potential respondents to discuss the need for the data and the 
objective of the study. Through these discussions email addresses of the potential 
respondents were obtained. All potential respondents were notified that a computer-
based questionnaire would be emailed to them. 
 
A website link, containing the questionnaire was emailed to all potential respondents 
that formed the sample and they were given approximately 30 days, ranging from 27 
February to 30 March 2015, to respond to the questionnaire 
 
As discussed above, after identifying the relevant persons to answer the 
questionnaire, the researcher discussed the nature and the purpose of the 
questionnaire with the respective individuals. The researcher also requested that the 
questionnaire be answered by at least three people from the PPP organisations in 
order to obtain a balanced view or responses from the experiences of the different 
individuals on the use of SMEs in PPP projects. In the email sent to the potential 
respondents, the researcher first acknowledged the telephonic discussions with the 
potential respondents and thanked them for agreeing to respond to the 
questionnaire. This was done in order to encourage a high response rate.   
 
At the end of the 30 days, which was 30 March 2015, only 20% of the responses 
were received. The researcher identified all those who did not respond to the 
questionnaire and made follow-up calls, first by calling each one of them and 
requesting that they respond to the questionnaire, as they had agreed to do so 
during the initial telephonic discussion with the researcher before the questionnaire 
was sent to them. At this stage some of the respondents did not agree that the 
questionnaire should be answered by more than one person in the organisation as 
the researcher had requested. They argued that it would not make sense because 
the responses would be the same. The researcher could not force those 
respondents to give the questionnaire to more than one person in the organisation, 
but accepted their argument, even though the researcher did not believe that was a 
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valid argument. After the telephonic reminders the researcher again sent emails as a 
follow-up to the telephone discussion and gave the respondents four days to 
respond. After the four days the responses increased to 28%, and further email 
reminders were subsequently sent to the outstanding respondents, after which the 
response rate increased to 37%. The researcher continued calling and sending 
emails to the respondents for another two weeks, until 15 April 2015. This means the 
data-collection exercise took six weeks based on the first questionnaire. At the end 
of the sixth week the response rate increased to 61%. It was at this stage where the 
researcher realised that some of the potential respondents were not going to 
respond to the questionnaire and as a result the survey was closed10. The 
researcher then evaluated the results of the survey and decided to supplement the 
survey results by developing another questionnaire which was meant to collect data 
from SMEs and specific public-sector organisations. This data-collection exercise 
targeted mainly government departments and agencies that had a high number of 
PPP projects which were already at the operational phases and SMEs which were 
providing services to PPP firms. This was done after realising that specific 
information was needed to be collected from SMEs and from certain public-sector 
organisations that did not respond to the first questionnaire, as most of the 
responses received came from the private-sector partner and other government 
agencies and departments. The aim for the second data-collection process was to 
have face-to-face interviews with at least five public-sector personnel (see Annexure 
C for the second questionnaire) and have a questionnaire sent to at least 12 SMEs. 
The target was to interview at least five public-sector personnel involved in PPP 
projects and 12 SMEs providing services to the different PPP firms operating in the 
different sectors, as shown in Table 4.2. This exercise took two weeks, from 18 April 
2015 to 30 April 2015. Although all five public-sector targeted respondents were 
interviewed, the face-to-face interviews did not happen with all of them due to 
difficulties in securing appointments with the respondents. The same applies to 
                                                          
10
 Although the response rate was 61%, the responses received by the researcher covered all the 
different PPP projects included in the sample. This means that the data collected was still a good 
representation of the PPP projects in the country.  Furthermore, the supplementary questionnaire 
used to collect additional data from five more organisations, also improved the data quality used for 
the study. 
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SMEs respondents, due to geographical location of some of these SMEs. However, 
the researcher was able to have face-to-face interviews with two SMEs. This helped 
the researcher obtain in-depth information about the working of SMEs in PPP 
projects. The researcher then decided to allow those who could not find time to have 
a face-to-face interview with the researcher, to just answer and email back the 
electronic questionnaire which was emailed to them by the researcher. Three of the 
public sector respondents answered the electronic questionnaire, one respondent 
gave a face-to-face interview and the fifth one gave responses through a telephone 
interview. The questions in the second questionnaire were different from the ones in 
the first questionnaire. This was done because the researcher wanted to obtain 
specific information on specific issues regarding the reason why the public entity 
opted to use PPP projects to deliver public infrastructure to its citizen instead of 
following the traditional infrastructure procurement approach. The data that the 
researcher needed to collect from the SMEs were mainly on the employment growth 
for SMEs contracted to PPP projects. The researcher received 11 responses from 
the SMEs through the electronic questionnaire. In total the researcher received 13 
responses from SMEs and 5 responses from government agencies during the 
second survey. This means that the 61% response rate on the first questionnaire 
was enhanced by the response to the supplementary questionnaire. The data-
collection exercise for both phases took approximately two months, from 27 
February 2015 to 30 April 2015.   
 
4.9 Response rate  
 
A response rate is the total number of responses divided by the total number in the 
sample minus ineligible and unreachable respondents. Normally, the response rate 
of data collected from a secondary source, especially within an organisation that has 
granted a researcher access to its information, can be as high as 100%. In contrast, 
a response rate from a sample to which one will be sending a questionnaire or doing 
interviews is in most cases lower than when secondary data are collected. According 
to Saunders et al. (1997:129), for a postal survey, a response rate of 15 to 20% is 
possible. However, other researchers assert that a response rate of about 50% for 
postal surveys and 75% for face-to-face interviews is acceptable. This shows that 
the response rate can vary considerably when collecting primary data, depending on 
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the data-collection method used. In a case where the target respondents are senior 
executives of companies, one should expect a lower response rate than when the 
target respondents are just general employees.  
 
The response rate for this study was 61% for the first questionnaire which targeted 
54 respondents. This information was supplemented by the responses received from 
the second questionnaire, where five more public sector responses and 13 more 
SMEs were received. The total number of PPP projects that were targeted for the 
study was 21 projects (see Section 4.6.2). After applying the sampling method the 
final sample size consisted of 14 PPP projects. The total number of respondents 
expected from the PPP private companies and the public sector was 42 and 12 
respectively. Therefore, a total of 54 responses was expected for the study. Out of 
the 54 potential respondents that were targeted by the researcher, 33 responded by 
submitting an answered questionnaire to the researcher. This translates to a 61% 
response rate. The responses were received from all the 14 PPP projects which 
were targeted by the researcher. 
 
This was a fair response rate, given the fact that for this study, data were collected 
from senior managers of the organisations that formed the population sample. For 
example, 84,9% of the responses came from operation/senior management level to 
chief executive officers/directors and managing directors of PPP companies. Only 
15,1% of the responses came from advisors’ level. The information on the second 
questionnaire was collected from senior government employees, from directors to 
chief directors’ level and senior managers of SME firms. 
 
Out of the 42 potential respondents from the private sector PPP companies, 21 
responded by answering the questionnaire, in contrast to the private sector 
responses, where 100% responses were received from the public sector 
respondents. Although the response rate for the PPP companies was not 100%, the 
responses were received from all the sectors and PPP projects that constituted the 
sample. Therefore, the response rate from the private sector constituted 64% of the 
total responses for the study (21 responses out of a total of 33 responses) and the 
public-sector responses constituted 36% of the total response rate for the study, 
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which was 61% (33 responses out of 54 targeted responses). For SMEs that were 
targeted, 13 SMEs responded to the questionnaire. Most SMEs were reluctant to 
respond to the questionnaire, claiming confidentiality of the information. 
 
4.10 Data reliability, validity, credibility and analysis 
 
This section discusses measures that were put in place in order to ensure that the 
data collected was reliable, credible and valid. This was important, as all the data 
featured would ensure the reader of the study that the conclusions made in the study 
were valid and credible and could be used for inference purposes. 
 
4.10.1 Data reliability and validity 
 
Polit and Hungler (1993:445) refer to reliability as the degree of consistency with 
which an instrument measures the attributes it is designed to measure. Reliability 
can also be ensured by minimising sources of measurement error such as data-
collector bias. Data-collector bias was minimised by the researcher being the only 
one to administer the questionnaires and standardising conditions such as exhibiting 
similar personal attributes to all respondents. The questionnaires were emailed to all 
potential respondents as indicated in the sample and a letter explaining the objective 
of the study and the treatment of confidential information was also emailed to all 
subjects by the researcher. 
  
All subjects were first given two weeks to respond to the questionnaires and email 
the questionnaire back to the researcher. This allowed the respondents enough time 
to answer the questionnaires without being put under too much pressure. The 
answered questionnaires revealed consistency in responses. 
 
4.10.2 Validity 
 
The validity of a study can be categorised into instrument validity, external validity 
and internal validity, where instrument or questionnaire validity in this case refers to 
the degree to which an instrument measures what it is intended to measure (Polit 
and Hungler, 1993:448). External validity refers to the degree to which the results of 
the study can be applied to the general population of interest. This type of validity is 
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mainly affected by the way in which subjects to participate in the study were 
determined. Validity can be improved by the use of randomisation procedures that 
limit potential bias in subjects’ selection. In the case of this study all PPP projects 
that met the set criteria were given an equal chance to be included in the sample, as 
a random sample approach was used; therefore this concern was not relevant for 
this study. 
 
Internal or content validity refers to the credibility of the study and is determined by 
the degree to which conclusions drawn from the study correctly describe what 
actually transpired during the study (Kallet, 2004:1230). To achieve content validity, 
the questionnaire that was used to collect the data included a variety of questions on 
the knowledge of PPPs and SMEs in general and the role of SMEs in PPP projects 
in particular. It also asked questions related to respondents’ experience in and 
knowledge about PPPs and SMEs. 
 
The questions contained in the questionnaire were based on information gathered 
during the literature review to ensure that the questions were comprehensive enough 
to cover all attributes of PPP projects and the role that SMEs could play in PPP 
projects. The questions were formulated in simple English for ease of understanding 
and a clear introduction, and the purpose of the study was clearly explained to the 
subjects. The draft questionnaire was then given to a statistician and a demographer 
at Statistics South Africa (STATS-SA), who had worked on census questionnaire 
design and census data analysis to make inputs into the final questionnaire. As a 
result, some questions were rephrased and others were deleted, while new 
questions were added to the questionnaire. New response choices were added to 
the closed-ended questions to provide for meaningful data analysis.  
 
According to Burns and Grove (1993:373), data collected for a study also need to be 
evaluated for external validity. In a case where the number of persons approached to 
participate in a study declines, generalising the study findings to all members of the 
population becomes difficult to justify. For this reason the data-collection process 
needs to be properly planned to limit a decline in the number of participants willing to 
participate in the study. The number of persons who were approached and refused 
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or failed to return the questionnaire should be reported so that threats to external 
validity can be judged. According to Burns and Grove (1993.270), as the percentage 
of those who decline to participate, increases, external validity decreases. In the 
case of this study, 54 subjects were approached and 33 subjects responded 
positively to the request and furnished the required information based on the first 
questionnaire. In addition to the 33 subjects who responded, a supplementary 
questionnaire was also developed as discussed above, to enhance the data quality, 
and five more public sector and 13 SMEs respondents answered the questionnaire 
(see Annexure C). 
 
4.10.3 Pre-testing the questionnaire 
 
A pre-test refers to a trial administration of an instrument to identify its shortcomings. 
It is done by giving the questionnaire to a few individuals who are part of the target 
subject to answer the questions. It is always advisable to pre-test a questionnaire in 
order to determine whether the questions and directions are clear to the subjects and 
whether respondents will understand what is required from them. For the purpose of 
this study, the researcher presented the questionnaire to three respondents included 
in the study sample. All of them answered all questions and no single question was 
changed following the pre-test. 
 
4.10.4 Ethical consideration 
 
Conducting research requires not only expertise and diligence, but also honesty, 
integrity and respect for the right of the other party participating in the study (Fouka 
and Mantzorou, 2011:4). To render a study ethical, the right to self-determination, 
anonymity, confidentiality, scientific honest and informed consent should be 
observed. For the purpose of this study, only confidentiality, informed consent, 
anonymity and scientific honesty were applicable. 
 
Polit and Hungler (1995:139) and Fouka and Mantzorou (2011:6) assert that, when 
subjects are promised confidentiality, it means that the information they provided will 
not be publicly reported in a way that identifies them. In this study confidentiality was 
maintained by keeping the collected data confidential and not revealing the subjects 
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and the companies’ identities when reporting or publishing the study, as there were 
no subjects and companies’ names written on the questionnaires. 
 
Scientific honesty was also maintained. Scientific honesty is a very important ethical 
responsibility of the researcher when conducting research. Dishonest conduct 
includes manipulation of design and methods or manipulation of data (Brink, 
1996:47; Fouka and Mantzorou, 2011:8). The researcher avoided all forms of 
dishonesty by recording, filing and entering all the data collected into a computer 
software programme for data collection called survey-monkey. The open-ended 
questions which were analysed by the researcher were also checked by the 
supervisor for confirmation of credibility. 
 
4.11 Data analysis 
 
After the data were collected it was organised and analysed using Microsoft Excel. 
Descriptive statistics were used to analyse the data. Frequency tables were drawn, 
and from these the data were presented in pie and bar charts. Percentages were 
often used to show the general trend or direction of a practice, and attitude or 
attribute of the different respondents. Using descriptive statistics and a combination 
of quantitative and qualitative information to analyse the survey results was 
appropriate for this study, as the size of the data could not allow the researcher to 
use empirical or statistical models, which require a large sample to have a 
meaningful analysis. Due to the fact that there were not many PPP projects in the 
country during the study period from which data to apply the quantitative approach 
could have been collected, the mixed-method approach became a natural alternative 
for this study. The open-ended questions were analysed through quantitative 
concept analysis with the aim of quantifying emerging characteristics and concepts. 
Concept analysis is the concept of analysing verbal or written communications in a 
systematic way to measure variables quantitatively (Polit and Hungler, 1995:698).    
 
The following section therefore seeks to identify the type of model that can be used 
to develop the appropriate PPP model for developing a sustainable SME sector. 
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4.12 Identifying the type of model approach appropriate for this study 
 
During the literature review on PPP models for SME development the researcher 
could not identify or find any PPP model whose objective is to increase the 
participation of SMEs in PPP projects or in infrastructure projects in general. Most of 
the PPP models identified were more institutional PPP models for SME development 
(see Annexure D). The objectives of these models are to assist SMEs with soft skills 
but not to partake in PPPs or infrastructure projects. The objective of this section is 
therefore to provide a ‘theory and practice’ review of different constructs on models – 
specifically searching for a flexible and more encompassing type of model for a PPP 
environment in developing countries, and more specifically, for South Africa. The aim 
is to identify the type of model or model approach that can be used to develop the 
model to be proposed in Chapter 7.  
 
In order to achieve the study’s objectives, the data collected based on the research 
method or process just discussed above need to be analysed and used in the model 
to be identified for this study to inform the development of the appropriate PPP 
model for sustainable SME development to be proposed in Chapter 7. This section 
therefore starts by defining models, followed by a discussion on the different types of 
models used in social science, with the aim of finally identifying the type of model 
that may be used to develop the PPP model to be recommended or proposed by the 
study.  
 
4.12.1 Types of models and the choice of a model to be used for the study 
 
Models are used in almost all research fields, and they differ according to what they 
are meant for. Some models are quantitative, while others are qualitative. According 
to Jonassen, Strobel & Gottdenker (2005:18): 
 
“... models are conceptual systems consisting of elements, relations, 
operations, and rules governing interactions that are expressed using external 
notation systems.” 
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Schwaninger and Groesser (2008:4) define a model as a conceptual construction of 
an issue under study or a construction of a subjective reality. Samuelson and 
Nordhaus (1998) give a broader definition of a model and define a model as a formal 
framework for representing the basic feature of a complex system by a few central 
relationships, which may take either the form of graphs, mathematical equations, or 
computer programs. This definition appears to be covering a wide enough range or 
types of possible models that may be used in different research fields.  
 
International literature identifies two classes or clusters of models, namely 
mathematical or statistical models and schematic or conceptual maps. Models such 
as flow charts, graphs, scatter diagrams and mind maps fall under the conceptual 
model cluster (Kaewsuwan, 2002:40). According to Rodgers (2010:1), a 
mathematical model is a set of assumptions together with implications drawn from 
them by mathematical reasoning evaluated using statistical modelling procedures. A 
conceptual model or framework, on the other hand, is a visual representation of the 
elements of an untested theory that explains the key factors, concepts or variables 
and their presumed inter-relatedness (Weideman and Kritzinger, 2003:5). 
Conceptual models/maps are subjective representations of their creator’s knowledge 
or understanding of a phenomenon, as two individuals may construct two different 
frameworks on the same topic depending on their understanding and interpretation 
of the topic (Derbentseva and Mandel, 2011:3).  
  
Within the mathematical cluster of models, there are a number of different types of 
models, namely economic, scientific, empirical, simulations and computer models to 
name but a few. All these models are fundamentally the same, as they are all based 
on mathematical equations evaluated using statistical techniques. Table 4.4 below 
gives a summary description and uses of these different models. 
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Table 4.4: Different types and uses of models  
Model Description  Uses 
Visual 
models 
These are pictures of an abstract phenomenon or 
economy, graphs with lines and curves that tell an 
economic story. They employ a visual device to 
present a general economic concept. Most of these 
models are visual extensions of mathematical models. 
Implicit in their structure is an underlying mathematical 
model. Sometimes when they are explained the 
mathematics is explained, sometimes it is not. 
Although these types of models are easy to 
understand, they are limited in their scope of 
application. 
They are used to show 
interrelationships 
between economic 
variables, for example, to 
show the effect of 
inflationary expectations 
on price and output. 
Mathemati
cal models 
The mathematical model is the most formal abstract of 
the phenomenon. It is a system of simultaneous 
equations with an equal or greater number of 
variables. The manipulation of such models requires a 
good knowledge of mathematics. Variables within the 
model can either be classified endogenous or 
exogenous. Endogenous variables are those that are 
determined within the model, or by the model's 
solution, whereas exogenous variables are those that 
come outside the model. 
Mathematical models are 
used mainly for 
conducting sensitivity 
analysis. For example, 
they try to answer 
questions such as "What 
will happen to inflation if 
income rises by 1%?' 
Empirical 
models 
These types of models are basically mathematical 
models designed to be used with data. In empirical 
models, data is gathered for the variables using 
accepted statistical techniques, the data are used to 
provide estimates of the model's values. In answering 
the question: "What will happen to inflation if income 
rises by 1%?", the purely mathematical model might 
only allow the analyst to say "logically it should rise" 
On the other hand, the empirical model would allow the 
analyst to use actual historical inflation data, income 
and other variables in the model to say that, based on 
the model estimate, investment should rise by about 
3%. 
Both mathematical and 
empirical models are 
used mainly for 
conducting sensitivity 
analyses. However, the 
empirical model gives a 
precise estimate of how 
sensitive a variable may 
be, given a change in 
another variable in the 
model. They are heavily 
dependent on data 
availability. 
Simulation 
models 
These types of models embody the very best features 
of mathematical models without requiring the user to 
be proficient in mathematics. They are basically 
mathematical models; the only difference between a 
simulation model and a mathematical model is that in a 
simulation model the equations of the model are 
programmed in a programming computer language. 
The computerised simulation model can show the 
interaction of numerous variables all at once, including 
hidden feedback and secondary effects that are so 
apparent to the user. 
The use for these models 
is similar to the 
mathematic and empirical 
models. They are used 
mainly for sensitivity 
analysis and prediction of 
future developments in a 
particular area of interest 
using a computer 
programme. Like the 
mathematical models, 
simulation models are 
also heavily dependent 
on data availability. 
Source: Kaewsuwan, 2002. 
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Although models are widely used in both government and the private sector, models 
however, have limitations which reduce their reliability. Table 4.5 below summarises 
some of the different limitations and reasons why the limitations exist. 
 
Table 4.5: Limitation of models  
Models' limitations   Description of the limitations 
 
Improper assumptions Although models have high integrity because they conform to 
rigorous mathematical standards, model building must begin with 
precise assumptions about the phenomena it represent. If the 
assumptions are wrong, incomplete or misleading, no matter how 
good the logical integrity of the model is, the model conclusions will 
be as much in an error as the initial assumptions. 
Mathematical 
intractability 
Mathematical models are limited in their use because they need to be 
tractable or say they are less useful unless they can be solved to 
produce meaningful results. In some cases, one can find a model that 
has a large number of equations. For the model to be useful these 
mathematical equations must be reduced to a solution and 
sometimes it is difficult to solve such a large number of equations, as 
they are sometimes expected to be converted to linear equations for 
them to be solvable. However, the real economic behaviour does not 
necessarily exhibit patterns that are linear or that can be represented 
well by mathematical equations. 
Over-simplification or 
incompleteness of 
models 
Given the fact that the real economy is too complex, when one 
develops a model, one would only include those variables which 
seem to have the most importance in explaining an economic 
phenomenon, leaving others that seem less important. Although this 
type of simplification is necessary, nonetheless, the simplified model 
is different from the real economy that it is designed to represent. The 
excluded variables often do matter in the real economy, as they carry 
some important information about the behaviour of other variables in 
the economic system. This missing information in the model may 
have significant implications on the model outputs and may render 
the model to be incomplete. 
Unavailability of data Mathematical, empirical and simulation models are hugely dependent 
on data as inputs into the model. Even if the model can be well 
developed, if data to be used in the model is not available or 
incomplete due to different reasons, assumptions about proxy data 
has to be made. The proxy data may not be a good representation of 
the actual data that was intended to be used in the model, and this 
may compromise the integrity of the model.  
Usefulness limited to its 
original purpose 
Models are developed for a specific purpose and as they reflect the 
performance and behaviour of a particular system. Correct use of a 
model requires that one understands the purpose of the model, as 
failure to do so may lead to improper application or misinterpretation 
of its results. Although a model can be adjusted to be used for a 
different purpose, the user of the model needs to know what the 
model was originally intended to do, what its new purpose is and 
what changes have been made. 
Assume the future will be 
like the past 
Models are built to represent a system based on historical data, yet 
they are used to forecast what will happen in future. If there are 
significant changes in the real-world system, the quality of the model 
suffers. This may render the model irrelevant and warrant model 
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Models' limitations   Description of the limitations 
 
update in order to reflect the latest developments in the system it 
represents. 
Source: Van Slyke, O. E. and Fusco, n.d.:658 
 
As discussed in the table above, one of the main limitations of models, especially the 
mathematical, empirical and simulation model, is unavailability of data. This means 
that it does not matter how these types of models have been developed, lack of data 
can make their usefulness irrelevant. Also notable is that all models are wrong, 
although some are more useful than others (Gross, 2003:4). This statement may 
suggest that there is not a single correct model, as different researchers may 
perceive a phenomenon differently and may develop different models for the same 
phenomenon.  
 
Based on the above discussion on different types of models and their limitations it is 
clear that the most suitable model for this study is the conceptual model which falls 
within the visual class of models. To develop this type of model the researcher does 
not need a lot of data or a big sample size to analyse a phenomenon, as these 
models are not as data-hungry as the mathematical, empirical and simulation 
models. 
 
4.12.2 Why a conceptual model is appropriate for this study 
 
A conceptual model is a printed representation of a mental map formed inside a 
person’s head on how certain activities are related with each other (USAID, 2007:1). 
It is a methodology used to establish a body of knowledge in a discipline often 
culminating in policy recommendations.  
 
According to Manley et al., (2000:140): 
 
“... Conceptual models express ideas about components and processes 
deemed important in a system, document assumptions about how 
components and processes are related and identify gaps in our knowledge as 
they are working hypothesis about system form and function.” 
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Following are some of the reason why a conceptual model is suitable or appropriate 
for this study: 
 
Firstly, a conceptual model approach is suitable for this study, as it is able to do the 
following, as USAID (2006:1) and Morgan (2008:1) argue: (i) explicitly define what it 
is that we want to influence or change, (ii) characterise and prioritise the factors that 
directly or indirectly result in undesirable outcomes in the South African PPP market, 
(iii) graphically represent how these threats, individually or in combination, cause the 
undesirable outcome, (iv) demonstrate that the to be proposed intervention clearly 
focuses on reducing the undesirable outcome and achieving the intended goal, (v) 
provide a strategic framework of what to monitor in order to assess the effectiveness 
of the intervention, (vi) offer a structure for reviewing and revising assumptions and 
activities of a phenomenon, as conditions change over time, (vi) depict the status 
quo and make the implicit explicit, thus challenging the status quo and suggest 
improvements, and (vii) allow sensible debate to take place about relationships 
between variables taxonomy and other relationships within the model. They allow 
clarity to be brought to the debate, with problems addressed in a concise and 
understandable manner. All the mentioned capabilities of a conceptual model are 
exactly what the researcher seeks to achieve in this study. The conceptual model 
approach is capable to demonstrate how the participation of SMEs in PPP projects 
can be increased. 
 
Secondly, it has been shown under Section 4.12.1 that there are basically four types 
of models used in social research, namely visual models, mathematical models, 
empirical models and simulation models. The manipulation of the last three models 
is hugely dependent on data availability as inputs into the model. This means that it 
may be impossible to develop and use these models if there is no adequate data to 
feed into them. Data on PPP projects in South Africa is limited; even the little 
available information is not complete and its integrity is also questionable. 
Furthermore, the total number of PPP projects in the country was small during the 
period when this study was conducted and any data collected from a sample drawn 
from such a small population of PPP projects would had not been adequate to be 
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used as inputs into the mathematical family of models. This may render the use of 
the three models impossible to explicitly determine any relationships between PPP 
projects, SMEs and job creation.   
 
Thirdly, the use of mathematical, empirical or simulation models is not appropriate 
for this study, as the objective of this study is not to conduct sensitivity analysis of 
the relationships between PPP projects and SMEs, but to improve the physical 
structure of the existing traditional PPP model to encourage an increased 
participation of SMEs in PPPs, based on current practices on the participation of 
SMEs in PPP projects. The objective is not to forecast future developments of the 
PPP or SME market, as these models are mostly used for forecasting purposes in 
addition to sensitivity analysis. The suitable type of model to be used to understand 
how the participation of SMEs in PPP projects can be improved is the conceptual 
model, which falls within the visual family of models, as discussed in Table 4.4 
above. Conceptual models are mainly applied in qualitative analysis; however, this 
does not mean they cannot be used for quantitative approaches. The mixed 
research method or approach is appropriate for this study, because it strikes a 
balance in the use of qualitative and quantitative information to have meaningful 
research results (Choy, 2014:102). Due to the fact that there were not many PPP 
projects in the country during the study period from which data for a quantitative 
approach could have been collected, the conceptual model became a natural 
alternative for this study compared to the mathematical models.  
 
Chapter 5, therefore, present the study findings based on the survey information 
collected through the questionnaire. This information will assist the researcher in 
developing the conceptual PPP model for sustainable development of the SME 
sector. 
 
 
4.13 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter described the research methodology, including the population, sample, 
data collection instruments as well as strategies used to ensure ethical standards, 
reliability and validity of the study. It also identified the type of model to be used to 
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achieve the study objectives and it gave reasons as to why the identified model was 
more suitable for the study compared to the other models discussed in the chapter.  
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CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH RESULTS 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
Chapter 4 focused mainly on the survey design and techniques followed when 
collecting data from the target population. It defined the population from which the 
data was collected, the methodology used to collect the data, the data collection or 
measuring instrument (the questionnaire), the sample criteria and data-collection 
procedure. The focus of this chapter (Chapter 5) is therefore on the presentation of 
the research/survey results. It presents the survey results collected during the data-
gathering exercise. The presentation of the results in this chapter follows the 
structure of the measuring instrument used to collect the data. The measurement 
instrument had three sections namely; classification, current industry practices and 
the respondents’ opinion regarding SMEs participation in PPP projects.   
 
The objective of this chapter is therefore to present the research results obtained 
through the survey. The chapter is organised as follows: the first part of the chapter 
presents experience profiles of the survey participants, then current practice by 
PPPs on outsourcing of services, followed by research results on the current practice 
on the use of SMEs by PPP firms. It moves on to present the survey results on 
challenges in using SMEs in PPP projects, and lastly, it presents results on what 
respondents think needs to be done in order to improve the participation of SMEs in 
PPP projects. 
 
5.2 Analysis of research results 
 
As discussed in Section 4.9, the data-collection tool used to collect information for 
this study was a questionnaire. The questionnaire was divided into three sections, 
namely Section A, B and C, with Section A aimed at collecting data on the level of 
experience that the respondents had on PPP projects and also to identify those who 
had experience in both the public and the private sector side of a PPP project. This 
helped balance the nature of responses, as data was collected from respondents 
who have worked in both private and public sectors.  
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Section B was aimed at collecting information on current industry practices: This 
section of the questionnaire focused mainly on obtaining information on whether or 
not small enterprises (SMEs) currently play a role in PPP projects in South Africa. It 
also aimed at collecting information on the types of services SMEs provide to PPPs 
and challenges faced by SMEs working with PPP projects. This information was 
necessary, as it would help to answer the first main research sub-question: “How 
have PPP projects in the country helped SME development?” and the second 
research sub-question: “What are the challenges faced by PPP firms when using 
SMEs to supply services to PPP projects?”   
 
The last section of the questionnaire (Section C) was aimed at collecting information 
on respondents’ opinion regarding SME participation in PPP projects. The section 
focused mainly on obtaining data on the respondents’ opinions regarding SME 
participation in PPP projects. This information was important, as it also addressed 
the third main research sub-question: “How can the involvement of SMEs be 
encouraged in PPP projects?” The information collected through the supplementary 
questionnaire also forms part of this section.  
 
Following is a discussion on the research results related to the information collected 
from the first questionnaire and the supplementary questionnaire as discussed. 
 
5.2.1 Employment status of survey participants 
 
Figure 5.1 below gives the employment status of the survey participants during the 
survey period. About 36,4% of the respondents were employed only by the public 
sector either in a government department or government agency responsible for 
PPP projects, and about 48,5% of them came from the private sector or PPP project 
operators, whereas 15,2% were employed as advisors to PPP projects, either for the 
private or public sector. The results showed that most of the respondents to the 
questionnaire were senior employees of the respective organisations. From Figure 
5.1b it is clear that about 57% of the respondents were operations managers/senior 
managers or supervisors in a PPP project, while 15% of them were PPP advisors, 
either in the public sector or in a PPP project, and about 27% were at director or 
chief executive officer level.   
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5.1b: Respondents' positions (%)
PPP Advisor
Operations manager
Director/managing director/CEO
 
Figure 5.1: Employment status of respondents 
Source: Survey conducted by Author 
 
5.2.2 Experience profile of respondents 
 
Figure 5.2 shows respondents’ years of experience in PPP projects. The majority of 
the participants had experience working on PPPs in the private sector as shown in 
Figure 5.2a, followed by those who had experience in both the public and the private 
sector. Figure 5.2b shows that about 67% of the respondents had more than ten 
years of experience working on PPP projects, mainly in the private sector, and about 
33% had more than ten years of experience in the public sector. The experience 
profile of the respondents was also fairly distributed, as on average one-third of the 
respondents had experience either in the public or the private sector or in both the 
public and the private sectors (see Figure 5.2a). The experience profile of the 
responds shows that the information on the current practice in involving SMEs in 
PPP projects was collected from a group of respondents who had good and 
balanced experience in PPP projects. It has been noted that the years of experience 
of the manging directors, directors or chief executive officers who participated in the 
survey was on avearge more than six years. Most of the respondents who held 
senior positions at the time when the data was collected had more than ten years of 
experience, and the majority of those that had experience only in one sector had less 
than five years of experience. 
 
48,5
36,4
15,2
5.1a: Employer of respondents (%)
PPP company Public sector /Agency
Contractor to  PPP
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Figure 5.2: Respondents’ years of experience in PPP 
Source: Survey conducted by Author 
 
5.2.3 Economic sector experience of respondents 
 
Figure 5.3 shows different type of projects in which respondents were involved 
before and during the time of the survey. About 13 of the respondents were involved 
in office accomodation, followed by 10 in health projects and 7 in water and 
sanitation, with another 7 in roads/transport PPP projects. There were no 
respondents that were involved in housing PPP projects. Housing PPPs are not 
common in the South African PPP market. Even the National Treasury PPP Unit did 
not have a housing PPP project in its database during the survey period. Again, this 
shows how balanced the collected information was. It was collected from almost all 
sectors where PPP projects were implemented. 
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Figure 5.3: PPP projects for which respondents once worked on  
Source: Survey conducted by Author 
 
5.2.4 Roles played by respondents in the different PPP projects 
 
Table 5.1 below shows the different roles played by respondents in the different PPP 
projects discussed above. For example, of the 18 respondents who once worked as 
project managers, 5 worked for hospitals and another 5 worked for office 
accommodation PPPs. Of the 18 respondents who worked as PPP 
specialists/professionals, 6 worked in road/transport PPP projects, while 4 worked 
for office accommodation PPPs. Office accommodation PPPs are popular in the 
South African PPP market. A number of government departments had moved 
towards employing PPPs to provide office accommodation.  
 
Table 5.1: Role played by respondents in the different PPPs (numbers) 
 Type of PPP Project 
manager 
Advisor to 
governme
nt 
Advisor to 
PPP 
project 
PPP 
Specialists/ 
Professionals 
Other Total 
Hospitals 5 2 4 2 1 14 
Roads/transpor
t/rail 
3 1 0 6 0 10 
Prison 0 2 1 2 0 5 
Office 
accommodatio
n 
5 2 1 4 2 14 
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 Type of PPP Project 
manager 
Advisor to 
governme
nt 
Advisor to 
PPP 
project 
PPP 
Specialists/ 
Professionals 
Other Total 
Water and 
sanitation 
2 0 1 3 2 8 
Power and 
energy 
1 0 1 0 1 3 
Housing 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tourism 2 2 1 1 0 6 
Total 18 9 9 18 6  
Source: Survey conducted by Author 
 
From Table 5.1 we see that, of the 14 respondents who had worked for hospitals 
PPPs, 5 worked as project managers, while 4 worked as Advisors to PPP projects. 
Of those who worked in office accommodation PPPs, 5 worked as project managers 
and 4 as PPP specialists or professionals. The experience profile of the respondents 
is also well-balanced and that improves the confidence on the quality and reliability 
of the information collected for this study. 
 
5.3 Presentation of research data on current industry practice   
 
As mentioned in the previous section and in Section 4.9.1 of the Chapter 5, the aim 
of Section B of the questionnaire was to collect data on current industry practices, 
focusing mainly on obtaining information on whether or not small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) currently play a role in PPP projects in South Africa. Below is a 
presentation of the research results on this issue. 
 
5.3.1 Outsourcing of services 
 
This section presents the survey results on current practices regarding outsourcing 
of services by PPP firms. The focus of this section is on whether PPP firms have a 
policy on outsourcing of services to SMEs and the type of services that PPP firms 
can outsource to SMEs. It also presents results on factors considered by PPP firms 
when awarding contracts to SMEs, and tools used by PPP firms to make SMEs 
aware of opportunities in their companies. 
 
   147 
 
 
5.3.1.1 Company policy on the use of SMEs and outsourcing of services 
 
When respondents were asked whether their firms had a policy on outsourcing 
services to third parties and whether there is a policy within the respective PPP firms 
on the use of SMEs, about 82% of the PPP companies who answered the 
questionnaire, indicated that they outsource their services to either SMEs or big 
firms, while 79% of them indicated that they have a policy on the use of SMEs in 
their PPP projects, and 21% said there was no policy on the use of SMEs in their 
organisations. It is worth noting that many respondents confused an SME policy with 
the Preferential Procurement Regulations of 2001, which promote the participation of 
Historically Disadvantaged Individuals (HDIs) in the South African economy. It was 
established during the second survey that most of the respondents were referring to 
the requirement by the Preferential Procurement Regulations of 2001, which requires 
state-owned entities to take into account the BBBEE factors when procuring goods 
and services. Since this policy requires bidders to indicate compliance with BBBEE, 
most respondents thought this was because they had to comply with their SME 
policy. Therefore the results based on these responses may not be accurate. The 
information may reflect that PPP firms do outsource some of their services to SME 
firms, but not that they have a policy for using SMEs. It may be some of them have a 
policy, but some may not have a policy. 
 
5.3.1.2 Services that PPPs can outsource to SMEs 
 
Based on respondents’ experience in PPP projects and current practice within a PPP 
project, Figure 5.4 shows respondents’ views or experience on the usefulness of 
SMEs in providing services to PPP projects. When respondents were asked whether 
SMEs can play a role in PPP projects during their operational phases, all 
respondents indicated that SMEs can play a big role in providing services to PPP 
projects. Figure 5.4a shows that the majority (29) of respondents think SMEs can 
provide services such as maintenance of PPP assets, followed by security (21) and 
then catering (20) services. It is not surprising that maintenance had a high score, 
given the fact that all assets need to be maintained at one point or another and all 
assets also need security.   
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The survey results also indicated that there is a need for a government policy that 
will force PPP project firms to use SMEs in both implementation and operation of the 
projects. Figure 5.4b shows that about 49% of the respondents think there should be 
a PPP-SME policy in place that will force PPPs to use SMEs during the operation of 
PPP projects. About 52% of the respondents think that the policy should force PPPs 
to set aside a minimum percentage of the services they need to be provided by 
SMEs. Provision of both management and operational skills, as well as provision of 
start-up capital, were also identified as important imperatives to ensure that SMEs 
effectively participate in PPP projects. This finding is not surprising, because even 
during the literature review exercise, these requirements were identified as 
hindrances in developing a viable SME sector, not only in South Africa, but in other 
countries as well. 
 
Figure 5.4: Services that PPPs can outsource to SMEs      
Source: Survey conducted by Author 
 
5.3.2 Current practice in the use of SMEs by PPP firms 
 
This section focuses on the current practice by PPP firms in using SMEs in PPP 
projects. It highlights the type of services outsourced by PPP firms, followed by a 
discussion on the type of enterprises that provide services to PPP projects and then 
0 10 20 30 40
Maintanance
Catering services
Laundry services
Security
IT services
Tolls collection
Number of responses
5.4a: Services that can be provided 
by SMEs
0 20 40 60
Policy on SMEs & PPPs
Start-up capital
Provide skills
Set aside a % for SMEs
percentages
5.4b: Measures to be in place to 
help SMEs to provide services to 
PPPs (%)
   149 
 
a discussion on the priority given to the use of SMEs and targets for contracts to be 
awarded to SMEs firms. 
 
5.3.2.1 Services outsourced by PPP firms during the operational phase 
 
Table 5.2 shows different type of services that are currently outsourced by PPP firms 
during the operational phase of PPP projects. Most of the PPP project firms covered 
in the survey outsourced certain services to SMEs. The only PPP that does not 
outsource its services to SMEs is the nature conservation PPP. 
 
PPPs that outsource five out of the six identified possible services at the operational 
stage of the projects are office accommodation and hospital PPPs. It can be argued 
that these PPPs have a high potential for providing SMEs with opportunities as well 
as having a high potential for job creation, followed by roads and prisons PPPs. 
Although roads PPPs only outsource four of the six services identified, it is likely that 
it has the highest potential for job creation compared to other PPPs, given the fact 
that road operation is more labour-intensive than any of the PPPs listed in Table 5.2 
below. It is highly possible that one needs more labourers per thousand rand spent 
on road maintenance compared to hospital or office accommodation.   
 
Other services that can be provided by SMEs to road PPPs include services such as 
traffic management services, tow-truck services for vehicles involved in accidents, 
traffic control, and many more. Road maintenance also involved a number of 
different activities that require different skills. Nature conservation PPPs seem to 
have low potential, as currently there is no service that is provided by SMEs to these 
types of PPPs. The information obtained from this type of a PPP project may not be 
generalised, as there was only one nature PPP that responded to the questionnaire. 
It needs to be noted that there are only a few nature PPPs in the country. However, 
nature conservation PPPs can employ SMEs to provide security services and asset 
maintenance to their facilities. 
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4,17
16,67
79,17
Big private firms  SMEs SMEs and big firms
Table 5.2: Services outsourced during the operational phase of PPP projects 
Types of services 
that can be 
provided by SMEs 
to PPPs 
Road Nature 
conserva
tion 
Water 
and 
sanitation 
Prison Hospital Office 
accommodation 
Maintenance x  - x x x x 
Catering  -  - x x x x 
Laundry  -  -  - x x x 
Security x - x x x x 
IT x  - x - x x 
Tolls/tariffs 
collection 
x  - x - - - 
Source: Survey conducted by Author 
X     =means the service is provided by SMEs 
-     =means there is no service provided SMEs 
 
5.3.2.2 Enterprises providing services to PPPs during the operational phase 
 
Figure 5.5 shows different types of enterprises that provide services to PPP projects 
during their operational phase. Most of the services (79,2%) are provided by SMEs 
and big firms. About 17% of the respondents indicated that SMEs provide services to 
the PPP projects they worked for, while only 4% indicated that their services are 
provided only by big private firms, and there were no services provided by foreign 
companies.   
 
Figure 5.5: Types of enterprises providing services to PPPs (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Survey conducted by Author 
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Although the majority of PPP project firms outsource their services to both big and 
small firms (79,2%), there is a high possibility that the bigger share of these services 
is provided by big firms and that the share allocated to SMEs is small. Figure 5.8 
shows in detail how much PPP services are provided by SMEs and big firms. 
 
5.3.2.3 Factors considered by PPP firms when awarding contracts to SMEs 
 
Figure 5.6 shows the different factors considered by PPP firms when awarding 
contracts to SMEs. About 46% of PPP firms appoint SMEs as service providers 
based on fitness for purpose, meaning there are no lighter requirements for SMEs 
compared to big firms when awarding a contract. SMEs have to compete with large 
firms for tenders under the same requirements or conditions.   
 
About 37% of the respondents indicated that their companies allocate contracts to 
SMEs because some of the tenders that PPP firms secure from the public sector 
have conditions that require them to subcontract SMEs. As discussed earlier, this 
requirement is not for SMEs, but for HDI compliance. Given the fact that most firms 
owned by HDIs are SMEs, many respondents see this requirement as a SME 
requirement. This means that preferential treatment is given to an HDI-owned firm 
during the bids evaluation process, which in most cases happens to be an SME.   
 
About 12% of respondents indicated that their companies use a preferred supplier 
database to identify suitable SMEs for the service they need. It is possible that these 
companies get some preferential treatment to a certain extent as discussed above, 
especially in order for the procurement of the service to meet the Preferential 
Procurement Regulations requirements. According to the Preferential Procurement 
Regulation, not more than 10% of the total bids evaluation points should be given to 
companies that are HDI-compliant either by being owned by HDIs or sub-contract 
companies that are owned by HDIs, which in most cases happen to be SMEs. Less 
than 5% of the respondents indicated that their PPP companies use SMEs only if 
they need special skills. Given that SMEs in most cases lack appropriate skills, this 
approach may disadvantage the majority of SMEs, as preferences in most cases 
may end up been given to a few SMEs that happen to have the required skills.  
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Figure 5.6: Priority given to the use of SMEs in PPP projects (%) 
Source: Survey conducted by Author 
 
When the PPP firms’ respondents were asked if their approaches to using SMEs 
vary depending on the geographical location of the project, the majority (54%) of 
them indicated that this category did not apply to them, while 46% said their 
approaches vary, based on the geographical location of the project. Figure 5.7 gives 
the different factors considered by those who vary their approaches to using SMEs if 
the project is in a different geographic area. 46% of the respondents said they 
appoint SMEs based on availability of a suitable SME in the area, while 33% 
consider proximity of the SME to the PPP project site and 12% consider the SME’s 
knowledge of the local environment as an important factor. It is worth noting that 
about 46% of the respondents do not consider any factor for awarding tenders to 
SMEs, as they indicated that the factors listed were not applicable to them. 
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Figure 5.7: Factors considered for awarding SMEs tenders in different 
geographical locations (%) 
Source: Survey conducted by Author 
 
 
5.3.2.4 Target for contracts to be awarded to SMEs 
 
Figure 5.8a shows that most PPP firms have targets for awarding contracts to SMEs. 
However, it has been found during the survey that the target that respondents 
referred to, was not meant for SMEs, but for HDI owned companies, which happen 
to be SMEs, as discussed earlier. The target that the respondents referred to was 
the 10% which is one of the requirements of the Preferential Procurement 
Regulations of 2001. The PFMA requires that all bids awarded by a public entity 
should be awarded to companies that comply with the Preferential Procurement 
Regulations requirements. The Preferential Procurement Regulations of 2001 
requires that not more than 10 percentage points be awarded to companies that are 
owned by HDIs or subcontract HDI-owned companies. Therefore indirectly there is a 
target for SMEs.  
 
Figure 5.8a shows that the majority (38%) of PPP companies set aside a low number 
of contracts to be awarded to SMEs. This means only a small share of the number of 
tenders that get allocated to HDI firms is therefore indirectly awarded to SMEs. The 
majority of PPP firms set a target of between 0 and 20% for SMEs, and the target 
becomes smaller as one moves towards higher percentage shares. About 42% of 
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37,5
12,5
0
8,3
0
41,7
5.8a: Targets for awarding tenders to SMEs 
(%)
0 - 20% 21- 40% 61- 80% Not applicable
the respondents indicated that targets for contracts to be awarded to SMEs do not 
apply or are not applicable to their PPP firms. Figure 5.8b shows that the share in 
rand amount of contracts that are awarded to SMEs is high at the lower percentage 
band and becomes lower (in percentages) as one moves towards the higher 
percentage bands.  
 
Figure 5.8: Targets for awarding tenders to SMEs  
 
Source: Survey conducted by Author 
 
5.3.2.5 Tools used by PPP firms to engage with SMEs  
 
Figure 5.9a shows that most PPP firms make SMEs aware of business opportunities 
through supplier databases or through adverts in the media. The most commonly 
used tools, as shown in Figure 5.9b, in making SMEs aware of business 
opportunities within a PPP firm are the list of approved SMEs or supplier database 
and local area directory of suppliers. It is possible that these tools are not only used 
to engage with SMEs but also to engage with big firms which may also supply PPP 
firms with different services. About 44% of the respondents indicated that they do not 
use any tool to create awareness about SMEs opportunities in their respective PPP 
firms. 
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43,48
8,7
4,35
43,48
5.9a: Different ways of making 
SMEs aware of opportunities 
within a PPP firm (%)
supplier database Direct contact
 On line registration portal Advert in the media
 
Figure 5.9: Ways and tools used by PPP firms to engage with SME 
Source: Survey conducted by Author 
 
5.3.3 Challenges in using SMEs in PPP projects 
 
Section B of the questionnaire also focused on collecting information on the different 
challenges that PPP firms face when dealing with SMEs in a PPP projects. It also 
analysed data collected on the causes of the challenges and the different ways in 
which the challenges could be overcome. 
 
5.3.3.1 Challenges faced by PPP firms when using SMEs 
 
Figure 5.10 shows the different challenges that PPP firms face when dealing with 
SMEs. When respondents were asked whether their firms face challenges with 
SMEs providing them with services, about 87% of respondents indicated that their 
PPP firms do face challenges when working with SMEs. The most worrying 
challenge they face is poor service quality delivered by SMEs, followed by failure by 
SMEs to deliver the service on time (see Figure 5.10). This finding is also confirmed 
by literature on SMEs, in that SMEs struggle to deliver services of high standard on 
time due to lack of human capacity.  
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Figure 5.10: Type of challenges faced by PPPs when using SMEs (%) 
 
Source: Survey conducted by Author 
 
In addition to the above challenges, Aigbavboa and Thwala (2014:776) investigated 
challenges and problems facing SMEs involved in in the construction in Mbombela 
(Nelspruit) and found that lack of managerial, planning, technical know-how, financial 
skills and job opportunities are the main challenges facing SMEs in the construction 
industry. Brink, Cant and Ligthelm, (2003: 18) also investigated problems 
experienced by small businesses, focusing on SMEs operating in townships and 
CBD areas in Gauteng in 2003, and found that inflation, interest rates, competition, 
technology change and credit management were of particular concern for the 
success of SMEs. All these challenges need to be taken into account when 
developing the conceptual model for SMEs in PPP projects. 
 
5.3.3.2 Causes of challenges and their possible solutions 
 
The main reason why SMEs encounter the problems mentioned above is lack of 
appropriate management skills. Figure 5.11 shows that about 80% of the 
respondents indicated that poor management of SME firms is the main cause of the 
problems that PPP firms face when certain services are supplied by SMEs. The 
second main cause is lack of appropriate human resources, followed by lack of 
64%
66%
68%
70%
72%
74%
76%
78%
80%
82%
Failure to deliver Late delivery Poor quality
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access to finance. Lack of appropriate technology and poor relationship between 
SMEs and PPP firms respectively were not identified as major problems. The 
majority of respondents think finding ways to improve managerial skills of SMEs 
should be a priority, followed by providing SMEs with training to improve the quality 
of skills for their employees. Another important factor is improving access to finance. 
Although access to technology is also seen as a hindrance, the respondents did not 
consider acquiring relevant technology as a high priority area that needs immediate 
attention by SMEs. 
 
Figure 5.11: Causes of challenges (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Survey conducted by Author 
 
Respondents were also asked to rate (from 1 to 6) the impact of the causes of the 
challenges faced by PPP firms using SMEs to provide services. The results of the 
ratings are presented in Figure 5.12, where a rating of 1 means a less significant 
impact and a rating of 6 means a significant impact. Poor management skills for 
SMEs have a significant impact on the performance of SMEs providing services to 
PPP projects. About 95% of the respondents who answered this question gave this 
factor a rating of 4 to 6, and only 5% of the respondents gave it a rating of 1 to 3.  
 
The next significant factor is lack of finance, followed by lack of appropriate human 
resources. Poor relationship with PPP project operators had no significant impact on 
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the performance of SMEs. The rating of the challenges is consistent with the results 
presented in Figure 5.11 above. 
 
Figure 5.12: Rating of factors affecting SMEs’ performance (%)11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Survey conducted by Author 
 
 
5.3.3.3 Interventions by PPP firms to help SMEs cope with challenges 
 
PPP firms were also asked which types of intervention/s they had provided to SMEs 
in order for SMEs to overcome the identified challenges. When asked how their 
companies had helped SMEs that provide services to their firms, the majority of the 
respondents indicated that they provided SMEs with human capacity building (60%) 
and finance or helped them get easy access to finance (50%) (see Figure 5.13). The 
majority of PPP firms have assisted SMEs with human capacity-building to help 
SMEs cope with the challenges identified above. About 5% of the respondents said 
their PPP firms had done nothing to help SMEs cope with the identified challenges. 
Although lack of appropriate technology was not seen as the main problem facing 
SMEs, acquiring the right technology for the services to be provided to PPP firms 
can go a long way in helping SMEs improve the quality of the services they provide 
to PPP firms. As it can be seen from Figure 5.13, the amount of assistance provided 
by PPP firms to SMEs is in response to the challenges that PPP firms face when 
                                                          
11
 A rating of 1–3 means less significant to medium impact, while a rating of 4-6 means significant impact 
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dealing with SMEs. Most of the efforts from PPP firms went towards helping SMEs 
improve human capacity, followed by improving access to finance. 
 
Figure 5.13: Assistance provided by PPP firms to SMEs (%) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Survey conducted by Author 
 
5.3.3.4 Employment and growth by SMEs providing services to PPP projects 
 
Figure 5.14 shows the number of employees employed by SMEs that provide 
services to PPP projects. The result show that, on average, the majority of SMEs 
that are contracted by PPP project companies employ between 0 and 20 employees 
(30,8%), followed by those who employ 21 to 40 and those employing more than 100 
employees (23,1%). This trend follows the one for the rand share of services 
outsourced to SMEs versus big firms shown in Figure 5.8.  
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Figure 5.14: Number of employees employed by SMEs in PPP projects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Survey conducted by Author 
 
Table 5.3 gives the number of people that the different SMEs employed in the 
beginning of their respective contracts with PPP firms and the current number of 
people who were still employed by the different SMEs during the research period. 
These employment figures do not include SMEs that provide services to PPP firms 
for a specific project, say not more than six months. Most of the SMEs that provided 
information on employment had a contract for at least three years and the figures 
presented here are for permanent employees.  
 
Eight PPP projects were covered by the employment figures, although other 
respondents refused to answer questions on employment. This translates to 57% of 
the PPP projects that comprised the study sample. SME1 to SME6 provide services 
to office blocks PPPs, SME7 provide service to prison PPP, SME8 to SME12 provide 
services to road PPPs and SME13 provide services to a hospital PPP. There were 
no responses received from SMEs providing services to water and conservation PPP 
projects. 
 
It is clear from Table 5.3 that the number of people employed by the different SMEs 
increased during the contracts period. It is also observed that SMEs that have been 
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operative or provided services to PPP projects for a longer period have increased 
their number of employees by a bigger margin over the years.   
 
Table 5.3: Employment by SMEs in PPP projects 
 Starting 
period  
SME 
1 
SME 
2 
SME 
3 
SME 
412 
SME 
5 
SME 
613 
SME 
7 
SME 
8 
SME 
9 
SME 
10 
SME 
11 
SME 
12 
SME 
13 
Starting 
employment14 
9 20 24 0 4 343 33 100 10 4 16 6 18 
Current 
employment-
2015 
15 36 36 2 4 350 65 200 36 100 107 60 24 
Percentage 
increase (%) 
67 80 50 100 0 2 97 100 260 2400 569 900 33 
Source: Survey conducted by the Author 
 
SME 1=facility management, SME 2= cleaning, SME 3=catering, SME 4=CCTV, SME 5= Garden services, SME 6= combined 
services for office block, SME 7=asset maintenance in general, SME 8= road maintenance, rehabilitation and accidents 
response, SME 9=security, SME 10=road maintenance, SME11=rehabilitation and accidents response, SME 12= toll collection, 
SME13=security 
 
5.3.3.5 Practice and challenges in fostering the use of SMEs by PPP firms 
 
When respondents were asked whether their PPP firms outsource some of the 
services they need, 82% said yes and 15% said their PPP firms do not outsource 
(see Figure 5.15a). It is worth noting that these PPP firms that outsource services do 
not only outsource their services to SMEs alone, but to both SMEs and big firms. 
Therefore the 82% represent services provided by both SMEs and big firms. Some 
of these PPP firms only outsource to big firms. When those respondents whose 
responses were no, were asked to give reasons why their PPP firms do not 
outsource to SMEs, the responses were that the extent of risk that can be 
transferred to SMEs can be over-whelming for many SMEs, while others said they 
had not ventured to this idea because the National Treasury PPP Unit first needed to 
be well-resourced and stabilised before PPP firms could consider using SMEs 
intensively. Others argued that the quality of work provided by some SMEs is not of 
a high standard, thus PPP firms are reluctant to employ SMEs, as most SMEs lack 
experience and capacity (see Figure 5.15b). It was also argued by the respondents 
                                                          
12
 There were no staff members employed in the beginning of the project. 
13
 The figure under this SME represents a number of SMEs providing services to the PPP project. The researcher could not 
get disaggregated figure. 
14
 The starting operation date for SME1 to 5 and SME13 was 2010.  For SME 6 was 2003, for SME 7 was 2002, for SME 8 
was 1997, and for SMEs 10,11,12 was 1997. 
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81,8
15,2
3
5.15a: Practise in outsourcing of 
services by PPPs (%)
yes No Not applicable
that PPPs are too expensive for SMEs and the finances needed by SMEs to 
participate in PPP projects can be difficult to access for most SMEs. In the tourism 
sector, because of the remoteness of nature reserves, finding a suitable SME is a 
challenge therefore in many cases PPPs struggle to find a suitable SME firm. 
 
Figure 5.15: Practices and challenges in fostering the use of SMEs in PPPs 
Source: Survey conducted by the Author 
 
From the public sector perspective, the main challenge in improving the participation 
of SMEs in PPP projects was found to be the lack of suitable SMEs to provide the 
required services due to the challenges mentioned earlier that SMEs lack skills and 
access to finance; as a result they may have difficulties in meeting the expectations 
of PPP firms in terms of service quality and delivery. Given the respondents’ 
experience with PPP projects and the involvement of SMEs as HDI-owned 
companies in PPPs, the public sector respondents argue that most of the SME 
companies are technically and financially weak. As a result some of them opt for 
financial compensation and to be bought out of the projects by big firms. Another 
argument made by the public sector respondents was that it is difficult for a big 
project to involve SMEs because that would mean to have a number of them coming 
together in order to have the capacity to deliver the service, which brings about new 
challenges. Other respondents mentioned reluctance of PPP firms to use SMEs as a 
challenge for increasing the participation of SMEs in the PPP market. This may be 
because of the poor quality service that PPP firms receive from SMEs such as late 
delivery and substandard services.  
3,0
45,551
5.15b: Challenges in fostering the use 
of SMEs by PPPs from a public sector's 
perspective (%)
PPP firms reluctant to use SMEs
Lack of suitable SMEs
Other
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5.4 Improving participation of SMEs in PPP projects 
 
This section focuses mainly on the structured questions of the questionnaire which 
include the complementary questions asked during the second survey. The main 
objective of these questions was to obtain respondents’ views on what, in their 
opinion, needs to be done in order to promote the participation of SMEs in PPP 
projects. 
 
5.4.1 SMEs as a requirement for public-private partnerships projects 
 
The public sector respondents were asked what the main reason was why the 
department or government agency decided to use PPPs as a way of procuring 
infrastructure instead of following the traditional approach to infrastructure 
procurement. All the respondents indicated that the main reasons to follow the PPP 
approach was to obtain the much needed skills such as design and construction of 
big infrastructure projects which the public sector did not have at the time. Other 
reasons include securing private funding through private-party lending and equity 
contribution, as the public sector did not have the required finances to build the 
needed infrastructure. Transfer of risk to the private sector, which is better able to 
manage it, was also an important reason to go the PPP route and to take advantage 
of the private sector efficiencies in delivering infrastructure projects. It also emerged 
from the survey that the PPP approach was followed to ensure that overall value for 
money was achieved in all projects.  
 
When the public sector respondents were asked whether SME participation was a 
requirement for the PPP bids, the researcher received different responses. Some 
respondents said yes while others said no. After some further probing, it emerged 
that those who said yes, were referring to the requirement for historically 
disadvantaged individuals (HDIs) as stipulated in the Preferential Procurement 
Regulations of 2001 pertaining to the preferential procurement policy framework Act: 
No. 5 of 2000 by the National Treasury. Section 4 of these Regulations requires that 
a minimum of 10 points may be awarded to a bid for a tender with a procurement 
value above R500 000 for being a historically disadvantaged individual (HDI) and/or 
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subcontracting with an HDI and/or achieving any of the specified goals stipulated in 
regulation 7. Regulation 7 states that an organ of state must, stipulate the preference 
point system which will be applied in the adjudication of tenders in the tender 
document.   
 
Given the fact that most HDI-owned companies are SMEs, in that way SMEs were 
indirectly a requirement for PPP projects. However, it needs to be noted that HDIs’ 
requirement only includes SMEs owned by previously disadvantaged South Africans. 
It is worth noting that this requirement is not compulsory; it merely increases bidders’ 
chances of winning a tender. This means that a bidder can still not fulfil this 
requirement and capitalise on the remaining 90% points and get the tender awarded 
to it. In the early PPP projects before the Preferential Procumbent Regulations of 
2001 came into being, the Request for Proposals (RFP) for PPP projects required 
that bidders indicate how they would support socio-economic development initiatives 
of government during both the construction and operational phases of the projects. 
As a result bidders would mention the use of SMEs as one way in which they would 
promote socio-economic development initiatives of government.   
 
An important observation that respondents also made was that before the 
Preferential Procurement Regulations of 2001 came into being, the commitment 
made by bidders in terms of supporting SMEs during the construction and 
operational phases of the PPP projects were higher than what the Preferential 
Procurement Regulations of 2001 requires and many service providers achieved 
higher percentage of SMEs participation in terms of Rand amount used for 
promoting SMEs than the minimum required by the current regulation of not more 
than 10 percentage points.   
 
It is clear from the results of the survey that SME participation is not a direct 
requirement for PPP projects, as bid requirements for PPP projects tend to focus 
more on the technical requirements of the projects and the ability of the service 
provider to deliver a project at the right time and the right cost with a small 
requirement for compliance with the transformation laws of the country. The question 
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is: Can this requirement transform the SME industry in PPP projects in the country? 
The answer to this question is discussed in the next chapter of this study. 
 
5.4.2 Expectation for PPP firms to meet certain SME requirement 
 
When respondents were asked whether RFPs for PPP projects stipulated any 
requirement to be met on the participation of SMEs and what these requirements 
were, the responses were that the only requirements were those stipulated in the 
transformation legislation, which requires that a certain percentage (at most 10 
percentage points) must be awarded to a company owned or contracting a company 
owned by HDIs. During the first PPPs where bidders were asked to propose as to 
how they would develop socio-economic initiatives, the proposals were used as a 
basis or target for performance monitoring purposes against which their performance 
was measured. Some of these requirements included significant development of 
companies owned by HDIs, through significant business support, and that the HDI-
owned companies should be empowered in order to be able to stand on their own 
during the operational stage or after the project has been completed. 
 
When respondents were asked whether successful bidders met the targets as they 
proposed them to the public sector agency responsible for the PPP projects, the 
responses were yes, as the targets used to measure their performance were only 
based on the proposal made. However, as discussed above, the targets they set for 
themselves were much higher than the target set by the Preferential Procurement 
Regulations of 2001. With regards to monitoring their commitments the companies 
had to submit quarterly/bi-annual empowerment reports to the public sector entity 
owning the project. The promises made in the proposal/bid became a commitment 
against which the performance of the service provider had to be measured. In cases 
where PPP firms failed to meet their commitments, agreements were reached 
between the PPP firm and the public sector agent to invest in an off-set project. The 
off-set project could be in another sector or in the same sector, if it proved difficult to 
meet the requirements within the PPP project. 
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5.4.3 Improving the participation of SMEs in PPP projects 
 
Respondents were asked how they thought the participation of SMEs in PPP 
projects could be improved and also asked about who they thought should play a 
significant role in improving the participation of SMEs in PPP projects. With regards 
to improving the participation of SMEs in PPP projects, most respondents (mainly 
SMEs and public-sector respondents) thought the state should lead in this area by 
creating an environment conducive for both the SMEs and the PPP firms. The state 
should enforce the participation of SMEs by making it a mandatory requirement 
through legislation or through the concessionaire contract that any PPP project 
should have a significant SMEs content in it. This can be done in addition to the 
transformation requirement of the Preferential Procurement Regulations of 2001. 
The state should provide training to SMEs in areas where SMEs struggle, such as 
providing managerial skills and financial management skills. With regards to who 
should play a significant role in promoting the participation of SMEs in PPP projects, 
respondents opined that both the state and the PPP firms should play a significant 
role; however, the responsibility should start with the state; the state should start by 
ensuring that SMEs are able to access opportunities in PPP projects. This can be 
done through legislation.   
 
The concessionaire should drive the participation of SMEs, while the state monitors 
progress and addresses any obstacles. Respondents also mentioned that using 
PPPs to build a sustainable SME sector is a good idea and has a lot of potential to 
succeed. This is because PPP projects bring together the private and the public 
sector to achieve the same goal. In many cases initiatives fail because it is difficult 
for participating parties to bring the private sector and the public sector together, but 
PPPs are capable of doing that. This means, by having a PPP project, the difficulty 
of bringing the private sector and the public sector together has already been 
overcome. Respondents also argued that the state and the private sector can easily 
start working out socio-economic strategies or initiatives that would benefit both 
parties in the long term. The two parties can agree on who should do what in order to 
improve the participation of SMEs in PPP projects. 
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It also emerged from the survey that the state needs to have clear policy direction 
and make consistent decisions or policy statements to improve regulatory certainty 
which is the biggest worry for private firms working in PPP projects. Policy decisions 
need to be taken promptly by the state, especially on issues that affect private-sector 
investment decisions. This can improve certainty in the economy and boost investor 
confidence. Once the private sector has certainty and confidence about the future 
direction of government policy, it would be possible to see an increase in private 
sector investment in the country. It can also make it easy for the private sector to 
work together with government to address other long-term socio-economic issues.  
 
Table 5.4 summarises the survey responses on how the participation of SMEs in 
PPP projects could be improved and who respondents thought should play a 
significant role. 
 
Table 5.4: Improving participation of SMEs in PPP projects 
Respondents’ opinions on how the participation of 
SMEs in PPP projects can be improved (things to be 
done by government) 
Respondents’ views on who should play a 
significant role in improving the 
participation of SMEs in PPP projects 
between government and the PPP 
company and why (things to be done by 
PPP firms) 
Government should put mechanisms in place to give 
incentives to PPP companies who actively involve 
SMEs 
The role of empowerment should be the 
task of both parties, as this can ensure a 
certain degree of credibility that will 
ensure SMEs are trained to successfully 
integrate and benefit from the PPP 
project 
SMEs need to acquire management skills in general 
and financial management skills in particular to 
ensure that problems are addressed as early as they 
emerge, such skills can be provided by the state 
PPP company (concessionaire) must 
take responsibility for assisting SMEs to 
deliver services required by the 
concessionaire by helping SMEs with skill 
development and access to technology 
and finance. 
Government should put mechanisms in place to give 
preferential treatment to PPP companies who actively 
involve SMEs 
The concessionaire should drive process 
of SME participation in PPP projects and 
government monitor progress 
Base all activities on business ethics, sound business 
principles and best practices. Business management, 
skills development and training in business 
intelligence should be a prerequisite for the increased 
PPP operator needs to have good 
oversight skills to identify problems at an 
early stage so that the SME can be 
assisted not to get into troubles, 
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Respondents’ opinions on how the participation of 
SMEs in PPP projects can be improved (things to be 
done by government) 
Respondents’ views on who should play a 
significant role in improving the 
participation of SMEs in PPP projects 
between government and the PPP 
company and why (things to be done by 
PPP firms) 
participation of SMEs in PPP projects particularly financially due to non-
performance 
A database of SMEs, ranked based on performance 
during the past five years, may assist 
concessionaires to select appropriate SME partners. 
PPP contracts should require the concessionaires to 
have a programme of skills transfer allowing SME 
participation to increase during the period of the 
contract 
All participants should play a role, 
especially the PPP company. The PPP 
company needs to make sure that it gets 
appropriate services or product from 
SMEs that can assist them in delivering 
the service as specified within the PPP 
agreement. 
The government’s role should be to create the right 
environment for the SME's to acquire the correct 
skills. The SMEs also need to put effort on their side 
to acquire those skills 
 
Government should ensure that SMEs take part in the 
forming of concessionaire rather than being add-on 
towards the end to satisfy government requirements 
 
 
More clear objectives to be set on what and how 
much of the work to be outsourced to SME's and 
government to monitor compliance with these targets 
 
Skills transfer, as well as policy development to 
integrate SME’s to the current PPP market system is 
a necessity 
 
Government should incentivise PPP companies, may 
be through tax breaks for using SMEs to provide 
some of their services 
 
Government to assist with access to finance for 
SMEs to procure goods that can be delivered to the 
PPPs 
 
PPP company should lead, but government should 
provide stringent policy and legislation to enforce 
compliance 
 
Provide realistic requirements in PPP contracts and 
avoid over expectations, knowing what SMEs can 
and cannot do will be helpful 
 
Government intervention should be embedded in the 
concessionaire contract and should not be construed 
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Respondents’ opinions on how the participation of 
SMEs in PPP projects can be improved (things to be 
done by government) 
Respondents’ views on who should play a 
significant role in improving the 
participation of SMEs in PPP projects 
between government and the PPP 
company and why (things to be done by 
PPP firms) 
as interference 
Government should train SMEs about opportunities in 
PPP projects by publishing a list of PPP projects and 
associated opportunities for SMEs on its website 
 
Source: Survey conducted by Author 
 
The responses given by respondents in the above table show that most of the things 
that need to be done in order to increase the participation of SMEs in PPP projects 
need to be done by the state. Low participation of SMEs in PPP projects should not 
be blamed only on the failure of PPP firms, but should also be blamed on the 
government’s failure to provide the right environment for PPP firms to use SMEs in 
PPP projects. The creation of such an environment involves the development of a 
clear policy on how SMEs should be involved in PPP projects. Such policy would 
assist PPP firms in engaging with SMEs for available opportunities within PPP 
projects. 
 
5.4.4 Missing factors in the current South African PPP model 
 
Respondents were also asked what they thought is missing in the current PPP 
model if it was to be used as a tool to alleviate poverty and unemployment. 
Respondents thought the model should specifically incorporate SMEs. If big projects 
can be divided into smaller projects where possible, to allow participation of SMEs in 
such projects, PPPs can be a good starting point to fight unemployment and poverty. 
The requirement for HDIs participation in PPP projects which indirectly includes 
SMEs, limit the potential of what can be achieved with PPP projects, because PPP 
firms bidding for PPP projects just aim to achieve the minimum and do not go 
beyond what the RFP requires. If the current requirement to involve HDIs/SMEs in 
PPP projects could be made a minimum requirement, it could be left open for 
bidders to propose more than the minimum and extra points could be awarded to 
those that propose to do more than the minimum requirement. Such an approach 
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could yield better results and maximise the potential of PPP projects in creating jobs 
and alleviating poverty. This means that the RFP should be incentive-based, 
meaning bidders that propose to do more than what the PFMA requires in terms of 
transformation should be allocated more points by the bid evaluators. 
 
Other respondents think the concessionaire should have a built-in condition that 
would force PPP firms to develop SMEs and be given a period in which the public 
sector agency implementing the project can monitor the progress made. If the 
requirement is not met penalties should be effected. They argue that this is possible, 
as the PPP project has already brought together the private and the public sector, 
which is normally difficult to do. As discussed above, the two parties can work out a 
viable approach that can be used to develop SMEs in such a way that both parties 
benefit in the process. Incentives should be part of the procurement requirement so 
that PPP companies can respond to the RFP with innovative ideas on how they 
would develop SMEs.  
 
There are those who argue that trying to force the participation of SMEs in PPP 
projects is not feasible, given the fact that PPP projects are big and require huge 
resources that SMEs do not have, and it may be difficult to break PPP projects down 
into smaller projects in order to accommodate SMEs. This argument may be correct 
at the construction stage of PPP projects; however at the operational stage the 
services that need to be provided by a third party to a PPP project are already 
disaggregated and they require different types of SMEs with different skill sets. Even 
at the construction there are a lot of activities that are performed by SMEs. The 
argument in this study is that it does not make sense to lump services such as 
maintenance, catering, security, laundry and toll/tariff collection together and award a 
contract to a single firm to provide them to the client. It is possible to award different 
contracts for these services to different SMEs to provide these services.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
The results of the research survey has shown that PPP firms do outsource services 
to either SMEs or big firms and that a number of PPP firms have a policy that 
encourages the use of SMEs to provide certain services. However, the research 
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results found that these policies are really not SME policies, but a requirement as per 
the Preferential Procurement Regulations that preferences for awarding government 
tenders should be given to companies that are HDI- compliant. It has also been 
found that PPP firms outsource a number of services during the operational phase of 
the projects. Such services include but are not limited to asset maintenance of the 
assets, provision of security, catering services, laundry services, toll collection and IT 
services. PPPs that can outsource most of their services are water and sanitation, 
office accommodation and hospitals PPPs.   
 
The study results have also shown that most of the outsourced services are provided 
by big firms, as the percentage in Rand value that goes to SMEs is small compared 
to the share that goes to big firms. The share of services provided by SMEs is high in 
the lower end (0 to 20%) and lower at the higher end (61% and above), while the 
share of services (in rand amount) provided by big firms is low at the lower end and 
high at the higher end. This shows that SMEs only provide a small percentage of the 
total services outsourced by PPP firms.  
 
The study results also found that PPP firms do not give special treatment to SMEs 
when SMEs bid for a tender. This is because the requirements of most of PPP 
projects focus mainly on the technical and financial abilities to deliver the project in 
time and at the lowest cost possible and on the transfer of risk to the private party. 
This shows that in most cases SMEs are contracted based on fitness for purpose. 
The survey results also showed that the most challenges faced by SMEs in the PPP 
market is failure to deliver services on time and poor quality services delivered. The 
results showed that these problems are due to a lack of human capacity within the 
SME sector as a whole. Lack of human capacity had been identified in the literature 
as one of the main challenges that most SMEs are faced with. Poor management 
skills, which are also linked to a lack of human capacity was highlighted as the main 
reason why SMEs fail to deliver services at the right time and quality, followed by the 
lack of staff skills and access to finance. 
 
Although SMEs provide services to PPP firms, however, SMEs struggle with many 
challenges, a number of PPP firms had helped SMEs with capacity building and 
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facilitated their access to finance, while another few have helped SMEs acquire the 
right technology for the services to be provided by the SMEs to the PPP firms. Most 
respondents thought the state should play a leading role in making sure that the 
participation of SMEs in PPP projects is improved by creating an environment 
conducive for both the SMEs and the PPP firms. This does not mean PPPs should 
not also take responsibility for the development of SMEs. Respondents thought that 
PPP firms should play a role in helping SMEs in areas where SMEs struggle, such 
as lack of human capacity and managerial skills.  
 
In order to improve the current PPP model and to encourage the participation of 
SMEs, most of the respondents thought the South African PPP model should 
specifically or directly incorporate SMEs in its structure. The SME requirement 
should be incentive-based, as the minimum for HDIs as stipulated in the Preferential 
Procurement Regulations of 2001 limits the potential of what can be achieved with 
PPP projects. This is because PPP firms bidding for PPP projects just aim at 
achieving the minimum and do not go beyond what the RFP requires. In a case 
where the requirement to involve SMEs in PPP projects is made a minimum, it 
should be left open for bidders to propose more than the minimum, and those that 
propose to do more than the minimum requirement should be awarded. Such 
approach can yield better results and maximise the potential of PPP projects in 
creating jobs and alleviating poverty.   
 
The study has also found that the main reasons why the public sector followed the 
PPP approach to procure infrastructure projects was to obtain the much needed 
skills, such as design and construction of big infrastructure projects which the public 
sector did not have at the time. Other reasons include securing private funding 
through private-party lending and equity contribution, as the public sector did not 
have the required finances to build the needed infrastructure. Transfer of risk to the 
private sector who is better able to manage it was also an important reason to go the 
PPP route and to take advantage of the private sector efficiencies in delivering 
infrastructure projects. 
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CHAPTER 6: SYNTHESIS AND ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH RESULTS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 5 presented the research results based on the data collected through a 
research survey. This chapter analyses and synthesises the data and the survey 
findings presented in Chapter 5 to establish whether the data answer the research 
questions and prove or disprove the research propositions as presented in Section 
6.2 below. 
 
The chapter is therefore organised as follows: The second section (Section 6.2) 
gives a contextual overview of this chapter in relation to other chapters of the study. 
The third section gives an analysis and synthesis of the research information as 
presented in Chapter 5 in relation to the main research questions (MRQs) and their 
respective propositions. The fourth section summaries the research key findings and 
shows whether the research has answered the main research sub-questions and 
proved or disproved their respective propositions. The fifth section gives a summary 
discussion on the different challenges faced by PPP firms when using SMEs to 
supply them with goods and services, and suggests possible solutions to the 
identified problems. The last section gives the chapter summary. 
 
6.2 Contextual overview of the research results  
 
Chapter 5 forms the foundation on which the discussions in this chapter are based. 
As mentioned above, Chapter 4 presented the methodology or research approach 
for the study survey used to collect the information analysed in Chapter 5 and this 
chapter. The information collected through the survey and presented in Chapter 5 
seek to answer the main research question of the study as presented in Section 1.13 
in Chapter 1: “How can the South African government use PPP projects to 
develop its SME sector?”  
 
The information collected and presented in Chapter 5 covers information on a high 
level on PPP firms’ practices on outsourcing services to a third party (see Section 
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5.3.1), current practices in the use of SMEs by PPP project firms (see Section 5.3.2), 
challenges in using SMEs in PPP projects (see Section 5.3.3), how the participation 
of SMEs can be improved in PPP projects (see Section 5.4), and information on 
what roles should be played by both the public and private sectors in ensuring 
improved participation of SMEs in PPP projects (see Table 5.4 of Section 5.4.3). 
 
The information presented in the above-mentioned sections and their subsections 
seek to answer the four main research sub-questions of the study (MRQI to MRQIV) 
and to prove or disprove their respective propositions (P1 to P4). The four main 
research sub-questions and their respective propositions are: 
  
MRQI: How have PPP projects in the country helped SME development? 
P1:  Contracting SMEs to provide certain services to PPP firms has contributed 
to SMEs’ growth in the country. 
 
MRQII: What are the problems or challenges faced by PPP project firms when 
using SMEs to supply services? 
P2:  PPP firms face different problems when using SMEs to supply goods and 
services and lack of skills is the root cause of most of the problems. 
 
MRQIII: How the involvement of SMEs be increased in PPP projects? 
P3:  There are a number of ways in which the involvement of SMEs in PPP 
projects can be enhanced. 
 
MRQIV: Does an appropriate PPP model for increasing the participation of SMEs in 
PPP projects exist that will respond to the South African economic 
challenges?  
P4: There is an appropriate model for sustainable SMEs development that can 
respond to the South African economic challenges.     
 
The following section answers the respective research questions. 
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6.3 Answering the main research sub-questions (MRQs) and their 
respective propositions 
The objective of this section is to answer the four main research sub-questions and 
to prove or disprove their respective propositions, with the aim of eventually 
answering the main research question that this study seeks to answer, as stated 
above. To answer the main research question the following research sub-questions 
and their propositions need to be answered: 
 
6.3.1 Answering the first Main Research Sub-question (MRQI)  
MRQI: How have PPP projects in the country helped SMEs development?  
 
The research has found that PPP projects had helped SME development in the 
country in different ways. Both PPPs and SMEs working together in a PPP project 
had faced challenges. These challenges are as a result of several factors affecting 
SMEs’ abilities to deliver services to PPP firms on time and in good quality. To prove 
that indeed PPP projects had helped SMEs’ growth in the country, the current 
practices by PPP firms in terms of involving SMEs in PPP projects are presented 
under Section 5.3.1, 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 of Chapter 5. The analysis of these practices 
covers PPP firms’ current practices in terms of outsourcing of services to SMEs and 
big firms (Section 5.3.1), PPP companies’ policy on the use of SMEs (Section 
5.3.1.1), services that PPP firms outsource to SMEs (Figure 5.4a) and types of 
enterprises that provide services to PPP projects (Figure 5.5). Following is a detailed 
discussion on the current PPP industry practices in using SMEs to provide services 
to PPP projects. 
 
6.3.1.1 Policy on the use of SMEs by PPP firms 
 
The current practice by PPP firms in terms of having a policy that facilitates the use 
of SMEs in PPP projects was presented in Section 5.3.1.1 of Chapter 5. This section 
shows that the majority of PPP companies outsource services they need to a third 
party. This third party can either be an SME or a big firm. It is also clear in this 
section that the majority of PPP firms had a policy on the use of SMEs in their PPP 
projects. Although the majority of PPP firms claimed to have a policy on the use of 
SMEs, the study also found that some companies confused SME policy with the 
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Preferential Procurement Regulations of 2001, which promotes the participation of 
Historically Disadvantaged Individuals (HDIs) in the economy. This was found during 
the complementary survey. However, what is important is that some PPP firms do 
make use of SMEs in their PPP projects (see Figure 5.5). This is an indication that 
PPP projects do help SME development in the country.  
 
Although the majority of them claim to have a policy on the use of SMEs, the 
question that remains is how much of the outsourced work is provided by SMEs. The 
survey found that only a small portion of outsourced work is allocated to SMEs, while 
the bigger share is allocated to big firms (see Figure 5.8a and Figure 5.8b of Section 
5.3.2.4). This is worrying because SMEs are seen as a catalyst for economic growth 
and development. This may also show that SMEs lack the capacity to undertake 
major PPP contracts; hence the low share as found by the study or this finding may 
also show that PPP firms deliberately decide not to contract SMEs in PPP projects.  
 
The more SMEs used to provide services to PPP projects, the more job opportunities 
are to be created for the poor. Section 3.2 of Chapter 3 explains in detail why SMEs 
have a high potential to contribute to economic growth and development compared 
to big firms. As it has already been argued in Chapter 3, Section 3.2, SMEs are 
responsible for growing employment at a faster rate than large organisations, they 
increase the competitive intensity of the market and reduce the monopolistic 
positions of large organisations; while they also encourage the deployment of 
entrepreneurial skills and innovation. SMEs are therefore effective job creators and 
are sources of income for a big proportion of a country’s population (AL-Mubaraki 
and Aruna. 2013:157).    
 
This research cannot definitively conclude that PPP firms have a policy on the use of 
SMEs to provide some of the services they need for their PPP projects. However, it 
can be concluded that many PPP firms are aware that they have to involve SMEs in 
the operation of PPP projects as subcontractors. It is not clear whether they involve 
SMEs because of their internal policy or because of the Preferential Procurement 
Regulations of 2001 that requires them to involve companies owned by HDIs, thus 
indirectly involving SMEs. However, the latter seems to be the possibility, as it is 
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difficult to believe why a private company should worry about developing SMEs, as 
its aim is to receive a good service; whether it is provided by an SME or a big firm 
does not matter. 
 
6.3.1.2 Services PPP firms outsource and type of firms providing the service  
 
Services that PPP firms can render or outsource to either SMEs or big firms and 
enterprises providing the services, and factors considered when awarding contracts 
to SMEs were presented in Section 5.3.2.1, 5.3.2.2 and Section 5.3.2.3 of Chapter 5 
respectively. Figure 5.4a of Section 5.3.1.2 presents respondents’ views and 
experiences on the usefulness of SMEs in PPP projects based on their experience 
from working in PPP projects, either from a government or a PPP firm’s perspective. 
The results of the study showed that SMEs can, as they already do, provide services 
to PPP projects, especially at the operational phase of a PPP project (see Table 5.1 
for services provided by SMEs to PPP projects). Table 5.2 of Section 5.3.2.1 shows 
the types of services that SMEs can provide to PPP projects during the operational 
phase. These include services such as maintenance of PPP assets, security, 
information technology, catering, toll collection and laundry services. Some of these 
services are already being provided by SMEs. The table also shows that some PPP 
projects have a potential to outsource more services to SMEs than others during the 
operational phase of the projects. It can be argued that these types of PPP projects 
have a high potential for job opportunities, compared to those that outsource few 
services to SMEs at their operational phases. The study has found that the role of 
big foreign firms and SME firms is small in the PPP market; however, the PPP 
market is dominated by big local firms, as they are the ones that have the financial 
and technical abilities to respond to the requirements of PPP projects. This finding is 
shown in Figure 5.5 of Section 5.3.2.2. The majority of services are supplied by 
either big local firms or local SMEs, as shown in Figure 5.5, with zero participation by 
foreign firms. 
 
The study has also found that, although SMEs already provide services to PPP 
projects, the participation of SMEs in PPP projects is not at a satisfactory level. In 
order to increase the participation of SMEs in PPPs there is a need for a government 
policy that will force PPP project firms to effectively use SMEs in their PPP projects. 
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Table 5.4 of Section 5.4.3 gives respondents’ views on how the participation of 
SMEs in PPP projects can be improved to a satisfactory level. The provision of start-
up capital and skills to SME firms are some of the areas that respondents think need 
government’s interventions in order to improve the effectiveness of SMEs in 
providing services to PPP firms.  
 
This research can indeed conclude that there are services that PPP firms can or do 
currently outsource to SMEs. This proves that PPP projects in the country had 
helped SME development. There is no doubt that SMEs that have been providing 
services to PPP projects have developed some experience in providing these 
services to PPP projects, and that has assisted SMEs with developing expertise in 
the areas of subcontracting to PPP projects in particular and infrastructure projects in 
general.    
 
6.3.1.3 Factors and priorities given by PPP firms in awarding contracts to 
SMEs 
Section 5.3.2.3 of Chapter 5 presented research results on factors considered and 
priorities that PPP firms give to SMEs when awarding contracts to SMEs and also 
targets for awarding tenders to SMEs. 
 
The research has found that the majority of PPP firms appoint SMEs mainly based 
on fitness for purpose (see Figure 5.6 in Section 5.3.2.3), meaning there is no 
preferential treatment given to SME when tendering for a PPP project. This practice 
puts SMEs at a disadvantage because most SMEs lack the technical and financial 
abilities to compete effectively with big firms for PPP tenders, especially if services to 
be provided to PPP projects are bundled together to few big projects that cannot be 
executed by SMEs due to resource requirements needed to execute big projects. 
This finding is supported by literature in that SMEs normally struggle with four things, 
namely human resources, access to market, access to technology and access to 
finance (see Section 3.3 of the Chapter 3). This finding supports the view that there 
is a need for government intervention in order to ensure that SMEs get special 
treatment when competing with large firms for PPP tenders.   
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This intervention can be in the form of a policy that forces PPP firms to set aside a 
certain percentage of the tender amount to be provided by SMEs. This is possible, 
especially when services to be provided to PPP projects are disbundled or 
disaggregated into smaller but viable projects that can be executed by SME firms. 
Table 5.2 of Section 5.3.2.1 in Chapter 5 shows some of the services that can be 
provided by SMEs at the operational phase of a PPP project, while Table 7.4 shows 
those services that can be provided by SMEs at both construction and operational 
phases of a PPP project. Most of these services do not require a lot of up-front 
capital investment and do not require too advanced technologies to provide them. 
However, if all these services were to be bundled together into one big project and to 
be provided by one firm, it can be difficult for SMEs to provide them because that 
would require a lot of up-front capital which many SMEs may not have. The 
subcontracting conditions should however be such that SMEs are able to participate 
even in capital-intensive projects. At the construction phase of the PPP project, PPP 
firms should be required by law to identify certain services that could be provided by 
SMEs. In a road PPP, such services could include installation of guardrails, road 
surface markings, road signs installation, plumbing work and other services that do 
not require large scale operation such as constructing the road itself.  
 
A study by the Construction Industry Development Board (2013:6) undertaken in 
2013, found that in South Africa the amount of work subcontracted to SMEs in the 
civil engineering construction is low compared to the total for the construction 
industry as a whole. In the civil engineering construction, general consensus is that 
20%–30% of the tender value is subcontracted to both SMEs and large firms, 
compared to an estimated average of between 55% and 80% for the construction 
industry as a whole. However, these figures are estimates, as there is no accurate 
data in South Africa. In Hong Kong, this figure increased from 47% in 1983 to 60% in 
2003. The low percentage in the civil engineering construction in South Africa is due 
to the capital-intensive nature of the projects. As a result, SMEs end up doing less 
capital-intensive work such as steel fixing, road marking and others. Given this 
information, it is clear that at the construction phase of PPP projects and other big 
infrastructure projects there is a reasonable level of subcontracting taking place, and 
this opens opportunities to ensure that SMEs are not left out. SMEs should not be 
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limited only to less capital-intensive work, but should be able to also participate in 
capital-intensive jobs. This can be made possible through government interventions 
to improve SMEs’ abilities to access funding for bigger and capital-intensive projects. 
It is worth noting that today’s SMEs are tomorrow’s big construction firms, therefore 
their development from SMEs to big firms is imperative. 
 
Although some of the PPP firms allocate contracts to SMEs as per the requirement 
of some tenders, this is not enough, as the tender requirement does not stipulate 
precisely as to how much of the tender should be given to SMEs; it merely specify 
the percentage points to be given to a BEE compliant bidder as per the requirement 
of the Preferential Procurement Act of 2001. In this case, PPP firms can decide as 
they please on how much of the contract they will award to an SME. As discussed 
earlier, this requirement is not for SMEs, but for HDI-compliance which happens to 
include SMEs. Another worrying practice is that SMEs are only used by PPP firms 
when special skills are required (see Figure 5.6 in Section 5.3.2.3). This is worrying 
because most SMEs do not have special skills, as SMEs lack human capital 
compared to big firms. This may mean that most of such opportunities end up being 
awarded to big firms, as they are the ones who possess special skills, or, in some 
instances, have access to a few SMEs that may happen to have such skills. These 
would be the only SMEs who may be awarded the contracts.  
 
As indicated by the Construction Industry Development Board’s (CIDB) study 
referred to above small construction firms end up doing work that require basic skills 
due to the capital intensiveness of some infrastructure projects. Although there are 
no figures that show the amount or value of the projects that is subcontracted to 
SMEs, the indication from the CIDB study is that this value is very small. This shows 
that there is little preferential treatment that SMEs receive from PPP firms as 
potential providers of services. SMEs have to compete with big firms on financial and 
technical abilities for contracts in PPP projects under the same conditions. Figure 5.6 
shows that most of the PPP firms award contracts based on fitness for purpose. In 
most cases, if not all, these requirements weigh not less than 60% of the total 
requirements for a tender, and this puts SME companies at a disadvantage during 
the tender evaluation process. This can create a situation where one may find that 
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most SMEs only provide services to PPP firms that require basic skills as shown by 
the CIDB study alluded to above, a practice that may hinder the development of the 
SME sector.  
 
SMEs should be given opportunities to provide all types of services, those that 
require special skills and those that require basic skills if we were to grow the SME 
sector in the country. However, to ensure that service quality delivered by SMEs to 
PPP firms is not compromised, SMEs will need to build capacity within themselves in 
those areas that are needed most in PPP projects. Government should also provide 
support to SMEs by making finances available for SMEs to undertake training on 
different financial and managerial skills. It is interesting to also note that the CIDB 
has initiated a number of SME development programmes in the construction industry 
aimed at developing small subcontractors. These include the development of 
standard skills that would result in nationally accredited outcomes through 
infrastructure contracts and standards for indirect targeting for enterprise 
development through construction works contracts (Construction Industry 
Development Board, 2013:10). 
 
The study has also found that the majority of PPP firms do not vary their approaches 
to using SMEs, even if the project is located in a different geographic area (see 
Figure 5.7). Those PPP firms who vary their approaches to using SMEs if their 
project is in a different geographical location, appoint SMEs based on availability in 
the area, or consider proximity to the project site and SME’s knowledge of the local 
environment (see Figure 5.7 in Section 5.3.2.3). These considerations make sense, 
provided SMEs are not treated as second best after big firms when awarded 
contracts by PPP firms. This is because this approach takes local content into 
account as it aims at giving local SMEs preferences over other SMEs that may come 
from different areas. This practice reduces costs for SMEs if they were to provide 
their services locally. This does not mean that opportunities should only be given to 
local SMEs; it means that local SMEs are likely to make a bigger profit from a local 
contract than SMEs coming from outside the geographical area, and that may help 
local SMEs’ growth and sustainability. This approach can be made one of the 
requirements to be included in any government policy that would foster the use of 
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SMEs in PPP projects. The policy could require that qualifying local SMEs be given 
preferential treatment compared to other SMEs when tendering for a local project. 
 
It can be concluded from the study that PPP projects have helped SME development 
in the country. However, SMEs are not given enough special treatment or 
consideration when PPP firms award contracts for services to be outsourced to a 
third party. In most cases SMEs compete with big firms under the same 
requirements, and SMEs struggle because they do not have financial and technical 
capabilities to out-compete big firms for contracts. The factors that are considered by 
PPP firms when awarding contracts to SMEs do not make SMEs attractive enough 
compared to big firms, as these factors do not empower SMEs to such extent that 
they become more competitive compared to big firms when competing for the same 
contract. However, as SMEs currently provide services to PPP firms, as the study 
has shown, it can be concluded that PPP projects have helped SME development in 
the country.  
 
6.3.1.4 Targets for contracts to be awarded to SMEs 
 
Section 5.3.2.4 of Chapter 5 presented research results on targets for contracts 
awarded to SMEs by PPP firms when outsourcing some of their services.  
 
The study has found that although PPP firms argued that they have targets for 
awarding contracts to SMEs, the target they were referring to is the target as 
required by the Preferential Procurement Regulations (PPR) of 2001 (see Section 
5.2.2.4 and Figure 5.8a). Therefore, it is likely that the results presented in Figure 
5.8a do not reflect targets for SMEs but contracts that have been awarded to SMEs 
as a result of different factors including the PPR requirement. The worrying 
observation is that a big proportion of PPP firms indicated that they do not have 
targets for awarding contracts to SMEs. Although these firms do not have targets, 
this does not mean that they do not outsource their services to SMEs.  
 
In my opinion, targets for awarding contracts to SMEs by PPP firms should not be an 
internal policy for PPP firms; it should rather be a government policy that requires all 
PPP firms to indicate the percentage share of the tender that will be allocated to 
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SMEs. The companies that propose a bigger share should then be given preference 
over those that are prepared to award less. This can ensure a consistent application 
of the policy across all PPP firms and consistent treatment of SMEs. This can also 
facilitate ease of monitoring the implementation of the policy by government or its 
agency. However, it is difficult at this stage to draw lessons from other countries on 
how they have incentivised PPP project firms to contract more SMEs in their 
projects, given the fact that there is no literature on the use of SMEs in PPP projects 
that the researcher has come across during the literature review of this subject. 
 
PPP firms award a small share of the PPP contract to SMEs. The study has also 
found that those PPP firms that claimed to have a target for SMEs, award a small 
share of their contracts to SMEs, while the bigger share is awarded to big firms (see 
Figure 5.8b). It also shows that a large number of SMEs share a small percentage of 
the total contract compared to a few big firms that share a bigger percentage of the 
contract. This may be due to lack of capacity by SMEs or a deliberate decision by 
PPP firms not to contract SMEs or failure from the SMEs’ side to participate in these 
projects due to a lack of certain resources such as capital. Such trend has a potential 
to exacerbate inequality or preserve long-term monopoly in the PPP market, as few 
big firms would remain dominant as long as there is no policy that encourages PPP 
firms to allocate a reasonable share of their contracts to SMEs. This practice is 
confirmed by the CIDB study as alluded to above in that, small construction 
companies which are also SMEs end up doing work that require basic skills due to 
the capital intensiveness requirements of infrastructure projects. It is normally the 
case that projects that require basic skills pay less compared to those that require 
advanced skills, and that is a clear indication that SMEs receive a small share of the 
total value of projects.  
 
The share of SMEs in PPP projects is low. The share in rands amounts of contracts 
that are awarded to SMEs is only high at the lower end or percentage and becomes 
smaller as one moves towards the higher end percentages of the spectrum (see 
Figure 5.8b). This may be an indication that, as a contract becomes bigger, big firms 
prefer to render services to PPP firms rather than to SMEs given the capital-
intensive nature of the service to be provided to the PPP project. This finding 
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confirms the suspicion revealed in Figure 5.5, that, although the biggest percentages 
of services are provided by both SMEs and big firms, SMEs are likely to be providing 
a small percentage of these services to the PPP firms. 
 
The study can conclude that although SMEs are awarded contracts to provide 
services to PPP projects, the percentage share (in rand value) of these contracts 
that are awarded to SMEs is smaller than those that are allocated to big firms. This 
means that a high number of SMEs compete for a small share of PPP contracts 
compared to big firms. 
 
6.3.1.5 Employment by SMEs providing services to PPP projects 
 
The research results on employment by SMEs providing services to PPP projects 
were presented in Section 5.3.3.4 of Chapter 5. The results of the responses are 
shown in Figure 5.14 and Table 5.3. The results in Figure 5.14 show that the number 
of people employed by SMEs providing services to PPP projects is not that high. 
This may be a reflection of the fact that SMEs receive a smaller share of the 
contracts, especially in rand value compared to big firms (see Figure.5.8b). What is 
important to observe at this point is that SMEs providing services to PPP projects do 
create jobs and employment for the country.  
 
According to a Construction Industry Development Board (CIDB) survey conducted 
in 2012, there are about 8 300 enterprises in the construction industry, of which and 
approximately 76% are black-owned15, creating about 1 000 000 employment 
opportunities. Another study by the Construction Industry Development Board 
(2004:30) conducted in 2004 estimated that about 51% of employees in the industry 
are employed on a short-term basis, 37% are permanent employees (comprising of 
supervisors, project managers and others) and 11% are managerial and 
administrative employees, also employed on a permanent basis. These jobs are 
created by about 8300 enterprises, of which approximately 76% are black-owned 
and the majority are SMEs. About 30% of the total value of all construction work in 
the country goes to big construction companies. This 30% include projects that have 
                                                          
15
 Black ownership means at least 50% of the firms shareholding is owned by black people. 
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a value of more than R130 million. This category includes PPP projects. The same 
study found that there is a positive correlation between increased expenditure in 
infrastructure projects and the growth16 of SMEs from one grade to the next17.  
 
An annual survey of SME growth in South Africa conducted by SBP (2013:4) found a 
strong positive correlation between SME turnover and employment growth. 
Approximately 50% of the 500 SMEs that participated in the survey that experienced 
turnover growth also reported an increase in their employment base. The study also 
found that SMEs are more likely to employ young and unskilled employees 
compared to big firms. This supports the argument that increasing the number of 
SMEs participating in PPP projects will have a positive impact on the unemployment 
rate in the country, as the high level of unemployment is among the youth and the 
low skilled labour force. This means that the more PPP projects are implemented, 
the more SME development would take place assuming unbundling of PPP projects 
is a legislated requirement for all big infrastructure projects including PPPs. An 
analysis of the rate of contractor growth (moving from one grade to the next grade) 
shows that about 10% of SMEs in the construction industry in grade 2 to grade 7 
grow by at least one grade per year. In another survey of contractors registered with 
the CIDB, the majority of such contractors said an increase in spending by both the 
public and the private sectors on infrastructure is the most significant opportunity for 
growth for contractors in the construction industry. 
 
It is worth noting that SME growth cannot be achieved without access to contract 
opportunities and that is why this study advocates for the unbundling of PPP projects 
into smaller projects where possible, to allow SMEs to access opportunities and to 
attain growth in the construction industry. It is worth noting that even the CIDB is 
advocating for various procurement models in the construction industry, including the 
unbundling of contracts to support socio-economic and developmental outcomes 
                                                          
16
 Growth is defined in terms of financial capacity and size of the largest contract undertaken during the past 
five years. 
17
 Grade 1 representing largely job seekers that are eligible to undertake government quotations up to a value 
R200 000, and Grade 9 covering the largest and often publicly-owned enterprises with annual sales in the 
billions. SME grades mostly fall between Grade 2 and grade 7. 
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(Construction Industry Development Board, 2008). The unbundling of big projects is 
necessitated by the fact that SMEs fail to compete with large firms for big projects 
due to a lack of technical skills and financial abilities, and unbundling will allow SMEs 
to participate in large infrastructure projects with PPPs to provide only those services 
that can be provided by SMEs. According to a CIDB survey, big contractors, which 
account for about 7% of the total number of registered contractors, are estimated to 
account for about 75% in Rand value of all public sector contracts. This supports the 
study finding that SMEs are allocated a small share of the total value of PPP 
projects. 
 
At the construction phase of PPP projects, most jobs are short-term, because 
construction work has definite start and completion dates, whereas at the operational 
phase of PPP projects, SMEs’ services are required continuously as long as the 
project still provides the service it is intended to provide. A study conducted by 
Moilwa (2013:107) on SMEs in the construction industry in Gauteng found that SMEs 
provide services such as building construction, civil engineering, home improvement 
and other work, and 65% and 29% of the 17 SMEs interviewed indicated that they 
provide building construction and civil work respectively. All these services are 
required in a PPP project during the construction phase. During the study survey the 
researcher found that, at the operational phase of the PPP projects that formed the 
study sample, SMEs currently provide services such as cleaning, catering, pest 
control, grass cutting, asset maintenance, security, gardening, waste removal, plants 
nurturing, energy management and CCTV. It is worth noting that at the operational 
phase, most of the services required in a PPP project are long term. This is because 
PPP projects can run for more than 25 years.  
 
Even if the contract given to an SME company at the operational phase of the PPP 
project can be short term, the services will be required for the duration of the 
concession, and a new firm will need to be contracted to continuously provide the 
services, should the contract with the first service provider be terminated. Whether 
the people are employed for a short or long term at the operational phase is not the 
problem of the PPP project; the problem is the decision of the PPP firm’s 
management to sign short-term contracts with SME firms. This may be because PPP 
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firms want to mitigate against the risk of poor service delivery by SMEs, but what is 
important is that the services required will create long-term jobs, whether permanent 
or on contract basis. By the time a PPP project comes to an end, the SMEs may 
have graduated to be one of the big firms providing services to PPP projects and 
expanded to even become involved in other sectors of the economy. This is due to 
the fact that SMEs could secure a long-term contract with PPP firms, provided they 
are able to meet the expected service standards in terms of timeous delivery of 
services and delivering high quality service. Most SMEs struggle to meet these 
expectations (see Figure 5.10 of Section 5.3.3.1 on challenges facing SMEs in 
delivering services to PPP firms) and that is why government intervention is required 
in this market. 
 
Table 5.3 in Section 5.3.3.4 shows that SMEs that are currently providing services to 
PPP projects that formed part of the study sample have created a number of jobs, 
and these jobs increase as the projects’ years of operational increase. This shows 
that jobs are not only created but the number of such jobs grows over time as more 
and more of the service is required by consumers. For example, Table 5.3 shows 
that the number of permanent jobs created by some of the SMEs from the start of 
operation of some PPP projects to the date of the study survey have grown by more 
than 100%. These numbers exclude temporary employees. The longer the period 
the PPP project has operated, the higher the number of new jobs created over the 
period. This makes sense because over time the number of consumers using the 
service increases and more resources are required to provide the service. The 
reasons for such increases are threefold: firstly, most of the concessionaire contracts 
required the PPP firms to contribute to socio-economic development, and one way to 
achieve this requirement was to contract SMEs. Secondly, the other requirement 
was that after five years from the time the project started operating, for example, the 
PPP firm should be procuring at least 35% of its services from previously 
disadvantaged individuals, of which most happened to own SMEs. Thirdly, the 
increase in SME employment was also due to natural business expansion or an 
increased demand for the services provided through the PPP project. 
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In addition to the permanent jobs created by the PPP projects, as presented in Table 
5.3, PPP firms also provided opportunities to other SMEs to provide certain services 
on an as-and-when-required base. Some of the concessioners’ contracts required 
that a certain percentage of all procurements of goods and services be provided by 
SMEs on an as-and-when-required base. For example, one concessionaire contract 
required the PPP firm to allocate at least 32% of the value of its short-term contracts 
to SMEs. This approach is another way in which PPP projects contribute to growth 
and development of the SME sector. 
 
It was also found during the survey that most of the contracts awarded to SMEs run 
for a period of between three and five years renewable. Under rare circumstances 
the contract could run for up to seven years, depending on the nature of the service 
provided. The reason why these contracts are short-term is due to the requirement of 
the concessionaire contract between the PPP firm and the public sector. Some 
concessionaire contracts require that PPP firms alternate the SMEs contracted to 
provide services to the PPP project so as to give other upcoming SMEs a change to 
grow. However, should a contract be terminated at the end of the period, some of the 
concessionaire contracts require that the new SME that is to take over the contract 
must retain at least 80% of the existing staff for continuity and other reasons.  
 
Some of the concessions’ requirements have been found to be constraining the 
number of people to be employed by the PPP firm. The researcher found that the 
public sector party determined the number of people that the PPP firm can employ 
without taking into account the fact that over time there would be an increase in 
demand for the services provided and more resources would be needed. Such 
clauses limit the ability of the PPP firm to contract more SMEs or for currently 
contracted SMEs to increase their labour force as the need arises. Before new 
employees can be added the PPP firm would need to make a motivation to the 
public sector party, as the costs of this increase would need to be paid by the public 
sector. Sometimes the public-sector party influences even the appointment of new 
employees and this defeats the objective of a PPP of transferring risks to the private 
party. 
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The study can conclude that infrastructure projects in general and PPP projects in 
particular have helped SME development in the country by providing opportunities to 
SMEs to provide services to PPP firms, thus contributing to the development of the 
SME sector. SMEs providing services to PPP firms create job opportunities for the 
country, and these jobs are long-term in nature, as PPP projects may run up to 25 
years continuously, providing employment and income to those employed and their 
families, thus alleviating poverty and inequalities. However, the number of job 
opportunities created by these SMEs is small due to a number of factors as 
highlighted in the preceding paragraphs of this section. 
 
Based on the above analysis this research has therefore answered 
the first main research sub-question (MRQI): How have PPP 
projects in the country helped SME growth? For example, Section 
6.3.1.2 has shown that SMEs currently provide services to PPP 
firms. Section 6.3.1.4 has shown that PPP firms have targets for 
awarding tenders to SMEs, while Section 6.3.1.5 has confirmed that 
SMEs providing services to PPP projects employ a number of 
people. This shows clearly that PPP projects have helped SME 
development in the country.  
 
The following section discusses the research findings with regard to the first main 
research sub-question with the view of either to prove or disprove the first research 
proposition as stated in Section 6.2 above. 
 
6.3.2 Proving or disproving Research Proposition 1 (P1)   
P1: Contracting SMEs to provide certain services to PPP firms has 
contributed to SME growth in the country. 
Following is a summary of the main findings from the analysis which was aimed at 
answering the first main research sub-question. These findings assisted the 
researcher to either prove or disprove the first research proposition as stated above. 
 
 Section 6.3.1.1 of the research analysis found that PPP-project firms do 
outsource services to SMEs; however, the amount of work given to SMEs is 
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less than that given to big firms. This may be due to a lack of capacity by SME 
firms or a deliberate decision by PPP firms to limit the number of SMEs 
contracted to provide services to PPP projects. 
 The research analysis in Section 6.3.1.2 showed that there are services that 
PPP firms can or currently outsource to SMEs. This shows that contracting 
SMEs to provide services to PPP projects had helped SMEs development in 
the country. 
 Section 6.3.1.3 showed that PPP project firms do contract SMEs to provide 
services to PPP projects; however, SMEs are not given enough special 
treatment or consideration when PPP firms award contracts for services to be 
outsourced to a third party. In most cases SMEs are appointed based on fitness 
for purpose.   
 Section 6.3.1.4 showed that although SMEs are awarded contracts to provide 
services to PPP projects, the percentage share (in Rand value) of these 
contracts that are awarded to SMEs is smaller than those that are allocated to 
big firms. It can however be concluded that the participation of SMEs in PPP 
projects has helped them build experience in PPP projects.  
 Section 6.3.1.5 showed that SMEs providing services to PPP firms create job 
opportunities for the country, and some of these jobs are long-term in nature, 
as PPP projects may run up to 25 years or more, continuously providing 
employment and income to those employed and their families, thus alleviating 
poverty and inequalities. However the number of job opportunities created by 
these SMEs is constrained by a number of factors as highlighted in the 
preceding paragraphs of Section 6.3. 
 
Based on the main conclusions of the above analysis, this 
research has therefore PROVED the first research 
proposition (P1): Contracting SMEs to provide certain 
services to PPP firms has contributed to SME development 
in the country. 
 
The following section gives an analysis and synthesis of the different problems or 
challenges that SMEs face when providing services to PPP firms. It also gives an 
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analysis of possible solutions to these problems. Although SMEs have played a big 
role in providing services to PPP firms, SMEs have faced a number of challenges in 
meeting the expectations of PPP firms in terms of service delivery and quality. The 
section starts by presenting the second main research sub-question. 
 
6.3.3 Answering the second Main Research Sub-Question (MRQII) 
MRQII: What are the problems or challenges faced by PPP project firms 
when using SMEs to supply services? 
 
This section presents the synthesis and analysis of the research results presented in 
Chapter 5 that relate to the second main research sub-question. The results of the 
analysis assisted the researcher to answer the second main research sub-question 
as stated above. 
 
6.3.3.1 Challenges faced by PPP firms when using SMEs in PPP projects  
 
The research results on the challenges faced by both SMEs and PPP firms working 
together in a PPP project are presented in Section 5.3.3 of Chapter 5. This section 
discusses different challenges that PPP firms face when dealing with SMEs in a PPP 
project. It also discusses their causes and the different ways in which these 
challenges could be overcome. The majority of PPP firms acknowledged that they do 
face problems or challenges with SMEs providing services to them. Section 5.3.3.1 
has shown that a high number of PPP firms face challenges when working with 
SMEs. 
 
Although the analysis focused mainly on challenges faced by PPP firms when using 
SMEs to provide services to PPP projects, it is worth noting that the same 
challenges that are faced by PPP firms are due to challenges faced by SMEs. The 
research results found that a high number of PPP firms do face challenges when 
using SMEs to provide them with certain services (see Figure 5.10). The challenges 
are due to the failure of SMEs to meet certain obligations between themselves and 
PPP firms. Most SMEs providing services to PPP firms struggle with three things, 
namely failure to deliver services when required by PPP firms, late delivery of 
services and poor quality of services delivered (see Figure 5.10 in Section 5.3.3.1). 
These problems are related to a lack of human capacity within SME firms. Many 
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SMEs employ a less-skilled labour force compared to big firms, thus causing SMEs 
not to benefit from economies of scale and scope, given the fact that they operate at 
a very small scale compared to big firms (see Section 3.3.2 on characteristics of 
SMEs). A study by SBP (2013:6) on South African SMEs found that one of the 
biggest challenges facing SMEs is skill shortages. According to Amra, Hlatshwayo & 
McMillan (2013:8), this may be due to the fact that SMEs tend to employ its 
personnel on a contract or fixed-term basis and the majority of those employed have 
less than matric qualifications. This assertion is supported by an SBP analysis 
(2013:5). Using Stats-SA data, it found that firms that have less than 49 employees 
are more likely to employ its workers on a fixed-term basis compared to firms that 
have more than 49 employees. 
 
Any PPP model that seeks to improve participation of SMEs in PPP projects should 
be geared towards addressing these challenges. Section 3.3.2 of Chapter 3 
discussed the human resources of SMEs in detail and highlighted what needs to be 
done in order to address SMEs human resources problems. As Cooke (2000:10) 
assert, SMEs that employ highly-skilled employees are likely to be more efficient, as 
they may increase productivity by producing a high level of output or by producing 
output of greater value.  
 
There is no doubt that the lack of human resources capacity by SMEs may affect the 
operations of PPP projects. This is because failure of SMEs to deliver a service 
when the service is required by PPP firms may also cause the PPP firm to fail to 
meet its own obligations with the government department responsible for the PPP 
project. This may eventually result in other problems, such as public 
unhappiness/dissatisfaction with the quality of service provided by PPP firms. Failure 
by SMEs to deliver a service when required or failure to deliver good quality services 
to a PPP firm may also result in PPP firms being reluctant to use SMEs to provide 
services to its projects (see Figure 5.15b in Section 5.3.3.5 on why few SMEs 
participate in PPP projects). These problems may have wide-ranging implications in 
terms of promoting the participation of SMEs in PPP projects and the acceptance of 
PPP projects by citizens of a country. Public unhappiness with services delivered 
through PPP projects may render PPP projects irrelevant in the country. 
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The poor quality of services delivered can be addressed by providing the necessary 
skills through training SMEs employees and their managers. This training can be 
provided by government through certain programmes aimed at building SME 
capacity. The failure of SMEs to deliver services may also be due to the fact that 
most SMEs lack the financial resources needed to provide training for their 
employees and to deliver the services they have to deliver to PPP firms.  
 
This may also be the root cause for their failure to deliver services on time, as they 
may not have the required skills to plan appropriately. It should be noted that not all 
SMEs fail to deliver services in time and in good quality; however, the majority of 
SMEs do face difficulties. The OECD (2006b:4) asserts that finance is needed by 
SMEs in order to expand their operations, develop new products and invest in new 
staff or production facilities. This shows that, even though SMEs can have access to 
markets, they may fail to compete effectively if they do not have appropriate human 
resources or finances required to respond to the challenges they may face in the 
market.  
 
The difficulty for SMEs to attract highly-skilled personnel is due to the fact that most 
SMEs do not offer good employee benefits compared to well-established big firms.  
As a result, even if SMEs happen to employ highly-skilled or experienced personnel, 
the highly-skilled personnel is more likely to leave an SME company and join a big 
firm that may offer them attractive packages. Staff retention is a big problem for 
SMEs compared to big firms, as most SMEs employ their personnel on a contract 
basis and that encourages staff to continuously look for a permanent job elsewhere 
(Amra, Hlatshwayo & McMillan (2013:7). 
 
It can be concluded that PPP firms do indeed face problems or challenges when 
using SMEs to provide certain services to PPP projects. These challenges may have 
wide-ranging implications in terms of promoting the participation of SMEs in PPP 
projects if left unaddressed. 
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6.3.3.2 Causes of challenges and their possible solutions 
 
The survey results on causes of challenges faced by PPP firms when using SMEs to 
supply them with certain goods and services are presented under Section 5.3.3.2 of 
Chapter 5. 
 
The study has found that the main causes for the challenges faced by PPP firms 
when using SMEs as service providers are: lack of skills, lack of appropriate 
technology, poor management skills and poor relationship between SMEs and PPP 
firms (see Figure 5.11). The main reasons why SMEs encounter these problems is 
mainly due to poor education level or quality of education and poorly trained SMEs 
personnel combined with a poor employee retention rate that results in less 
experienced SMEs personnel. Lack of collateral and a poor credit history for many 
SMEs make it difficult for them to access funding from financial institutions. A study 
conducted by Bakhas (2009:14) found that lack of collateral and other factors are the 
major reasons why SMEs struggle to have access to finance in the North West 
Province. This challenge is likely to apply to most SMEs operating in the South 
African economy. Poor relationship between SMEs and PPP firms respectively does 
not seem to be a major cause of SME problems.  
 
Continuous improvement of SME personnel expertise through continuous training 
needs to be a priority for government and SMEs themselves. Although access to 
finance did not seem to be a big issue for SMEs compared to poor management 
skills and the general lack of skills as discussed above, it is however a problem, as 
for SMEs to build the capacity that is needed to respond to the human resources 
needs as highlighted in Figure 5.11, SMEs must first have the budget to address 
these issues. It is likely that the lack of skills by SMEs is due to the fact that most 
SMEs do not have enough finances to attract the right skills or to up-skill their 
existing employees to the required skill levels.  
 
Improving the quality of skills for SMEs employees would aid in improving the quality 
of services that SMEs render to PPP firms. Section 3.3.2 of Chapter 3 discussed in 
detail the advantages of having a highly-skilled workforce for SMEs. Once SMEs 
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have access to finance, they would be in a better position to expand their operations, 
thus benefiting from economies of scale and scope and be able to meet the 
demands of PPP firms. The impact of these SME problems to PPP firms is 
significant (see Figure 5.12). Poor management skills by SME firms have the biggest 
impact on the quality and timely delivery of services. Improving managerial skills of 
SMEs can go a long way in alleviating the other problems faced by SMEs, as 
discussed above. 
 
The question is: “Who should help SMEs with skill development and access to 
finance?” In my view the government, the PPP firms and the SMEs themselves 
should all play a role in improving the capabilities of SMEs in meeting their clients’ 
expectations. The following section focuses on how SMEs can be assisted to 
overcome these challenges. Once SMEs are able to meet the expectations of PPP 
firms in terms of quality and timely delivery of services, it is expected that more 
SMEs would be afforded opportunities by PPP firms to provide services to PPP 
projects, thus expanding the benefits of increasing the involvement of SMEs in PPP 
projects, as discussed in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3. 
 
It can be concluded that most of the problems that PPP firms face when using SMEs 
to provide services to PPP projects are caused mainly by lack of managerial and 
other appropriate skills by SME employees. Improvement in these skills needed by 
SMEs can go a long way in alleviating most of the challenges faced by SMEs 
providing services to PPP projects. 
 
6.3.3.3 Interventions by PPP firms to help SMEs cope with challenges 
 
Research results on the different interventions made by PPP firms in helping SMEs 
cope with identified challenges were presented in Section 5.3.3.3 of Chapter 5. 
Although some PPP firms did nothing (see Figure 5.13) in terms of helping SMEs 
cope with the challenges that PPP firms faced when using SMEs, some PPP firms 
assisted SMEs with the development of human capacity, access to the right 
technology and access to finance. The interventions made by PPP firms are in line 
with the challenges faced by SMEs, as indicated in Figure 5.10. The interventions 
that are required to address these challenges are discussed in Section 5.3.3.2 
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above. This means that PPP firms responded appropriately to the challenges they 
encounter when using SMEs in their PPP projects (see Figure 5.13). Improvement in 
the human capacity of SMEs by providing training to SMEs received the greatest 
attention from PPP firms, followed by underwriting SME loans to improve access to 
finance so that SMEs can acquire the right technology (see Figure 5.13).   
 
Although PPP firms should also help SMEs improve their human capacity and 
access to finance, I believe government should play a leading role when it comes to 
improving human capacity and access to finance for the SME sector. PPP firms can 
only play a complementary role in addition to any assistance provided by 
government. Government could make special funds available for SMEs general and 
SMEs working in PPPs in particular. There are already a number of these initiatives 
in the country, as discussed in Section 3.5 in Chapter 3, but what is being highlighted 
here is that such initiatives have not produced the intended results, as SMEs are still 
struggling with the very same issues. This is because there are many state 
departments that are responsible for SME development in one way or another and 
their activities or interventions are not coherent. Therefore there is a need for 
alignment of all these interventions to achieve maximum benefits for what they 
intend to achieve. A PPP model that would help the development of a sustainable 
SME sector needs to take into account all these challenges. 
 
It can be concluded that PPP firms had assisted SMEs to cope with the challenges 
that SMEs faced when providing services to PPP projects, and the interventions by 
PPP firms responded appropriately to the challenges identified, which are lack of 
appropriate skills either at managerial level or employee level. Although some PPP 
firms did nothing (see Figure 5.13) in terms of helping SMEs cope with the 
challenges that PPP firms faced when using SMEs, some PPP firms assisted SMEs 
with training to develop human capacity, access to the right technology and access 
to finance. However, the problems related to human capacity that SMEs face cannot 
be completely eliminated because SMEs have a high staff turnover rate compared to 
large firms for reasons already discussed earlier. 
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6.3.3.4 Challenges in fostering the use of SMEs by PPP firms 
 
The presentation on the research results on challenges faced by both PPP firms and 
government in fostering the use of SMEs in PPP projects are presented in Section 
5.3.3.5 of Chapter 5. The main challenges respondents identified and which are 
faced by PPP firms in fostering the use of SMEs in PPP projects are; (i) the extent of 
risk that can be transferred to SMEs can be too high for SMEs, (ii) the National 
Treasury PPP Unit needs to be first well-resourced and minimise staff turnover 
before PPP firms can consider using SMEs intensively, (iii) the quality of work 
provided by some SMEs is poor, thus PPP firms are reluctant to use SMEs, as most 
SMEs lack experience and capacity, (iv) PPPs are too expensive for SMEs, and the 
finances needed by SMEs to participate in PPP projects can be difficult to access for 
most SMEs (see Section 5.4, Figure 5.15b and Table 5.4).  
 
However, unbundling services to be provided to PPPs projects could create a good 
opportunity for SMEs to participate in PPP projects and reduce most of the risks that 
can be transferred to SMEs. Most of the services that can be provided by SMEs 
during the operational phase of PPP projects require less capital and that makes 
them affordable to SMEs (see Table 5.2 in Section 5.2.2.1 in Chapter 5 for services 
that can be provided by SMEs). Even during the construction stage of a PPP project, 
certain services do not require huge up-front capital outlay; such services can be 
provided by SMEs.  
 
What needs to be done is that the human capacity of SMEs be improved so that they 
can be in a position to handle these challenges. Fostering the use of SMEs in PPP 
projects without improving the human resources capacity of SMEs would not yield 
the results expected from such an intervention. SMEs must be ready and able to 
deliver services to PPP projects. It is clear that, to get SMEs to the level where they 
should be in terms of service delivery to PPP projects, there is a need for SME 
empowerment in one way or the other, especially in the area of skills development. 
 
From the public sector’s perspective, the main challenges in improving the 
participation of SMEs in PPP projects was found to be the lack of suitable SMEs to 
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provide the required services (see Figure 5.15b). Some of the public sector 
respondents asserted that most of the SME companies are technically and 
financially weak, and risk averse. As a result, even if they get a contract with PPP 
firms, some of them opt out for financial compensation and are bought out of the 
projects by big firms (see Section 5.3.3.5). These type of challenges form the 51,5% 
as indicated in Figure 5.15b. Because of SMEs’ failure to meet their obligations they 
have with PPP firms in terms of delivering services in time and in good quality, many 
PPP firms become reluctant to use SMEs. This is because the services to be 
provided to PPP projects are bundled together to big projects. Should the services 
be sliced into smaller but viable projects, as proposed in this study, SMEs would be 
able to deliver the services as required by the PPP firms with minimum assistance or 
even without assistance in some cases. 
 
This may be true in that PPPs are a new field for many companies, including the 
public sector itself. Many SMEs have not yet gained experience in providing services 
to PPP projects. As mentioned earlier, this means the public sector needs to put 
more resources in training and continuous up-skilling of SMEs with the skills required 
in the PPP market. Table 5.4 gives respondents’ opinions on what needs to be done 
by the public sector in order to improve participation of SMEs in PPP projects.  
 
It can be concluded that there are challenges faced by PPP firms and government 
when trying to enhance the participation of SMEs in PPP projects in the country. 
Most of the problems are as a result of SMEs not being well-empowered to deliver 
services as required by PPP projects. In most cases it is because SMEs lack skills 
and relevant experience to respond effectively to the needs of PPP projects. 
 
Based on the above analysis, this research has therefore answered the 
second main research sub-question (MRQII): What are the problems or 
challenges faced by PPP project firms when using SMEs to supply services? 
This was done by identifying the different challenges (see Section 6.3.3.1), 
causes of the challenges (see Section 6.3.3.2), interventions made by PPP 
firms to address the challenges (see Section 6.3.3.3) and challenges in 
fostering the use of SMEs by PPP firms (see Section 6.3.3.4). 
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The following section provides a summary of the research findings with regard to the 
second main research sub-question with the view of either to prove or disprove the 
second research proposition as stated in Section 6.2. 
 
6.3.4 Proving or disproving Research Proposition 2 (P2) 
 P2: PPP firms face different problems when using SMEs to supply goods 
and services, and lack of skills is the root cause of most of the 
problems. 
 
Following is a summary of the main findings from the analysis in Section 6.3.3 which 
was aimed at answering the second main research sub-question. The analysis and 
the findings assisted the researcher to either prove or disprove the second research 
proposition as stated above. Below are the main findings on the different challenges 
facing PPP firms when using SMEs to provide them with certain services. 
 The analysis in Section 6.3.3.1 identified different problems or challenges 
faced by PPP firms when using SMEs to provide certain services to PPP 
projects. These challenges include failure by SMEs to deliver services on 
time and in good quality. It also found that lack of skills by SMEs is the root 
cause of most of these challenges. These challenges may have wide-
ranging implications in terms of promoting the participation of SMEs in PPP 
projects if left unaddressed. 
 
 Section 6.3.3.2 found that most of the problems that PPP firms face when 
using SMEs to provide services to PPP project firms are caused mainly by 
lack of managerial skills and technical expertise by SME employees. In 
addition to these challenges, a lack of appropriate technology and a poor 
relationship between SMEs and PPP firms also contribute to the challenges. 
 
 Section 6.3.3.3 found that PPP firms had assisted SMEs to cope with the 
challenges that SMEs faced when providing services to PPP projects, and 
the interventions by PPP firms responded appropriately to the challenges 
identified, which are lack of appropriate skills either at managerial level or 
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employee level. The interventions made by PPP firms were in line with the 
challenges faced by SMEs. 
 
 Section 6.3.3.4 concluded that there are challenges faced by PPP firms and 
government when trying to enhance the participation of SMEs in PPP 
projects in the country. Most of the problems are a result of SMEs being not 
well-empowered to deliver services as required by PPP projects. In most 
cases it is because SMEs lack skills and relevant experience to respond 
effectively to the needs of PPP projects. It has also been found that most 
SME companies are technically and financially weak, and risk averse as a 
result; even if they get a contract with PPP firms, some of them opt for 
financial compensation and are bought out of the projects by big firms, thus 
derailing the participation of SMEs in PPP projects. 
 
Based on the above main findings of the research analysis, 
on problems faced by PPP firms when using SMEs to supply 
goods and services to PPP projects, this research has 
proved the second research proposition (P2): PPP firms face 
different problems when using SMEs to supply goods and 
services and lack of skills is the root cause of most of the 
problems. 
 
The following section gives an analysis and synthesis of the different ways in which 
the involvement of SMEs can be improved in PPP projects. Although SMEs have 
played a big role in providing services to PPP firms, the participation of SMEs in PPP 
projects is still very low. The section starts by presenting the third main research 
sub-question. 
 
6.3.5 Answering the third Main Research Sub-Question (MRQIII) 
MRQIII: How can the involvement of SMEs be increased in PPP projects? 
 
This section present the synthesis and analysis of the research results presented in 
Chapter 5 that relate to the third main research sub-question. The results of the 
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analysis assisted the researcher to answer the third main research sub-question. 
Following below is the synthesis and analysis of the research results. 
 
6.3.5.1 SMEs as a requirement for public-private partnership projects 
 
The presentation of the research results on how the participation of SMEs in PPP 
projects can be improved is covered under Section 5.4 of Chapter 5. Most of the 
information on this section was collected through the open ended questions of the 
questionnaire and through the supplementary survey.  
 
The research results showed that involving SMEs in PPP projects is not a legislated 
requirement, as most respondents indicated that they were not aware of any policy 
that forces PPP firms to make use of SMEs in the operation of PPP projects. 
However, indirectly through the PPR process, SMEs get involved in PPP projects as 
PPP firms need to be BEE compliant (see Section 5.4.1). It needs to be noted that 
this requirement only include enterprises owned by HDIs thus it excludes other 
enterprises that are not owned by HDIs, and this may limit the potential of PPP 
projects to develop the SME sector in the country. The study also found that the 
main reasons (see the first paragraph of Section 5.4.1) given by the public sector for 
procuring infrastructure through PPPs was to (i) obtain the much needed skills which 
the public sector did not have at the time, (ii) secure funding for the projects (iii) 
transfer of risk to the private sector which is better able to manage it, (iv) take 
advantage of the private sector efficiencies in delivering infrastructure projects, and 
(v) achieve value-for-money in project procurement. This shows that there had never 
been a plan to use PPP projects to develop the SME sector in the country. It should 
be noted that, at the operational stage of PPP projects, all these risks are small as 
the project would have been completed.  
 
The biggest risks are during the construction phase of PPP projects. During this 
phase government want to transfer risks and secure funding and skills from the 
private sector. This is not the case during the operational phase of the PPP projects. 
Involving SMEs at the operational phase of PPP projects would not compromise the 
above-mentioned five objectives of governments. However, even at the construction 
stage, if PPP projects can be unbundled and select those tasks that can be provided 
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by SMEs, that can limit the risks that government may be worried about, as SMEs 
can only deliver those parts of the PPP project that carry less risks. Such services 
may include guardrail installations, road lines marking and other services that are 
needed in a road construction PPP project, such as the construction of small bridges 
and many others. 
 
For the country to be able to use PPP projects to develop the SME sector, there is a 
need to consider including “developing the SME sector” or something to this effect as 
one of the objectives for using PPPs to procure the needed infrastructure. The 
question that one should ask is: How can this be done? This can be done through 
legislation. Including “developing the SME sector”, as one of the objectives for using 
PPPs to procure infrastructure projects will assist in improving the participation of 
SMEs in PPP projects. For example, in her budget speech for the 2015/16 financial 
year, the Minister of Small Businesses in South Africa, mentioned that a policy is 
being developed that will force big firms contracted by government to allocate at 
least 30% of their tenders to be supplied by SMEs (Chapter 7 of this study shows in 
detail how SMEs can be incorporated into the current South African PPP model 
structure in order to address the shortcomings of the current PPP model). This 
requirement should be included in the PPP legislation. This is because, once 
government has awarded a PPP contract to a private party, in a way the government 
has locked itself out of the project. This means that the government has limited 
control on how the project is to be executed.  
 
This is not the case when the traditional approach is used to procure a project. If the 
traditional approach is used, the government always has the right to make any 
changes as it wishes, because it always has full control of the project, as all 
subcontractors to the project are appointed by the government or client and remain 
under government control. This is not the case when the PPP approach is employed: 
as soon as the project is awarded to the PPP firm, government loses its control of 
the project, as the project control becomes ring-fenced. That is why the “developing 
the SME sector” requirement should be a policy and not part of the concessionaire. 
Potential bidders should indicate in their bidding documents how they would involve 
SMEs in the PPP project. In this case governments should also put in place a 
   203 
 
support mechanism that would address SMEs challenges in order to facilitate ease 
implementation of the policy. 
 
The study has also found that, before the PPR Act came into being in 2001, the 
Request for Proposals (RFP) for PPP projects required that bidders indicate how 
they would support socio-economic development initiatives of government during 
both the construction and operational phases of the projects (see paragraph 3 of 
Section 5.4.1 in Chapter 5). As a result bidders would mention the use of SMEs as 
one way in which they would promote socio-economic development initiatives of 
government. However, these SMEs were only limited to HDI- owned SMEs. 
Nonetheless, this approach encouraged innovation on how to maximise the benefits 
of using PPPs, as many bidders achieved a higher percentage of SMEs participation 
than the minimum required by the current regulation of not more than 10 percentage 
points awarded to a company that contracted a HDI-owned firm.  
 
Currently bidders just strive to meet the bare minimum required and that hinders 
innovation on how to use SMEs in PPP projects. This is because firms that propose 
to do more than the minimum are not acknowledged or given extra points during bid 
evaluation. Bidders do not have an incentive for proposing to do more because they 
are not rewarded any points to do so. This is because this requirement is not 
compulsory, but only increases bidders’ chances of winning the tender. This means 
that a bidder can still not fulfil this requirement, capitalise on the remaining 90% 
points and still get awarded the tender. This shows that there is a need to incentivise 
bidders who are prepared to do more than the required minimum. The 10 percentage 
points given to BEE compliant bidders should be used as a minimum requirement, 
and any bidder that proposes to do more than the minimum should be awarded extra 
points during the bid evaluation process.  
 
In order to increase the participation of SMEs in PPP projects the study can 
conclude that government, through a policy developed with the aim of improving the 
participation of SMEs in PPP projects, should incentivise bidders who are prepared 
to do more than the required minimum BEE requirement. The 10 percentage points 
given to BEE compliant bidders can be used as a minimum requirement and any 
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bidder that proposes to do more than the minimum must be awarded extra points 
during the bid evaluation process. Secondly, the use of SMEs in PPP projects should 
be one of the main requirement for PPPs’ request for proposals (RFP), as already 
discussed above. 
 
The study can conclude that SME participation is not one of the objectives for using 
PPPs to procure infrastructure, as the main objective is to achieve value for money. 
Bidding requirements for PPP projects tend to focus more on the technical and 
financial abilities of service providers to deliver a PPP project at the right time and 
the right cost, with a small requirement for compliance with the transformation laws 
of the country. 
 
6.3.5.2 Expectation by government for PPP firms to meet a certain SME 
requirement 
The study results on expectations by government for PPP firms to meet a certain 
SME requirement is presented in Section 5.4.2 of Chapter 5. The study has found 
that there were no expectations by government for PPP projects to meet certain 
SME requirements (see the first paragraph of Section 5.4.2). The main expectation 
from the government was that PPP projects be delivered on time and within costs 
and that they should meet the BEE requirement as stipulated in the PPR Act of 
2001. Before the PPA Act of 2001, expectations were only made once the bidders 
had proposed as to how they would contribute to socio-economic initiatives of 
government when bidding for the project (see the second paragraph of Section 5.4.3 
in Chapter 5). The proposals were used as a basis for performance-monitoring 
purposes against which the PPP firm’s performance was measured. As asserted 
earlier, with regards to monitoring their commitments, the companies had to submit 
quarterly/bi-annual empowerment reports to the public sector entity responsible for 
the project. The promises made in the proposal/bid became a commitment against 
which the performance of the service provider was measured.  
 
An approach similar to this approach can be used by government if it intends to 
improve the participation of SMEs in PPPs. As discussed in Section 6.2.3.1, 
government should develop a policy that will force PPP firms to set aside a certain 
   205 
 
percentage of the PPP contract to be awarded to SMEs. In order to ensure that the 
participation of SMEs is improved, government can then put in place a monitoring 
system that will monitor the implementation of the policy. This can be done by 
requiring all PPP firms to submit quarterly reports on progress made in terms of 
involving SMEs in their PPP projects. This can include information such as the 
number of SMEs contracted by the PPP firms and the Rand value of all contracts 
awarded to SMEs involved in the PPP project.  
 
The study can conclude that there were no expectations by government for PPP 
firms to meet certain requirements on involving SMEs in PPP projects. However, the 
study has found that the participation of SMEs can be improved by putting in place 
some incentives to encourage PPP firms to improve SMEs participation in PPP 
projects and also by putting a monitoring system that would monitor the 
implementation of any policy developed by government with the aim of improving the 
participation of SMEs in PPP projects. 
 
6.3.5.3 Improving the participation of SMEs in PPP projects 
 
The research results on improving the participation of SMEs in PPP projects are 
presented in Section 5.4.3 of Chapter 5. When respondents were asked to give their 
opinion on how they thought the participation of SMEs in PPP projects could be 
improved and were also asked about who they thought should play a significant role 
in improving the participation of SMEs in PPP projects, several opinions emerged in 
response to this question (see the first paragraph of Section 5.4.3). The most 
prominent ones are that: (i) the state should start by creating an environment 
conducive for both the SMEs and the PPP firms, (ii) the participation of SMEs should 
be made a mandatory requirement through legislation, (iii) state should provide 
training to SMEs in areas where SMEs struggle, such as providing managerial skills 
and financial management skills, (iv) the concessionaire should drive the 
participation of SMEs, while the state monitors progress and address any obstacles, 
(v) the state needs to have a clear policy direction and make consistent decisions or 
policy statements to improve the regulatory environment, and (vi) policy decisions 
need to be taken promptly by the state, especially on issues that affect private sector 
investment decisions. Table 5.4 of Section 5.4.3 of Chapter 5 gives a comprehensive 
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summary of the different respondents’ opinions on how the participation of SMEs in 
PPP projects can be improved.   
 
The above assertions make sense as conducive PPP market conditions are 
imperative for enhancing SMEs participation in PPP projects. However, it should also 
be noted that the focus should not only be on improving participation of SMEs in 
PPPs; it should also be in improving the rate and the number of PPP projects 
implemented in the country so as to expand the PPP market and allow it to absorb 
more SMEs. This will enable the country to receive the full benefits that can be 
offered by PPP projects. This includes improving the country’s investment climate as 
a whole as this can improve certainty in the economy and investor confidence. Once 
the private sector has certainty and confidence about the future direction of 
government policy, the results would be an increase in private sector investment in 
the country as a whole, resulting in more money available from the private sector to 
invest in PPP projects.    
 
The study can indeed conclude that there are many ways in which the participation 
of SMEs in PPP projects can be improved. However, for these ideas to work, 
government needs to play an active role in the process by creating the necessary 
conditions that would be conducive for both the PPP firms and the SMEs 
themselves. This include empowering the SMEs with the required skills and 
encouraging PPP firms to make use of SMEs in all PPP projects through policy 
intervention. 
 
Based on the above analysis, this research has therefore 
answered the third main research sub-question (MRQIII): 
How can the involvement of SMEs be increased in PPP 
projects? Sections 6.3.5.1, 6.3.5.2, and 6.3.5.3 give 
different ways in which the involvement of SMEs in PPP 
projects can be improved.  
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The following section gives a summary of the main research findings with regard to 
the third main research sub-question with the view of either to prove or disprove its 
proposition (P3). 
 
6.3.6 Proving or disproving Research Proposition 3 (P3) 
P3: There are a number of ways in which the involvement of SMEs in PPP 
projects can be enhanced. 
 
The following is a summary of the main research findings related to the third 
research sub-question (MRQIII), showing that indeed there are different ways in 
which the involvement of SMEs in PPP projects can be improved. 
 
 Paragraph 3 of Section 6.3.5.1 concluded that, for a country to be able to use 
PPP projects to develop the SME sector, there is a need to consider including 
“developing the SME sector” as one of the objectives for using PPPs to procure 
the needed infrastructure. This can assist in improving the participation of 
SMEs in PPP projects. 
 
 Paragraph 4 of Section 6.3.5.1 concluded that bidders for PPP projects should 
be incentivised in order to allow more SMEs in their PPP projects and reward 
those bidders that are prepared to do more than the required minimum as 
prescribed by the PPA Act. The 10 percentage points given to BEE compliant 
bidders as per the PPA Act can be used as a minimum requirement and any 
bidder that proposes to do more than the minimum should be awarded extra 
points during the bid evaluation process. 
 
 Paragraph 2 of Section 6.3.5.2 concluded that government should develop a 
policy that will force PPP firms to set aside a certain percentage of the PPP 
contract to be awarded to SMEs. In order to ensure that the participation of 
SMEs is improved, government can then put in place a monitoring system that 
will monitor the implementation of the policy. 
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 Section 6.3.5.3, showed that there are indeed many ways in which the 
participation of SMEs in PPP projects can be improved, including the 
unbundling of PPP projects. The first paragraph of this section lists a number 
of ways in which the participation of SMEs can be improved. However, for this 
to work, government needs to play an active role in the process by creating 
the necessary conditions that would be conducive for both the PPP firms and 
the SMEs themselves. 
 
Based on the above main conclusions of the research 
analysis on the number of ways in which the involvement 
of SMEs in PPP projects can be enhanced, this research 
has therefore proved or confirmed the third research 
proposition (P3): There are a number of ways in which the 
involvement of SMEs in PPP projects can be enhanced. 
 
The following section gives an analysis and synthesis of the research results 
presented in Sections 5.3.3 and 5.4.4 of Chapter 5. The analysis discusses the 
appropriate PPP model for sustainable SMEs development that can respond to the 
South African economic challenges with the view to answer the fourth main research 
sub-question. 
 
6.3.7 Answering the fourth Main Research Sub-Question (MRQIV)  
MRQIV: Does an appropriate PPP model for increasing the participation of 
SMEs in PPP projects exist that will respond to the South African economic 
challenges? 
 
This research question is the ultimate question that this study seeks to answer. The 
information discussed, analysed and synthesised in the previous chapters and in this 
chapter is meant to give an answer to this question. 
 
Sections 5.3.3 and 5.4.4 of Chapter 5 discussed possible ways in which the current 
South African PPP model could be improved in order to facilitate the use of SMEs in 
PPP projects. The results of the research showed that the current South African PPP 
model lacks certain elements which are important in facilitating SME participation in 
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PPP projects. In Sections 6.2.3.1, 6.2.3.2 and 6.2.3.3 the research found that an 
appropriate model for SMEs development should  
(i) specifically incorporate SMEs as part of the PPP model structure (see Table 5.4 
on how the participation of SMEs in PPP projects can be improved). SMEs should 
not just be add-on but should be permanent features of the PPP model,  
(ii) allow big PPP projects to be divided into smaller but viable projects at both 
operation and construction phases of PPP projects.,  
(iii) make the BEE as stipulated by the PPR Act of 2001 a minimum requirement to 
encourage PPP firms to be innovative on how they would support SMEs. Section 
5.3.1.2, discussed how activities in a PPP project can be disaggregated into 
manageable but viable small projects,  
(iv) have a condition built in the concession that would encourage PPP firms to 
develop SMEs,  
(v) develop a programme within the PPP model that would support skills 
development for SMEs participating in PPP projects. Such programmes should be 
geared towards addressing the challenges faced by SMEs when providing services 
to PPP firms, as identified in Section 5.3.3.2 of Chapter 5, and  
(vi) incorporate the different institutional SME models discussed in Annexure D into 
the current South African PPP model to address the different challenges SMEs are 
faced with when providing goods and services to PPP firms. 
 
The study can conclude that an appropriate PPP model for sustainable SMEs 
development that can respond to the South African economic challenges does exist. 
This model can be developed based on the research findings of this study. The main 
focus of Chapter 8 is therefore on the development of such a model.  
 
Based on the above analysis, this research has therefore 
answered the fourth main research sub-question (MRQIV): Does 
an appropriate PPP model for increasing SMEs participation in 
PPP projects exist that will respond to the South African economic 
challenges? The above analysis of Section 6.3.7 showed with the 
aid of examples the type of a PPP model that is appropriate to 
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develop a sustainable SME sector and respond to the South 
African economic challenges. 
 
6.3.8 Proving or disproving Research Proposition 4 (P4) 
P 4: There is an appropriate model for sustainable SMEs 
development that can respond to the South African economic 
challenges. 
 
This section of the study discusses the main conclusions of the analysis in Section 
6.3.7, with the aim of proving or disproving the fourth research proposition as stated 
above. 
 
Paragraph 2 of Section 6.3.7 lists a number of different ways and 
factors/components the traditional PPP model and the current South African PPP 
model would need to incorporate into its structure and the role that the policy-makers 
need to play in order to develop an appropriate PPP model for sustainable SME 
development that will respond to the South African economic challenges. 
 
Based on the above main conclusion of the research analysis, 
this research has therefore proved or confirmed the fourth 
research proposition (P4): There is an appropriate model for 
sustainable SMEs development that can respond to the South 
African economic challenges. 
 
6.4 Summary of data and research propositions 
 
Table 6.1 presents a summary of the propositions tested through the data collected 
during the study survey. It shows the research questions answered, propositions 
proved or disproved, analysis of data, and the conclusion related to each proposition. 
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Table 6.1: Summary of research propositions, data presentation and analysis 
) 
Research 
questions 
answered 
Propositions proved 
or disproved 
Presentation 
of data 
(chapter and 
section) 
 Analysis 
of data 
(chapter 
and 
sections) 
Conclusion  
1. How have PPP 
projects in the 
country helped 
SME 
development? 
Contracting SMEs to 
provide certain 
services to PPP firms 
has contributed to 
SME growth in the 
country 
Chapter 5: 
Section 5.3.1 
and 5.3.2 
Chapter 6: 
Section  
6.3.1 
 
Proved 
2. What are the 
problems or 
challenges faced 
by PPP project 
firms when 
using SMEs to 
supply 
services? 
PPP firms face 
different problems 
when using SMEs to 
supply goods and 
services, and lack of 
skills is the root cause 
of most of the 
problems 
Chapter 5: 
Section 5.3.3 
 
Chapter 6: 
Section  
6.3.3 
 
Confirmed 
3. How can the 
involvement of 
SMEs be 
increased in 
PPP projects? 
 
There are a number 
of ways in which the 
involvement of SMEs 
in PPP projects can 
be enhanced 
Chapter 5: 
Section 
5.3.4 
Chapter 6: 
Section 
6.3.5 
 
Confirmed 
4. Is there an 
appropriate 
existing PPP 
model for 
increasing the 
participation of 
SMEs in PPP 
projects that will 
respond to the 
South African 
economic 
challenges? 
There is an 
appropriate model for 
sustainable SME 
development that can 
respond to the South 
African economic 
challenges 
Chapter 5: 
Section 
5.3.5 and 
5.3.6 
Chapter 6: 
Section  
6.3.7 
 
Confirmed 
 
The study has answered all the main research sub-questions and proved or 
confirmed that all the propositions for each of the sub-questions are correct. Given 
that all the propositions are correct, the next step is to develop an innovative 
conceptual PPP model for the development of a sustainable SME sector taking into 
account the findings of the research study as presented in Chapter 5 and this 
chapter. The following section discuses summary findings of the research and 
possible solutions related to a specific finding. 
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6.5 Summary of challenges faced by SMEs in PPPs and possible solutions 
 
This research has proven through the data presented in Chapter 5 of this study and 
in this chapter that the South African government can use PPP projects to contribute 
to the development of its SME sector. However, this can be done only if the current 
PPP model is adjusted to take into account the information and the findings on the 
above four main research sub-questions. Below is a summary of the findings on 
these research sub-questions: 
 PPP project firms currently contract SMEs to provide services to PPP 
projects, 
 Not enough preferential treatment are given to SMEs when PPP project firms 
award contract to a third party, 
 SME participation is not a requirement for a PPP project and there is no policy 
that forces PPP firms to use SMEs in PPP projects, either during construction 
or the operational phases, 
 Low share of contracts in Rand amount are allocated to SMEs compared to 
large firms, 
 SMEs face challenges when providing services to PPP projects. These 
challenges include late delivery of services, poor quality of services, and 
failure to deliver services when needed by PPP firms, 
 SME challenges are due to a lack of appropriate skills, right technology, 
access to finance, poor managerial skills and poor relationship with PPP 
firms, 
 The most significant challenge for SMEs is poor management skills, followed 
by a lack of appropriate human resources and then a lack of access to 
finance, 
 PPP firms had assisted SMEs with building human capacity, access to 
finance and the right technology, 
 Improving participation of SMEs in PPP projects is difficult because SMEs 
lack technical and financial ability to effectively participate in PPP projects, 
 PPP project risks are too big for SMEs, and therefore PPP firms are reluctant 
to use SMEs for these reasons. 
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The table in Annexure E gives a summary of the identified shortcomings with the 
current South African PPP model and the traditional PPP Model. It also gives 
possible solutions to the problems based on literature (see Annexure D) and 
research findings as presented in Chapter 5 and in this chapter. The last column of 
the table gives PPP-SME models that are relevant to addressing the identified 
challenges. These PPP-SME models are discussed in detail in Annexure D. To 
address the issues identified in this study, the proposed PPP model needs to 
incorporate these models into its structure and ensure that all the issues identified 
receive the necessary attention in the new PPP model for sustainable SMEs 
development to be proposed in the eighth chapter of this study. 
 
In improving the effectiveness of the current PPP model, one can set up an 
independent centre or a centre within the existing government agencies responsible 
for SMEs or within the PPP Unit to provide all the services required to address the 
identified challenges as summarised in Annexure E. Given the challenges and the 
possible solutions as in Annexure E, the next step was to look at how these 
challenges could be incorporated into the traditional PPP model and the current 
South African PPP model to develop a PPP model for a sustainable SME sector. 
 
6.6 Chapter summary 
 
The research has identified lack of managerial skills for most SMEs as being the 
biggest problem that hinder effective participation of SMEs in PPP projects. To 
address this problem there is a need for a long-term strategy that will focus on skill 
development for SMEs. The process for developing the strategy should be driven by 
the public sector working together with PPP firms that use SME services. PPP firms 
are in a better position to recommend to the government the types of skills that 
SMEs need to be developed on. 
 
Another challenge that PPP firms face when intending to use SMEs is the amount of 
risk involved with PPP projects that can be transferred to an SME. As PPP projects 
involve enormous amount of risks, PPP firms find it difficult to transfer these risks to 
an SME, given the fact that SMEs lack capacity to handle such risks. This also 
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hinders the effective use of SMEs in PPP projects. This problem necessitates that 
PPP projects, be disbundled into smaller projects that can be easily managed by 
SMEs. This will allow the risks to be spread amongst a number of SMEs, and each 
SME would be able to manage whatever risk is allocated to it, since the risks would 
have been reduced to a manageable level. For example, at the operational stage of 
a road project, a contract can be divided into grass cutting, toll collection, IT services, 
road line renewal, taw truck services, and so forth. This approach can reduce the 
amount of risk that each SMEs would carry, should these services be carried by 
different SMEs. 
 
Development of a policy to force PPP firms to use SMEs is one of the important 
steps that needs immediate attention if the country was to improve the participation 
of SMEs in the PPP market. This should not only address SMEs issues at the 
operational stages of PPP projects only, but should apply at the construction or 
implementation stages of the projects as well. The use of SMEs in PPP projects 
should be mandatory and should not be left to the PPP firms to decide whether they 
involve SMEs or not. 
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CHAPTER 7: THE PROPOSED INNOVATIVE CONCEPTUAL PPP MODEL 
FOR DEVELOPING A SUSTAINABLE SME SECTOR 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 4 discussed the research methodology and also identified the appropriate 
model approach to be used to develop the model to be proposed in this study. The 
model approach was identified to be the conceptual model. Chapters 5 and 6 
presented the research results and analysis on the current practices on the 
participation of SMEs in PPP projects in South Africa respectively based of the 
results of the study survey. The objective of this chapter is therefore to develop a 
conceptual PPP model based on the conceptual model approach that has the 
potential of informing the development of a sustainable SME sector that will create 
jobs for the poor, thus alleviating poverty and inequality. The development of such a 
model takes into account information collected during the literature review and the 
surveys conducted on SME participation in PPP projects, the results of which were 
presented in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 analysed the results presented in Chapter 5 and 
made findings and conclusions. It highlighted the difficulties and challenges that both 
SMEs and PPP firms face when working together in a PPP project. This chapter 
therefore seeks to propose an innovative conceptual PPP model for the development 
of SMEs that takes into account all the research findings of this study. 
 
The objective of this chapter is to develop an innovative PPP model for the 
development of sustainable SMEs in South Africa, which could be adopted by other 
developing countries. The chapter is organised as follows: Section 7.2 briefly 
discusses the South African PPP model in practice. Section 7.3 briefly discusses the 
two South African PPP model approaches relevant for this study and how the 
research findings were used to develop the proposed model, while Section 7.4 
focuses on building the conceptual innovative PPP model for SME development. 
Section 7.5 presents and discusses the proposed innovative PPP model. Section 7.6 
discusses how the proposed model addresses the shortcomings of the traditional 
PPP model. Section 7.7 discusses the structure of the proposed model, Section 7.8 
discusses model evaluation and validation, while Section 7.9 focuses on how the 
proposed innovative PPP model works or can be applied in practice. Section 7.10 
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discusses risks and benefits associated with implementing the model, while Section 
7.11 discusses different ways in which PPP firms can be incentivised to contract 
more SMEs in their projects, and the last section concludes. 
 
7.2 The two South African PPP model approaches 
 
It is important to note that in practices, South Africa follows two PPP approaches. 
The first approach uses the private sector to design, finance, construct, operate and 
maintain the infrastructure project. The second approach, which is the hybrid of the 
traditional PPP approach, was followed by SANRAL when procuring the Gauteng 
road expansion project. Under the first approach, the role of government or the 
public sector agency is limited when it comes to implementing the PPP project in that 
most of the responsibilities, such as design, finance construct, operation and 
maintenance become the responsibilities of the private sector partner. This model 
was followed by SANRAL when procuring the N3 toll road, N4 toll road and the 
Bakwena toll road PPP projects.  
 
The government’s role in these PPP projects is to monitor the implementation and 
the operation of the project and also to monitor that the private party meets the 
performance indicators agreed upon. Under the second approach (hybrid approach), 
the government agency raises funds for the project through issuing government 
bonds or raise debt from financial markets. Under this approach the public sector 
partner has more liberty to appoint or influence the appointment of subcontractors to 
design, construct, operate and maintain the project. Under this approach the public 
sector carries all market and financial risks related to the project, which is not the 
case when the other approach is used to procure projects.  
 
Both approaches have their own advantages and disadvantages. For example, when 
the first approach is used, government or its agency has limited control on how the 
project is implemented, as all responsibilities are transferred to the private sector 
party. The influence of government on how SMEs should be contracted to a project 
is limited compared to when the project is financed by the public-sector agency. This 
is because under this approach most of the risks are carried by the private sector 
partner. The concession between the private and the public-sector party locks the 
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government out of the project until the concession period has expired. In other 
words, the concession ring-fences the project from external influence until the project 
is delivered according to the specifications and performance standards agreed upon. 
The responsibility of government is limited to monitoring the implementation of the 
project, and its interest in this case is limited to having the project completed and 
delivering the service to the public as planned.  
 
When the hybrid approach is used, the government agency retains more influence 
on how the project is to be implemented as it carries most of the risks, such as 
demand risks, given the fact that under this approach the public partner funds the 
project itself. It has control on who should be contracted to do what and it can also 
easily influence the participation of SMEs during both the construction and 
operational phases of the project. Under the first approach the government loses 
most of its influence and flexibility. The decision on which approach to follow seems 
to depend on what the government wants or intends to achieve with the project. 
 
However, both approaches have failed to facilitate participation of SMEs in PPP 
projects. The reasons is that both approaches do not include developing SMEs as 
one of their requirements and there is no policy that incentives PPP firms to use 
SMEs in PPP projects, either during construction or at the operational phases of 
PPP projects. Therefore there is no preferential treatment given to SMEs when PPP 
project firms award contracts to a third party. Furthermore, both approaches do not 
have a mechanism or a programme in place that deals with different challenges to 
assist struggling SMEs with required skills and other assistance that they may need. 
The hybrid approach seem to be the appropriate approach to follow if the 
government wants to increase the participation of SMEs in PPP projects. 
 
It is therefore important that the to be proposed model takes these two PPP 
approaches or practices followed in South Africa, as well as the inadequacies of 
these two approaches in facilitating participation of SMEs in PPP projects into 
account. The following section briefly discusses the relevant models to this study. 
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7.3 Revisiting the current PPP model and incorporating the survey results 
into the proposed model development 
 
Most of the PPP models for SMEs identified in the literature are institutional PPPs as 
opposed to concessionaire PPPs (see Annexure D). Their main objective is to 
empower SMEs with soft skills that will help SMEs unblock all the challenges that 
they are faced with, as identified in Chapters 5 and 6. The objectives of these 
models are not to directly create opportunities for SMEs, but to create a environment 
within which SMEs could operate and to empower SMEs with the know-how to 
operate in these market environments. Most of the problems facing SMEs as 
identified through literature (see Section 3.3 of Chapter 3) and confirmed by the 
study survey findings (see Section 5.3.3.1 of Chapter 5) can be addressed by 
employing these types of PPP models. Below is a discussion on how this information 
and the information collected through the study survey had been used by the 
researcher to develop the proposed model as shown in Figure 7.1. 
 
7.3.1 Shortcomings of the current South African and traditional PPP models 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, Section 1.10, both the traditional and the South African 
version of PPP models fail to incorporate SMEs as a permanent feature in their 
structure, and that makes it difficult to use PPPs to create employment through the 
use of SMEs in PPP projects. The following observations or issues are noted about 
both the traditional and the current South African PPP model: 
(i) Although the South African version of the PPP model does refer to SMEs, it 
does not force the PPP consortium or SPV to include SMEs in order to 
facilitate SMEs development;  
(ii) the traditional PPP model and the current South African PPP models also do 
not formally unbundle the activities, tasks or services required by PPP 
projects into smaller projects and that limits or hinders effective participation of 
SMEs in PPP projects;   
(iii) the SME requirement in the South African version of the traditional PPP model 
is one of many requirements that the PPP project needs to meet. This means 
that a service provider can still be awarded a project even if it does not meet 
either the PPA or SME requirements; 
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(iv) the SME requirement is only for black owned South African SMEs, as it is 
based on the BEE policy. The objective of this requirement is not to develop 
the SME sector in general, but aims at developing a specific segment of the 
SME sector. The reason behind this approach may be that the government 
wants to address historical imbalances within the SME sector caused by past 
injustice. This approach can only work in South Africa or in countries that have 
similar challenges as South Africa. Even in South Africa it cannot be applied 
forever, as the apartheid legacy will disappear in the long-term and BBBEE 
requirements may no longer be a condition for procurement of public projects. 
Such a requirement may render the model irrelevant in other jurisdictions and 
across different time periods; 
(v) the traditional model does not recognise that PPPs can be used by developing 
countries to foster the indigenisation process and contribute to sustainable 
economic development, for example, the black economic empowerment in the 
South African case. However, the South African PPP model does take this 
into account; 
(vi) the traditional PPP model does not take into account the challenges of 
developing countries, such as unemployment, poverty, and inequality, 
although the South African model does take into account the challenges of 
developing countries; however, it puts more emphasis on BEE compared to 
SMEs development and that limits what PPP projects can achieve for the 
country; 
(vii) Neither model addresses small business development challenges in relation 
to PPP projects. The institutional PPP models identified in the literature 
become relevant in addressing these challenges and need to be incorporated 
into the PPP model structure. 
 
Below is a discussing on how the information collected through the study survey and 
through the review of related literature has helped the researcher to develop the 
conceptual model that will address the shortcomings of the traditional as well as the 
South African PPP models mentioned above.  
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7.3.2 Incorporating the survey results into the model development 
 
The results of the study survey and the review of the related literature identified all 
the challenges that both SMEs and PPP firms face when working together in PPP 
projects. These challenges range from lack of soft skills by SMEs and failure by 
SMEs to participate in PPP projects, given the fact that PPP projects require high 
technological know-how and a strong balance sheet which SMEs do not have. It also 
found that PPP projects are too big for SMEs; however, SMEs can participate in PPP 
projects if PPP projects were to be unbundled to smaller but viable projects. As a 
result the researcher used the information collected through the survey to feed into 
the development of the conceptual PPP model. During the survey a number of 
activities or tasks that SMEs could provide to PPP projects were identified, as shown 
in Table 5.2 in Chapter 5.  
 
Services that could be provided by SMEs during the construction phase were also 
identified through related literature and the study survey. Table 7.3 lists the different 
activities that are undertaken during both construction and operational phases of a 
PPP project. It also shows the type of firms that can execute these activities. It is 
worth noting that this list is not exhaustive. The disaggregation of the different 
activities (as shown in Table 7.3) required in a PPP project assisted the researcher 
to understand as to how a PPP project can be unbundled and which activities should 
be reserved for or allocated to SMEs and which ones should be executed by big 
firms or by the SPV itself.  
 
The unbundling has the potential to provide a continuous market for SMEs goods 
and services in PPP projects and increase SME participation in PPPs, since SMEs 
can afford to finance these smaller activities that feed into the bigger PPP project. 
The unbundling also assisted the researcher to identify those activities that require 
high technological know-how and those that do not. Those services or activities that 
do not require high skills and expensive technologies are the first candidates for 
SMEs as shown in Table 7.3.  
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During the literature review the researcher also identified a number of SMEs-PPP 
models as discussed above. These models are summarised in Annexure D. 
Annexure E gives a summary of the different problems facing SMEs as identified 
through the study survey and literature review. It also shows which of the models in 
Annexure D could assist to address each of the identified SME challenges. All the 
challenges identified in Annexure E are incorporated into the proposed PPP model 
through the SME-PPP support mechanism shown as component C of the proposed 
model. All this information assisted the researcher to develop the proposed 
innovative conceptual PPP model for SME development as shown in Figure 7.1. 
 
The following section therefore discusses how the innovative conceptual model for 
SME development is developed. The model development process takes into account 
the different issues listed above and those that were identified in the literature and 
the research survey results as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. It also shows how the 
researcher has complied with the internationally recognised conceptual model-
building criteria based on the discussion in Section 4.12 of Chapter 4. 
 
7.4 Building the conceptual innovative PPP model for SME development 
 
Table 7.1 below shows how a conceptual model is built. The table shows the 
different steps followed when building a conceptual model. The last column of Table 
7.1 shows whether the development of the conceptual model adhered to the required 
steps for developing conceptual models as defined by (USAID, 2007 and Gross, 
2003). 
  
Table 7.1: Steps in building a conceptual model 
Steps Description of model 
development steps 
Researcher compliance to 
model building criteria 
Goal Decide on the overall goal of your 
intervention. This goal should be 
visionary or long term and 
inspiring. Identify where 
knowledge is inadequate and 
further research is needed. 
Describe and illustrate key 
hypothesis about the target 
The long-term goal is to develop an 
innovative PPP model for a sustainable 
SME sector that can be used by different 
government departments locally and 
internationally involved in PPP projects to 
encourage the participation of SMEs in 
such projects. 
   222 
 
Steps Description of model 
development steps 
Researcher compliance to 
model building criteria 
outcome. This includes 
understanding the environment 
within which the model will be 
used. 
Target Define the target you want to 
reach, (e.g. stakeholders), 
establish a common vision, the 
relevant spatial and temporal 
bounds, as well as the most 
important system component. 
Define purpose and intended use 
of the model.  
The target stakeholders for this model are 
the different government departments and 
state-owned enterprises involved in PPP 
projects, as well as other developing 
countries facing socio-economic 
challenges similar to the ones faced by 
South African. 
 
Threats Collect all the information that is 
relevant for the model and list all 
the direct and indirect factors that 
you believe are threats to your 
targeted outcome. Arrange the 
threats in a way that shows how 
each threat relates to other threats 
that work against achieving your 
targeted outcome. 
Information to develop the model was 
collected through literature review and 
through a survey using a questionnaire 
(see Section 5.6.2 and 5.8.1) 
The biggest threats to the implementation 
of the model are:  
 Reluctance of PPP firms to involve SMEs 
in PPP projects;  
 Reluctance by PPP firms to disbundle 
activities or services to be provided at 
both the construction and the 
operational phases of the projects into 
smaller projects that can be executed by 
SMEs; 
 Failure by SMEs to meet PPP firms’ 
service requirements; and  
 Failure by government to support SMEs 
with skills and finances. 
Interventions List the current or planned 
interventions and arrange them 
adjacent to the threats they are 
meant to address. 
The following interventions are planned: 
 Policy intervention will be used to make it 
mandatory for PPP firms to involve 
SMEs in PPP projects, 
 A PPP-SME support system will be put in 
place to assist struggling SMEs in 
meeting PPP firms’ requirements and 
assist SMEs with other challenges such 
as lack of skills, 
 The PPP-SME support system will also 
help with the monitoring of the 
implementation of the policy that will 
force PPPs to use SMEs in PPP 
projects. 
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Steps Description of model 
development steps 
Researcher compliance to 
model building criteria 
Develop 
models 
Consider a wide range of 
processes relevant to the problem 
and discipline and also identify 
major system drivers that will be 
included into the model. 
The model is developed based on the 
traditional PPP model and the South 
African PPP model. All the factors that are 
applicable to the two models mentioned 
above are also applicable to the proposed 
model. In addition to these factors, the 
proposed model also takes into account 
unemployment issues, the PPP-SME 
support system, and the disbundling of 
tasks during construction and the 
operational stage of PPP projects to 
smaller but viable projects to allow SME 
participation. 
Use, review, 
revise, refine 
models 
As all models represent an 
incomplete abstraction of reality, 
therefore most models will need to 
be revised to accommodate new 
observations, information or to 
meet changing goals. 
The proposed model has the flexibility of 
being revised should there be new market 
developments. For example, the BBBEE 
element may be removed from the model 
should it no longer be required in the long 
term and new factors can be added 
should there be a need to do so. 
Source: USAID (2007), Gross (2003) and Author 
 
According to Whetten (1989:490), by the time the conceptual model is developed the 
researcher should have at least systemically addressed six questions through the 
model, namely; what, why, how, who, where and when. Table 7.2 below shows how 
the researcher has answered these questions to comply with model-building criteria. 
The last column of Table 7.2 explains how each question was addressed during the 
process of developing the conceptual model. 
 
Table 7.2: Compliance to model building criteria 
 
Question Description Researcher compliance to model 
building criteria 
What  Here two criteria are 
recommended to ensure that 
the right variables are 
included, namely 
comprehensiveness (are all 
relevant factors included?) 
and parsimony (i.e. should 
some factors be deleted 
because they add little value 
in explaining the model?) 
(a) Section 3.3 of Chapter 3, Section 5.3.3.1 of 
Chapter 5 and Section 6.3.3.1 of Chapter 6 
identified and discussed a number of factors that 
affect SME participation in PPP projects and also 
identified possible solutions to these factors or 
challenges. All the factors identified in these 
sections were considered in building the 
conceptual PPP model. Factors which were less 
significant in explaining the model were excluded 
from the model and only those that were 
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Question Description Researcher compliance to model 
building criteria 
This step involves answering 
the question of what the 
underlying psychological, 
economic or social dynamics 
are that justify the selection 
of factors and the proposed 
causal relationships. 
significant were included.  
  
(b) Factors were selected based on the problems 
identified in the different sections of Chapter 5 and 
6. For example, the underlying economic 
dynamics that warranted the development of a 
PPP model that will support a sustainable 
development of the SME sector is the high rate of 
unemployment in the country. To allow SMEs to 
participate in PPP projects, services to be 
provided to PPPs need to be disaggregated to 
manageable sizes that SMEs can afford to deliver, 
hence the unbundling of services as shown in 
Figure 7.1. The use of SMEs to alleviate 
unemployment is due to the fact that SMEs grow 
employment at a faster rate than large firms (see 
Section 3.2 of Chapter 3 on the advantages of 
using SMEs instead of big firms to fight 
unemployment).  
How The question here is how the 
different elements of the 
model are related? Here 
arrows can be used to 
connect the boxes as a way 
of showing the relationships 
between different factors of 
the model.  
As shown in Figure 7.1, arrows have been used to 
indicate the relationships between the PPP-SME 
support system and the different services that SMEs 
can provide to a PPP projects. The arrows also show 
how the different SME components make up the 
Experts implementation and application 
Subcontractors of the conceptual model and how 
this expert subcontractors link to the whole PPP 
model. 
Why  The question to ask here is, 
what are the underlying 
psychological, economic, or 
social dynamics that justify 
the selection of factors and 
the proposed causal 
relationship? Why should 
colleagues give credence to 
your presentation of the 
phenomena? 
In this case, the literature review on PPPs and 
SMEs, together with the information collected 
through the survey and analysed in Chapters 5 and 
6 showed which factors needed to be included in the 
model development and why they should be 
included. 
Who, 
Where 
and 
When 
These conditions place 
limitations on the usefulness 
of the model. They set 
boundaries of the 
generalisability of the model. 
The key questions here are 
firstly, who will use the 
model? Secondly “will the 
model hold in other 
The proposed conceptual PPP model for sustainable 
development of the SME sector can be applied 
during the implementation and application phases of 
PPP projects. Although the model is developed 
based on South African data collected through a 
survey of PPP firms operating in the country and 
government departments responsible for 
implementing PPP projects (see Section 4.5 and 
Section 4.6 of Chapter 4), the model can be applied 
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Question Description Researcher compliance to model 
building criteria 
jurisdictions and across 
different time periods?”  
by PPP practitioners in other developing countries 
who want to maximise the benefits that PPP projects 
can render to their citizen. The model is developed in 
such way that it holds across different time periods, 
provided it is adjusted based on the prevailing socio-
economic conditions at that time. 
Source: Whetten (1989) and Author 
Having taken into account all the above steps necessary in building a conceptual 
model, the following section presents the proposed PPP model for sustainable 
development of the SME sector. 
 
7.5 The proposed PPP model for SME development 
 
As mentioned earlier, the different PPP models for SMEs discussed in Annexure D 
and the research findings in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 served as a foundation on which 
the proposed innovative PPP model is built. Below is a discussion on the different 
features of the proposed PPP model. 
 
The traditional PPP model has five major role players; namely, the government, 
financiers, SPV, customers, and the experts. Opportunities for SMEs can only be 
found within the financiers, SPV, and the expert components of the traditional PPP 
model. However, the focus of this study is only on the experts’ component of the 
PPP model, as the researcher believes that most opportunities for SMEs exist within 
the experts’ component. The experts consist of three role players; namely; engineer 
designers, insurers, implementation or construction experts and the application or 
operations experts. The execution of the different tasks within the Experts 
component requires different sets of skills, given the fact that the activities involved 
in these phases are different. 
 
The proposed PPP model as presented in Figure 7.1 is an extension of the PPP 
model presented in Figure 1.4 in Section 1.10. The model assumes all the elements 
of the traditional PPP model still hold; however, it proposes changes at the experts 
level of the model to facilitate increased participation of SMEs in PPP projects.   
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It proposes that at this level, the SPV should unbundle services to be provided to 
PPP projects into smaller separate but viable projects where possible. This means 
that SMEs will be contracted by the SPV, which is the main contractor for the project. 
This will allow opportunities to be spread to different SMEs that specialise in 
providing different services. However, the author is aware that at the implementation 
and or construction phase it may be difficult to unbundle a PPP project, for example 
unbundling the actual construction of a road project into smaller projects may not be 
economically viable due to the nature of a road PPP project and also due to both 
technical and financial resources required at the construction stage. This means that 
the actual construction of the project should be done by the main contractor or 
subcontract a big firm to execute it, while the smaller tasks, which are mainly the 
finishes (road markings, signs installation, water drainage, small bridges etc.) be 
done by different SMEs (see Table 7.3 below). In some PPP projects this is already 
the case. There are some tasks that are highly specialised, such as engineering 
design. Such tasks can be done by SMEs as long as the SMEs have the required 
skills, since such tasks do not require significant capital outlay. 
 
The SPV can decide on the tasks to be executed by big firms and those to be 
executed by SMEs. The allocation of different tasks should be based on certain 
characteristics as discussed below. Table 7.3 lists the different activities or tasks that 
can be undertaken by different experts during the different phases of a PPP project. 
It is worth noting that the list of activities in Table 7.3 and 7.4 below is not 
exhaustive.   
 
The unbundling of different activities of PPP projects as showed in Table 7.3 below 
should be based on factors such as complexity of the task, size of the task to be 
executed, capital requirement, required technical skills and other factors. Most 
activities that are candidates for SMEs are expected not to be too big, to require less 
capital outlay and technical expertise (some but not all), and to be less complex 
(some but not all). These factors were used to unbundle and allocate the different 
activities to either big firms or SMEs as shown in Tables 7.3 and 7.4. The projects 
listed in the table below cover all the sectors that formed part of the research 
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sample. It needs to be noted that the unbundling of the activities within each type of 
a PPP project is not exhaustive. 
 
Table 7.3: Activities undertaken in a PPP project by firm type 
PPP project Activities at the implementation 
phase 
Activities at the application phase 
 
 
 
 
 
Road 
construction 
Activities to be provided by big 
firms 
 Construction of the road itself or 
refurbishment/extending an existing 
road, 
 Bridges 
 etc. 
 
Activities to be provided by SMEs 
 Water drains 
 Road markings 
 Road signs installation 
 Security services 
 Construction of toll offices 
 Installation of road gutters or rails 
 etc. 
Activities to be provided by big 
firms 
 Major road maintenance 
 Major bridge maintenance 
 etc. 
 
Activities to be provided by SMEs 
 Minor road maintenance  
 Toll collection 
 Security services 
 Tow-truck services 
 Road signs replacement 
 Guard rail replacement 
 Road markings 
 etc. 
 
 
 
Office Block 
Activities to be provided by big 
firms 
 Construction or refurbishment of an 
existing asset (building) 
 IT system installation 
 etc. 
Activities to be provided by SMEs 
 Furniture 
 Security 
 etc. 
Activities to be provided by big 
firms 
 Major building maintenance 
 IT system maintenance 
 etc. 
  
Activities to be provided by SMEs 
 Garden services 
 Security 
 Catering 
 Cleaning 
 etc. 
 
Prisons 
Activities to be provided by big 
firms 
 Construction or refurbishment of an 
existing asset (building) 
 IT system installation 
 
Activities to be provided by SMEs 
 Furniture 
 Security 
 etc. 
Activities to be provided by SMEs 
 Garden services 
 Security 
 Catering 
 Cleaning 
 Laundry 
 etc. 
 
 
Hospitals  Activities to be provided by big 
firms 
 Construction or refurbishment of an 
existing asset (building) 
 IT system installation 
 Medical equipment 
 etc. 
Activities to be provided by SMEs 
 Furniture 
Activities to be provided by big 
firms 
 Major building maintenance 
 Medical equipment maintenance 
 IT system maintenance 
 etc. 
 
Activities to be provided by SMEs 
 Garden services 
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PPP project Activities at the implementation 
phase 
Activities at the application phase 
 Security 
 etc. 
 Security 
 Catering 
 Cleaning 
 Laundry 
 etc. 
Water Activities to be provided by big 
firms 
 Construction or refurbishment of an 
existing asset (reservoir and 
pipelines installation) 
 IT system installation 
 etc. 
 
Activities to be provided by big 
firms 
 Major asset maintenance 
 Billing of clients 
 etc. 
Activities to be provided by SMEs 
 Maintenance of pipeline system 
 Meter replacement 
 Meter readings 
 etc. 
Conservation 
PPP projects 
Activities to be provided by big 
firms 
 Construction or refurbishment of an 
existing asset (building, fencing) 
 IT system installation 
 etc. 
 
Activities to be provided by SMEs 
 Furniture 
 Security 
 etc. 
 
Activities to be provided by big 
firms 
 Major building or fencing 
maintenance 
 IT system maintenance 
 etc. 
 
Activities to be provided by SMEs 
 Horticulture  
 Security 
 Veterinary services 
 Bed and Breakfast services 
 Catering 
 Cleaning 
 etc. 
Source: Author 
 
It is clear from the table that most of the activities done at both implementation/ 
construction and application/operational phases of most PPP projects are similar. 
Few of these tasks require a substantive amount of technical experience and 
financial capabilities. These tasks are the ones that really define the PPP project. 
Such tasks should be executed by big firms such as the PPP project firm itself or be 
contracted to a big subcontractor.   
 
Table 7.3 above can be summarised and presented as Table 7.4. Table 7.4 shows 
how the different activities can be summarised into only implementation and 
application phases by firm type. 
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Table 7.4: Summary of activities for big firms and SMEs 
 Activities at the implementation 
phase 
Activities at the application phase 
Activities to 
be allocated 
to big firms 
Big firms implementation 
experts  
 Engineering design of asset 
 Construction of asset 
 Construction of bridges 
 Refurbishment of existing asset 
 Major IT system installation 
 Security (for prison PPPs) 
 Medical equipment 
 etc. 
Big firms application experts  
 Major asset maintenance 
 It system maintenance  
 Major equipment maintenance and 
replacement 
 etc. 
Activities to 
be allocated 
to SMEs 
SME implementation experts  
 Consulting services 
 Road markings 
 Road signs installation 
 Road rail installation 
 Security services 
 Construction of toll offices 
 Furniture provision 
 Plumbing services 
 Electrification services 
  Supply of construction materials 
 etc. 
 
SME application experts  
 Minor asset maintenance and 
replacement 
 Toll collection/billing services 
 Tow-truck services (road PPP) 
 Road marking 
 Guard rail replacement 
 Road signs replacement 
 Security  
 Furnisher provision 
 Catering 
 Laundry 
 Cleaning 
 etc. 
Source: Author 
 
Tasks that should be executed by big firms include but not limited to construction 
activities of the asset, such as roads, water dams or reservoirs, the water distribution 
systems, refurbishment of an existing asset, installation of IT systems and 
installation of medical equipment depending on the nature of the project. These 
tasks or activities should remain the responsibility of the main contractor or be 
contracted to a big firm. The reason for allocating these tasks to big firms is because, 
if these tasks are not executed properly, the PPP firm would have failed to deliver 
the PPP project, as delivery of these activities really defines the PPP project. All 
other activities or tasks that are done at the implementation stage are done once 
these activities have been executed successfully.  
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Other activities such as water drains, road markings, installation of road signs, 
security services, construction of toll offices and installation of road gutters or rails 
and furniture installation should be provided by SMEs, as they do not need high skills 
and huge financial capabilities. Most of these services are also required at the 
application stage of many PPP projects. Even at this stage they should be provided 
by SMEs, as shown in Table 7.4 above. 
 
Below is the presentation of the proposed innovative conceptual PPP model for SME 
development. A prominent feature of the proposed model is the unbundling of PPP 
project activities/tasks and the inclusion of the PPP-SME support system as part of 
the permanent structure of the model. The PPP-SME support system is important 
because it directly addresses most of the challenges facing SMEs identified during 
literature review and analysis of the study survey results in Chapters 5 and 6. The 
PPP support system should be housed within the PPP Unit or the Department of 
Small Businesses or its agencies, such as SEDA. 
 
The functions or responsibilities of the PPP-SME support system are to: 
 provide SMEs with the required training, focusing on skills development; 
 help SMEs gain easy access to finance based on the CIDB grading to 
mitigate default risks and other risks that may be involved;  
 ensure SMEs comply with contract requirements based on predetermined 
compliance indicators and act as an arbitrator of disputes, monitor operational 
risks and give guidance on mitigation measures to be taken;  
 collect and disseminate data on the PPP market and the participation of 
SMEs in PPP projects; and 
 provide advice to SMEs in the different areas in which SMEs struggle. 
 
Figure 7.1 below shows the proposed innovative conceptual PPP model for 
sustainable development of the SME sector and Annexure F(b) shows the South 
African version of the proposed PPP model.  
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Figure 7.1: An innovative conceptual PPP model for sustainable development of the SME sector based on the traditional 
PPP model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Japan external trade organisation (JETRO) (2010:14), United Nations (2011) and Author 
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The proposed model is expected to be effective in improving the participation of 
SMEs in PPP projects in the country in that it has a monitoring function and a dispute 
resolution mechanism built in it. In an environment where small businesses are 
involved with big firms such as in PPP projects, disputes are likely to occur. Without 
a mechanism to deal with disputes, SMEs may always lose and suffer financial loss 
against PPP firms and that may affect the effective participation of SMEs in PPP 
projects in the long term.    
 
The following section discusses how the different shortcomings of the traditional and 
South African PPP models have been addressed by the proposed innovative 
conceptual PPP model for sustainable development of the SMEs sector. 
 
7.6 Addressing the shortcomings of the traditional PPP model  
 
In order to enhance the participation of SMEs in PPP projects, the innovative 
conceptual PPP model proposed above have taken into account the shortcomings of 
the current PPP model in addressing participation of SMEs in PPP projects as 
discussed in Section 7.3.1 of this chapter and Chapters 5 and 6. Table 7.5 below 
shows how the shortcomings of the traditional and the current South African PPP 
models have been addressed by the proposed model. The first column of Table 7.5 
lists the shortcomings of the traditional PPP model and the second column shows 
how the identified shortcomings have been addressed by the proposed innovative 
conceptual PPP model. 
 
Table 7.5: Addressing the shortcomings of the traditional PPP model 
Identified shortcomings of the 
current PPP model and 
problems identified through 
the research survey  
How the identified shortcomings and challenges are 
addressed by the proposed model 
Does not take advantage of 
infrastructure backlogs as an 
opportunity to develop SMEs 
through PPP projects. 
Government is to be made aware through the model that 
infrastructure backlogs can be converted into employment 
opportunities through the use of SMEs in unbundled PPP 
projects. 
The model bundles all tasks or 
activities at both the 
implementation and application 
The proposed model unbundles activities or services at the 
implementation and application phases of PPP projects and 
classifies them as those that can be executed by SMEs and 
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Identified shortcomings of the 
current PPP model and 
problems identified through 
the research survey  
How the identified shortcomings and challenges are 
addressed by the proposed model 
phases of PPP projects, thus 
limiting SME participation in PPP 
projects. 
those that can be delivered by big firms. 
All activities or tasks at both phases of all PPP projects are 
disaggregated into smaller but viable projects where 
possible, to allow ease of SMEs participation (see Table 7.4) 
The model lacks a support 
system to help SMEs with skills 
development and other 
challenges 
A PPP-SME support system is added as a permanent 
component of the PPP model 
SMEs are not a permanent 
feature of the model. 
SMEs are added at both implementation and application 
phases through the unbundling process and are now a 
permanent feature of the PPP model, 
SME requirement is only for 
black-owned SMEs, as it is based 
on BBBEE requirement. 
The proposed model proposes that all SMEs, regardless of 
who owns them, should be given equal opportunities to 
participate in PPP projects. It also advocates that all SMEs 
should comply with BBBEE requirements, 
The model does not force PPP 
firms to use SMEs at both 
implementation and application 
phases of PPP projects. 
The study proposes that the use of SMEs in PPP projects 
should be mandated through legislation and be made part of 
the request for quotation (RFQ) requirement. 
SMEs lack technical and 
financial ability to effectively 
participate in PPP projects, PPP 
projects risk are too big for 
SMEs. 
The proposed model unbundles PPP projects into smaller but 
viable projects to allow effective participation of SMEs. This 
will also reduce the amount of risks involved and the capital 
outlay required by SMEs to participate in PPP projects, 
Low share of contracts in Rand 
amount are allocated to SMEs 
compared to large firms, and no 
preferential treatment for 
contracts given to SME by PPP 
firms.  
The study proposes that a certain percentage of the PPP 
contract in Rand value should be set aside for SMEs and the 
unbundling of projects will allow more SMEs in PPP projects 
SMEs face challenges when 
providing services to PPP 
projects. These challenges 
include late delivery of services, 
poor quality services, and failure 
to deliver services when needed 
by PPP firms. 
The proposed PPP model incorporates a PPP-SMEs support 
mechanism meant to assist SMEs to deal with these 
challenges and provide the necessary training where 
possible. The department of Small Business or SEDA, has a 
responsibility to help SMEs with these challenges. 
Lack of suitable SMEs to 
participate in PPP projects. 
The unbundling of PPP projects as per the proposed PPP 
model will allow SMEs to focus on services of which they 
have experience delivering. The development of a database 
for SMEs participating in PPP projects will help PPP firms 
identify suitable SMEs to participate in PPP projects. 
Source: Author 
 
The proposed model has addressed all the concerns or challenges identified in the 
current traditional and the South African PPP models and those that were identified 
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during the study survey. The following section explains the different components of 
the proposed conceptual PPP model for SMEs development. 
 
7.7 The structure of the innovative conceptual PPP model  
 
This section discusses the different components of the proposed innovative 
conceptual PPP model for sustainable development of the SME sector. Based on 
Figure 7.1, there is one new component (Component C) that has been added to the 
existing typical PPP model, while one component, (Component B) has been 
reorganised in order to produce the proposed conceptual PPP model for SMEs 
development.   
 
Component A: This part of the conceptual model represents the existing 
components of both the traditional PPP model (Figure 1.4) and the current South 
African PPP model (Annexure F (a)). The functions of the different factors in this 
component remain unchanged as discussed in Table 1.3 of Section 1.10 in Chapter 
1, except that the construction expert subcontractors and the operations expert 
subcontractors are now referred to as implementation or construction experts and 
application or operations experts respectively. This makes it easy for the conceptual 
model to be applicable to all types of PPPs, not only on PPPs that involve 
construction and operation. Such PPPs include nature conservation and tourism 
PPPs. These types of PPPs do not involve construction activities such as roads and 
office blocks PPPs. 
 
Component B: In a typical PPP model services provided during the implementation 
and the application phases are normally provided by expert 
implementers/contractors or application/operations subcontractors. These expert 
subcontractors are mainly big firms and few SMEs as indicated by the study findings 
presented in Chapters 5 and 6. The innovative conceptual PPP model proposes that 
services at the implementation and application phases of a PPP project be 
unbundled and be provided mainly by SMEs and few be provided by big firms, only if 
SMEs could not provide them due to lack of capacity and technical requirements. As 
shown in Table 7.4 above, some of the services needed at the application phase of a 
PPP project can be provided by SMEs. 
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At the implementation level of a PPP project, normally the main role players there 
are big construction companies. The new model proposes that even at this phase, 
services to be provided to the project should be provided by both big and SME firms. 
This can be made possible only if the required services at this stage of the project 
are unbundled, with those that can be executed by SMEs identified before the start 
of the project and be allocated to SMEs accordingly, as shown in component B of 
Figure 7.1. Component B shows how PPP projects can be unbundled to different 
activities and how those activities can be allocated between big and SME firms. This 
should be a legislated requirement for all PPP projects, otherwise it may be difficult 
to force PPP firms to comply with this requirement. The proposals should request all 
bidders to indicate the type of services and the percentage of the tender value that 
will be allocated to SMEs during both the implementation and the application phases 
of the project.  
 
Component C: The research findings in Chapters 5 and 6 showed that SMEs 
struggle with different challenges when providing services to PPP firms and a 
recommendation was made that, for SMEs to participate effectively in PPP projects, 
there must be a support mechanism, the objective of which should be to help SMEs 
deal with their challenges. This component of the proposed PPP model is included to 
deal exactly with all SMEs’ challenges as identified during the study survey. This 
support mechanism should be provided by the government, either within the 
Department of Small Businesses or within the PPP Unit of the National Treasury. 
The function of the PPP-SME support system is discussed in detail in Section 7.9 
below. 
 
Since the model has been developed and adhered to the criterion as presented in 
Table 7.2, the next step is to evaluate the model for its; completeness, consistence, 
coherent, un-ambiguity and correctness (Cherti, Akoka, & Comyn-Wattiau 
(2002:416), Assenova and Johannesson (1996:3) & Mehmood and Cherfi 
(2009:225)). The following section therefore discusses model validation and 
evaluation. 
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7.8 Model validation and evaluation  
 
Model validation and evaluation aims at answering the question of whether the 
proposed conceptual model and its concepts make sense, not only to the 
researcher, but also to other scholars and practitioners (Jabareen, 2009:54). Once a 
model has been developed it needs to be validated for its usefulness for the tasks it 
has to perform. There are therefore several ways of validating a conceptual model or 
framework. The validation process normally starts with the researcher, who then 
seeks validation among outsiders, presenting an evolving model at a conference, a 
seminar, or some other types of academic frameworks which provide an opportunity 
for the researcher to discuss and receive feedback (Jabareen, 2009:54). This model 
was therefore presented at an international conference for public-private partnership 
(ICPPP) held in Austin, Texas in the United States of America from 26 to 29 May 
2015 and was also presented at the School of Business Leadership of the University 
of South Africa where it was presented to both academics and practitioners in the 
PPP market. Inputs received from these presentations were incorporated to improve 
the model.    
 
Table 7.6 below gives the model validation criteria as well as the compliance of the 
above proposed innovative PPP model to the criteria. The model validation criteria 
are based on academic frameworks as discussed above; however the conceptual 
model was further validated through conference presentation and discussions of the 
model with practitioners and academics. Feedbacks from these interactions were 
taken into account when finalising the model. 
 
Table 7.6: Model validation  
Model validation criteria Researcher compliance to model validation 
criteria 
Completeness: A conceptual 
model should include all possible 
significant factors or elements that 
affect the phenomenon. It should 
ensure that all needs, constraints 
and policies are covered by one or 
more requirements.  
It needs to be noted that the proposed model is an 
extension of an existing model. Therefore all the identified 
significant factors that make up the proposed model which 
are applicable in facilitating SMEs development or 
participation in PPP projects are included in the model.  
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Model validation criteria Researcher compliance to model validation 
criteria 
Consistency: Processes within 
the conceptual model should be 
consistent with one another and 
also be consistent with empirical 
data. Any model that is 
inconsistent with underlying 
empirical data or which cannot be 
reproduced must be either 
modified or rejected. 
The factors that were added to the model, such as the PPP-
SME support system and the different type of SMEs that 
can provide different services to a PPP project at both 
implementation and application stages are consistent with 
one another, as shown by the arrows on Figure 7.1 and 7.2. 
The model was also built from information obtained 
empirically from respondents through the study survey, 
face-to face supplementary interviews and data collected 
from relevant government departments or agencies. The 
model is thus consistent with the underlying empirical data. 
It can be used for different PPP projects with no or little 
adjustment. 
Coherent: It should be organised 
in such a way that all elements of 
the model are logical. 
As shown in Figure 7.1, all the elements of the model are 
arranged logically and they support the intended outcome, 
which is an innovative PPP model for a sustainable 
development of the SME sector. 
Correctness: The model should 
be appropriate for the intended 
application and should have the 
potential to address the identified 
gaps. 
 
As the objective of developing this model was to enhance 
the participation of SMEs in PPP projects, the unbundling of 
services or tasks at both the implementation and the 
application phases of PPP projects allows for ease of SME 
participation. The PPP-SME support system is also meant to 
address all problems that SMEs may face during the 
execution of the tasks contracted to deliver (see Figures 8.1 
and 8.2). Given the fact that the model was constructed 
from empirical data obtained from a survey using a 
questionnaire and covering all types of PPP projects in the 
country, it is therefore generalisable. 
Complexity: The model cannot be 
too complex to ensure ease of use 
and implementation in real world 
project environments. 
The model is presented in a user-friendly, visually 
appealing, simple format. The model allows for ease of use 
and implementation in real world PPP project settings.   
Transparency: The model should 
be transparent, making the 
conclusions of the model more 
understandable and in doingso, 
should increase its applicability to 
real world projects. 
All the elements of the model have been explained in simple 
terms (see Section 7.8 below) and their relationships with 
one another are clear and understandable; that provides for 
ease of applicability in real-world PPP project settings. 
Decision-making: A model should 
be oriented to support the process 
of decision-making. It should 
facilitate more effective decision-
making within a project 
environment.  
The model is supported by the practical PPPs and SME 
experiences collected from respondents involved in PPP 
projects. The collected information provided clarity on the 
various factors to be considered when SMEs provide 
services to PPP project firms. The results of the survey on 
which the proposed model is based also give respondents’ 
suggestions on different activities that different role players 
have to play in order to improve the participation of SME in 
PPP projects (see Table 5.4) and that enhances the 
decision making process.  
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Model validation criteria Researcher compliance to model validation 
criteria 
Explainability: It must be easily 
explainable (model legitimisation) 
to ensure the general acceptability 
of the model.  
The model was built based on an existing model which was 
already working, understandable and accepted in the 
industry. The improvements or the new elements added to 
the existing model are based on the survey results and are 
clear and easy to link with other elements of the model. 
Moreover, they talk or directly address the socio-economic 
dynamics that the proposed model seeks to address, which 
is the high unemployment rate. These features of the model 
make it easily explainable and acceptable.  
Source: Hass (2009); Valadares (1999); Remenyi, Williams, Money & Swart (1998); Schmenner 
(2009) and Author 
 
Given the above model validation criteria or standards and the compliance of the 
proposed conceptual model to these standards, it can be concluded that the 
proposed conceptual PPP model for developing a sustainable SME sector is valid 
and can be used by different stakeholders to facilitate the participation of SMEs in 
PPP projects, thus reaping the full benefits that PPP projects can offer to citizens. 
  
7.9 Working of the proposed model  
 
The purpose of this section is to discuss in detail the functions or the working of the 
added or new components of the proposed model for a sustainable development of 
the SME sector as presented in Figure 7.1 and Figure F (b) in Annexure F.  
 
Structure of the proposed model: The proposed model has kept the roles and 
responsibilities of the different role players in the traditional PPP model or in the 
current South African PPP model unchanged, except that the expert subcontractors 
and experts operator subcontractors are in this model referred to as implementation 
experts and application experts respectively. The existing components are shown as 
component A in Figure 7.1. The roles and responsibilities remain as discussed in 
Table 1.3 in Section 1.10 of Chapter 1.  
 
In the proposed model, the SPV continues contracting with any service provider to 
construct the facility, as is the case currently with the traditional PPP model. 
However, such contracting is expected to take into account the BBBEEE 
requirements in the case of South Africa. The new model proposes that, at the 
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experts component (component B), which covers engineering designers, 
implementation/contractors experts, insurers and application/operations experts, 
there must be an increased SME participation to do certain work. Instead of having 
one big firm constructing the whole project, for example, a certain percentage of 
work must be done by SMEs. This can be made possible only if services required at 
this phase are unbundled to smaller projects as shown by the four different blocks 
within component B.  
 
Any tender for PPP projects should require that a certain percentage of the tender 
value be allocated to SMEs. PPP firms should then indicate in their bids as to how 
much and what type of work will be done by small firms. The list of different activities 
at the two different phases in component B shows which services are candidates for 
SMEs and which ones are candidates for big firms. The new model proposes that 
the services to be provided by the different experts be unbundled into smaller 
projects and be provided by SMEs, unless the task is so big in such a way that 
SMEs could not provide it due to lack of financial and technological capacity.  
 
The understanding here is that, by disaggregating the different tasks into smaller but 
viable projects or activities that can be performed by SMEs, the country could 
maximise the opportunities that PPP projects present to its citizens. Services such 
as the maintenance of the building, catering, laundry, security and garden services 
can be provided by different SMEs, thus spreading the benefits arising from the 
project to a wider number of beneficiaries. The advantage with this approach is that 
SMEs would be guaranteed a market for the duration of the PPP contract, especially 
during the application phase, provided they meet the PPP firm’s service standards.  
 
Section 3.3.4 of Chapter 3 identified lack of access to markets for SMEs as one of 
the challenges that SMEs are faced with. Most PPP concessions last for 20 years or 
longer, and during this period many SMEs would have graduated from SMEs to big 
businesses if that was their objective while other SMEs may be satisfied to remain 
SMEs rather than developing to a big firm.  
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SMEs as a permanent feature of the model: To foster the development of the 
SME sector through PPPs, SMEs need to be part of the main PPP model. For 
example, instead of having big firms (implementation and application experts), the 
new model proposes unbundling18 of PPP projects at these phases to allow SME 
sub-contractors (see component B of Figure 7.1) to participate in providing the 
required services at these phases. The government, through a PPP policy or 
infrastructure procurement policy, should dictate that a certain percentage of all 
subcontracts at the different stages of PPP projects be awarded to SMEs. This may 
not cause a huge problem to PPP firms, as already some PPP firms are contracting 
SMEs to provide certain services during both the implementation and the application 
phases of PPP projects. However, this happens at a very small scale (see Figure 5.8 
in Section 5.3.2.4 of Chapter 5). This approach could facilitate the process of black 
industrialisation.  
 
The SPV should not be given the discretion of whether to contract an SME or not, as 
is the case with the current approach. Although the South African PPP model allows 
outsourcing of some services, as indicated by the survey results in Section 5.3.2.2 of 
Chapter 5, the companies providing most of these services are mainly big firms; 
SMEs only provide a small share of the services. Making SMEs part of the PPP 
model structure as shown in Figures 7.1 can go a long way in empowering SMEs 
and developing them into big firms in the long term.  
  
Identify all services to be supplied by SMEs: In this model, PPP firms bidding for 
a PPP project would be required by law to list all services that PPP firms will 
outsource to SMEs. This means that any bid for a PPP project should list all the 
services that will be provided by SMEs at both implementation and application 
phases of the project. These services are listed under component B of Figure 7.1. 
The list of services to be provided by SMEs would need to be considered during the 
bids evaluation stage, and deserving bidders should be awarded points as per 
government policy in involving SMEs in PPP projects.   
                                                          
18
 Unbundling means disaggregating the PPP project into small but viable projects that can be executed by 
SMEs without facing difficulties.  
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A support system for SMEs: Section 5.3.3.1 of Chapter 5 identified a number of 
challenges that SMEs face when supplying goods and services to PPP project firms. 
Possible solutions to these challenges are also discussed in Section 5.3.3.2 and 
Section 6.3.3.2. Most of the identified challenges are related to lack of soft skills in 
the SME sector, which are crucial for service delivery by SMEs. Most of the 
institutional PPP models discussed in Annexure D are meant to support SMEs with 
such skills. Annexure E has matched each SME challenge with the institutional PPP 
model that has the potential to address it. This model therefore embed these 
institutional PPP models as a PPP-SME support system onto its physical structure to 
deal with all the challenges SMEs are faced with when supplying goods and services 
to PPP project firms. Such support mechanism can either be housed within the 
Department of Small Businesses or within the Small Business Development Agency 
(SEDA) or within the National Treasury PPP Unit. Its focus should be on providing 
support to SMEs subcontracted to PPP projects or to SMEs in general. Its funding 
may come from either the private firms involved in PPP projects or from the state or 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs).  
 
Such an institution should be able to provide SMEs with all the services provided by 
the different institutional PPP models for SMEs as discussed in Annexure D and 
Annexure E. This SME-PPP support mechanism is meant to provide a one-stop-
shop for all support needed by SMEs involved in PPP projects. It should be placed or 
positioned as shown in the proposed model (see PPP-SMEs support system at the 
bottom of the model in Figure 7.1). When PPP firms identify a gap in an SME 
providing a certain service to a PPP project, it can suggest a solution and refer the 
SME to the PPP-SME support system which would have the capacity and the know-
how to address the identified problem or refer the SMEs to relevant specialists, for 
example, for technology-related issues the CSIR or the Technology Innovation 
Agency (TIA). For capacity related issues, SEDA is the right institution to deal with 
such issues. 
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Selection of SMEs to participate in the PPP project: One difficulty that may be 
faced by the SPV would be to identify the suitable SMEs for a PPP project. For 
example, what criteria should the SPV use to select or identify suitable SMEs to 
participate in a PPP project? To mitigate the risk of appointing poor performing 
SMEs, the PPP Unit or the PPP-SME support function housed within a government 
department as proposed in this study should: 
 develop a database for all SMEs that had or have a contract with a PPP project. 
The database should contain information such as the type of services these 
SMEs provide to the project, the Rand value of the contract, financial records 
(balance sheet) of the different SMEs, type(s) of PPP projects they were 
involved with, and two or three references. This information should be made 
available to SPVs in order to evaluate SMEs that may qualify for a PPP contract,  
 grade SMEs based on the type(s) of projects that they had undertaken in the 
past and their performance on delivering the required services. SMEs that had 
undertaken similar projects and performed well should be assigned a higher 
grade compared to those who undertook small projects and failed to deliver. The 
size of the project undertaken should be based on the Rand value of the contract 
successfully executed, and, 
 black-list SMEs that have failed to deliver services as per their contract with PPP 
firms. This requires the SPVs to report poor performing SMEs to the PPP-SMEs 
support or to the PPP unit. 
 
Availability of such information would make things easier for PPP firms to identify 
suitable SMEs to provide services to PPP projects. 
 
7.10 Risks and benefits associated with unbundling PPP projects 
 
Although the proposed model has the potential to address a number of issues that 
confront SMEs, however, it also has its own challenges. For example, unbundling of 
services into smaller tasks or projects and awarding different contracts to different 
SMEs may have both benefits and risks/challenges. The benefits associated with 
unbundling may include:  
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(i) Broad-based development of entrepreneurs: Instead of awarding a PPP 
contract to one big established firm, unbundling encourages participation of 
more than one different SME in a PPP project. This helps develop a large 
number of entrepreneurs that may become serious competitors in future PPP 
project contracts and thus reduce the overall project cost of PPPs, which may 
decrease the cost of the service to be provided to the consumer through 
future PPP projects.   
 
(ii) Distribution of income: The results of unbundling may also result in an 
increased distribution of income to ordinary citizens that may be employed by 
the different SMEs. SMEs are believed to be more labour intensive compared 
to big firms and that promises well for increased employment and income 
distribution.  
 
On the other hand the risks associated with unbundling may include:  
(i) Increased administrative burden: Administrative burden to the 
concessionaire or the PPP firm/SPV may be increased due to the increased 
number of role players in the project. This may also increase project 
complexity. It may be difficult and costly to manage a large number of service 
providers compared to when services are provided by one big firm that has 
the capabilities and know-how to deliver on the required project. This risk can 
be mitigated by avoiding over-disaggregation of PPP projects and by 
appointing SMEs that have experience in working in PPP subcontracts, 
 
(ii) Increased project costs: Involving many players in a PPP project may 
increase costs such as transaction costs and contract management costs. 
This may also cause project implementation delays, as the project SPV may 
have to negotiate and agree with many role players before implementation 
can take place. This risk can also be mitigated by appointing SMEs that have 
experience in PPP projects and that understand the requirements of the SPV 
with regards to service delivery standards, 
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(iii) Increased number of disputes: The number of disputes between the 
different project role players may increase due to the increased number of 
project role players and given the fact that most contracts are incomplete. This 
may result in a costly contract re-negotiation process, thus increasing the 
overall project cost. This risk can be mitigated by using the PPP-SME support 
mechanism to deal with disputes between PPP project role players including 
SMEs. 
 
(iv) Increased risk of project failure: Using a large number of SMEs to deliver 
certain parts of a PPP project may increase the risk of project failure due to 
poor performing SMEs. The overall impact of unbundling could increase the 
project complexity. This risk can be mitigated by carefully selecting SMEs that 
will provide the service to the PPP project using the criteria listed in Section 
7.9 above. 
 
(v)  Lack of human capacity within the public sector: Lack of human capacity 
within government departments responsible for PPP projects may hinder the 
successful implementation of the proposed model and negatively affect the full 
benefits that PPP projects can offer to the public. The main challenge facing 
South Africa is poor policy implementation. Although the country has good 
policies, their implementation has been a challenge in the past few years. 
Capacity to coordinate between the public sector and private firms involved in 
PPP projects is paramount for the successful implementation of the proposed 
model.   
 
(vi) Projects capture: As discussed in Section 3.4, there is also a high risk of 
projects captured for patronage purposes as it was detected during the first 
and second phases of the EPWP. One may find that only SMEs that have a 
strong link with politicians get opportunities to participate in PPP projects.  
 
(vii) Fronting: There is a high possibility of big PPP firms fronting as SMEs in 
order to access opportunities in PPP projects that are reserved for SMEs. As 
discussed in Section 3.4, big PPP firms may create their own small 
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companies that will participate in PPP projects as SMEs and that may defeat 
the whole purpose of using SMEs in PPP projects to create jobs, reduce 
poverty and inequality. 
 
These risks and challenges may differ from one project to another based on how the 
project is financed, as that determines the amount of influence the financier may 
have on the implementation of the project. The project can either be funded by the 
state or its agency or by the private sector partner. Irrespective of who funds it, there 
would still be risks and challenges associated with each funding mechanism. In a 
case where the responsibilities to design, finance, construct, operate and maintain 
remains with the private sector party (in the case of the traditional PPP model), 
unbundling of a PPP project may be difficult because the new risks introduced by the 
unbundling have to be carried by the private sector, as the private party takes the 
whole life responsibility of the project. The private sector may refuse or resist the 
idea of unbundling, unless it is guaranteed by the state that these new risks would be 
carried by the public sector partner. Such guarantee may eventually increase the 
overall project costs. However, as long as the increased costs due to the unbundling 
of the project do not increase the overall costs of the PPP project above the public 
sector comparator (PSC) figure, there is still a case to implement the project using 
the PPP approach. If the opposite happens, the case for unbundling the project 
becomes weak. However, if the request for proposals stipulates the unbundling 
requirements of the project upfront, bidders can incorporate any costs associated 
with unbundling the project in their bids. In a case where the PPP project is financed 
by the state or its agency (following the hybrid approach as discussed in Section 
7.2), unbundling PPP projects may not be as difficult as when financed by the private 
sector partner because the state can agree to compensate the private sector partner 
for the new risks that unbundling introduces to the project or agree that any cost 
increase due to unbundling will be carried by the state. This can be easy because all 
the finances for the project under this approach would be managed by the public 
sector partner. 
 
Such risks can be mitigated by writing a tight contract between the SPV and the 
different SMEs. However, writing a complete contract is impossible because it is 
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difficult if not impossible to anticipate or identify all risks or possible eventualities that 
may be faced by the project beforehand. As discussed in Chapter 2 the 
incompleteness of contracts is one of the challenges associated with PPP projects. 
Another way to mitigate for these risks is to make use of the PPP-SME support 
system, the objective of which is to play the role of a regulator as it is independent 
from the PPP firm and the SME. It can ensure contract compliance and act as an 
arbitrator of disputes, monitor operational risks on the part of the SME and give 
guidance on mitigation measures to be taken where necessary.   
 
However, one can also argue that as long as the overall economic benefits of 
allowing SMEs to participate in PPP projects outweigh the overall administration 
costs to the concessionaire, there is an economic case for disaggregating or 
unbundling services as shown in the proposed model. It needs to be noted that even 
if the main contract was to be awarded to a BEE firm, the requirement for SMEs 
participation should still remain a condition of the contract.   
 
7.11 Incentivising PPP firms to contract more SMEs 
 
Forcing PPP firms to use SMEs in PPP projects may not be welcomed by most PPP 
project companies. PPP firms may try to find reasons not to contract SMEs. Given 
these potential reactions by PPP firms, there is a need to find ways to encourage 
PPP firms to contract more SMEs to provide services to their PPP projects. Some of 
the incentives may include the following: 
 
(i) Government should set a minimum percentage through a policy to be 
allocated to SMEs by any PPP firm that is awarded a PPP tender. Any PPP 
firm that does not indicate how SMEs are going to be involved in the PPP 
project should be disqualified or allocated less points during the tender 
evaluation process; 
(ii) Government departments should be forced by legislation to give preferential 
treatment to PPP firms that allocate more than the minimum required 
percentage to SMEs. Such PPP firms should be awarded extra points during 
bids evaluation process compared to those that strive just to meet the bare 
minimum; 
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(iii)  Government should develop a monitoring system that will monitor the 
implementation of the policy and the risk of fronting. PPP firms that fail to 
adhere to the policy should be penalised according to an agreed penalty 
clause in the concessionaire contract; 
(iv)  To mitigate for the risk of PPP firms contracting SMEs that have a poor track 
record of delivering services to PPP firms, government will need to develop a 
database that will record all SMEs involved in PPP projects and the type(s) 
of services these SMEs are or have provided to these projects. SMEs that 
have failed to deliver services as per the contract between them and PPP 
firms will be black listed and will not be eligible for new contracts in future 
PPP projects; 
(v) Government can also use tax breaks to award PPP firms that contract or 
allocate a bigger percentage of the project value to SMEs and;  
(vi) The PPP-SMEs support system proposed in the innovative PPP model in 
Figure 7.1 should play the role of a regulator in cases where there are 
disputes and disagreements between a PPP firm and an SME company. 
This PPP-SMEs support system should also provide training to struggling 
SMEs as already alluded to earlier. 
 
7.12 Implementation and evaluation of the success of the proposed model  
 
Once a model has been developed, it needs to be implemented. Once implemented, 
it must be evaluated to determine whether it achieved its objective. Table 7.7 gives a 
summary of the different steps that one has to follow when implementing the 
proposed PPP model. The table shows clearly who is responsible for what in the 
process of implementing the model. 
 
Table 7.7: Step-by-step implementation of the proposed PPP model 
Step  Step-by-step 
activities  
Description 
1. Government 
identifies a PPP 
projects 
Through its internal processes, the relevant government 
department identifies a project to be implemented using the 
PPP approach. 
2. Government 
advertises for bids 
(RFP) 
In the advert, it is made clear that bidders should show 
innovative ways as to how the participation of SMEs is to be 
increased in the PPP project. The expectation is that the bidder 
will indicate the type of activities that would be contracted to 
SMEs and those that would be contracted to big firms and also 
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Step  Step-by-step 
activities  
Description 
show the Rand amount of the project(s) to be contracted to 
SMEs 
  Government 
receives and 
evaluates bids 
Once bids have been received, they are evaluated based on the 
bidders’ proposed innovative approaches of involving SMEs in 
PPP projects and the percentage of the contract in Rands value 
that will be executed by SMEs. This should also take into 
account other factors such as technical and financial abilities. 
5. Government 
awards tender 
The tender is awarded to the bidder that have proposed the 
best approach to involve SMEs in the PPP projects, taking into 
account the total project cost. There will be a need to balance 
the total cost of the project against the proposed innovative 
ways for involving SMEs in the project. If the bidder that 
proposed the best innovative way for SME participation is the 
most expensive one, the second best bidder should be 
considered, should it meet the other requirements such as 
technical and financial requirements. This means that SME 
participation should not be the only criteria for awarding a PPP 
tender to a PPP firm. 
6. SPV/PPP firm 
implements PPP 
project 
During the implementation of the project the PPP-SME support 
system monitors the involvement of SMEs in the project against 
predetermined indicators between the SPV and the relevant 
government department. These indicators include the 
percentage of the contract awarded to SMEs and the type of 
activities that are executed by SMEs during the implementation 
phase 
7. SPV/PPP firm 
operates PPP 
project 
During the application phase of the project the PPP-SME 
support system also monitors the involvement of SMEs against 
predetermined indicators agreed upon by the SPV and the 
relevant government department. These indicators include the 
type of activities or services that are executed by SMEs during 
this phase. 
8. Develop a database 
for SMEs 
participating in PPP 
projects 
The PPP-SME support system develops a database on the 
performance of SMEs involved in PPP projects. The database 
should contain information such as projects executed by the 
SMEs, the Rand value of the projects, performance of the SMEs 
in delivering the expected service, weaknesses of the 
participating SMEs, etc. This should include the documentation 
of lessons learned.  
9. Develop a training 
programme for 
SMEs 
After identifying the different challenges that SMEs face when 
participating in PPP projects, the PPP-SME support mechanism 
will develop a training programme that will respond to the 
identified challenges faced by SMEs in PPP projects 
Source: Author 
 
If implemented properly, the model must achieve its objectives. To determine 
whether or not it has achieved its objectives, it must be evaluated based on 
predetermined criteria or indicators. Below are the indicators to be used to evaluate 
the successful implementation of the model: 
(i) Conduct a benchmark study to create baseline data that will be used to 
compare the indicators below before and after the model had been 
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implemented. The information should be collected by either the PPP Unit, or 
the PPP-SME support mechanism or the Department of Small Business. The 
indicators are as follows: 
a.  the number of SMEs currently providing services to PPP,  
b. data on size of SMEs in terms of assets, number of employees etc.  
c. type(s) of services currently provided by SMEs to PPP, 
d. number of permanent and temporary employment during 
implementation and operation of PPP projects; 
e. percentage share of the total contracts in Rand value that is allocated 
to SMEs 
f. type of technologies used by SMEs,  
g. number of PPP firms with a policy on involving SMEs, 
h. number of SMEs that have received training from both the public and 
private sectors, 
i. type of training provided to SMEs; 
(ii)  The organisation responsible for the data collection should decide to collect 
this information annually or collect it after five years from date of 
implementation. Collecting data after five years would allow PPP firms 
enough time to implement the proposed model and adjust their business 
processes to accommodate the new model requirements. The advantage of 
collecting information every year is that the responsible institution can 
produce trends over time to see how effective or successful the model had 
been in increasing the participation of SMEs in PPP projects; 
(iii) Compare the baseline indicators over the years or with the results of the 
second study to see if there are changes in terms of SMEs participation in 
PPP projects. 
 
It is worth noting that, without the baseline information, it would be difficult to 
evaluate the success implementation of the model and its impacts on improving the 
participation of SMEs in PPP projects. 
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7.13 Chapter summary 
 
Introducing SMEs into a PPP projects may come with its own challenges. Involving 
many players in a PPP project may increase costs such as transaction costs. This 
may also cause project implementation delays, as the project SPV will have to 
negotiate and agree with many players before implementation of the project can take 
place. Such arrangements may also increase the number of disputes between the 
project role players. All these are likely challenges that may be experienced during 
implementation. However, involving SMEs in PPP projects may have benefits to the 
economy as a whole in terms of employment creation and poverty alleviating. 
It is worth noting that, by applying the proposed model, it does not mean the country 
would completely eradicate the problems of unemployment, poverty and inequality, 
as that requires other government interventions such as proper policy 
implementation, skill development, continued political stability and fight against 
corruption within both the public and the private sectors, to name just a few. 
However, involving SMEs in PPP projects is one of the many interventions that the 
country needs. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.1 Introduction  
 
As discussed in Section 1.10 of Chapter 1, despite the positive role that SMEs play 
in an economy and the potential that PPP projects have in converting developing 
countries’ infrastructure backlogs into socio-economic opportunities such as job 
creation and reducing inequality, there has been no or little attempt by developing 
countries to use PPP projects to develop their SME sectors. The problem is that the 
traditional PPP model has failed to convert the opportunities presented by 
infrastructure backlogs in developing countries into job creation, as this model mainly 
focuses on developing infrastructure assets and does not consider other challenges 
that may be imperative for developing countries, such as SMEs development and job 
creation.  
 
The main objective of the study was to develop an innovative conceptual PPP model 
for sustainable SME development and to determine the potential role of PPPs in the 
South African economy. To achieve this objective the study has answered the main 
research question and its four sub-questions as stated in Section 1.12 of Chapter 1.  
The study has found that PPP projects have helped SME growth in the country 
through subcontracting SMEs to provide certain services to PPP firms. However, the 
rand value of services provided by SME to PPP projects is small compared to big 
firms. This is because PPP firms bundle most of the services into one big project. 
The study has also found that SMEs face problems when supplying services to PPP 
firms. These problems are late delivery of services, poor quality of services 
delivered, and failure to deliver services when required. The main cause of these 
challenges was found to be lack of skills in general and management skills in 
particular by SMEs employees.  
 
With regards to encouraging the participation of SMEs in PPP projects, the study 
found that PPP projects should be unbundled into bigger and smaller projects, and 
allocate projects that do not need high technical skills, are less capital intensive and 
has low financial requirement needs to SMEs, while allocating the big components of 
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the project that require huge capital and high technical skills to big firms. In this way, 
SMEs will have opportunities to effectively participate in PPP projects and create the 
needed jobs. It has also been found that making SME participation in PPP projects a 
policy requirement would also enhance the participation of SMEs in PPP projects. 
The study has also concluded that an appropriate PPP model for sustainable SME 
development that will respond to the South African economic challenges can be 
developed taking into account all the research findings. This model was developed 
and presented in Section 7.5 of Chapter 7. 
 
Based on the research findings briefly discussed above, this chapter presents the 
conclusions and recommendations of this research study. It also proposes a number 
of further research topics that need to be pursued in order to have a broad 
understanding of the role of PPP projects in the South African economy.  
 
8.2 Conclusions 
 
This section gives a summary of the key conclusions that can be drawn from the 
reviewed literature and study findings. 
 
Although PPPs may be a solution to financially constrain government and to a 
government that has the finances but lack efficiencies in delivering infrastructure 
projects, involving the private sector in providing public service requires adequate 
capacity within governments and a comprehensive monitoring system with clear 
performance measures or indicators. Lack of proper monitoring of PPP projects may 
result in adverse impacts on the consumer and the country. This is normally lacking 
in most public sector PPP units or departments.  
 
A successful implementation of a PPP programme is imperative for SME 
participation in PPP projects. Such programme is affected by certain statutory, 
regulatory and institutional factors. Government has a responsibility to establish the 
necessary legal framework, including competition policy, entry and exit laws in order 
to promote a prosperous PPP programme. The existence of an effective and efficient 
legal and regulatory environment, a well-functioning domestic debt market, low levels 
of corruption and unethical activities, transparency, easy access to information, well-
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functioning political institutions, and stable economic and financial institutions are 
paramount to the successful implementation of PPP projects, thus contributing to the 
development of the SME sector. 
 
SMEs face four main challenges, namely: lack of finances/financing, limited human 
resources, low technological capabilities, and lack of access to market. Linking 
SMEs to PPP projects may address some of these challenges to a certain extent, 
especially if SMEs are used by PPP firms to provide some of the services needed by 
PPPs, specifically at their operational stage, where PPP services are required for a 
long term. However, governments need to put in place mechanisms to address the 
challenges SMEs face if SMEs are to benefit from PPP projects and create the 
needed jobs for the unemployed. 
 
Infrastructure backlogs present an opportunity for developing countries to develop 
their SME sectors through PPP projects. Many countries have not yet seen or 
identified infrastructure backlogs as presenting opportunities for the development of 
the SME sector. Infrastructure backlogs can be used by governments to address the 
triple challenges of unemployment, poverty and inequality by linking SMEs to PPP 
projects. In that way, PPPs would provide a sustainable market for SMEs’ goods and 
services and facilitate the expansion of the SME sector, thus creating jobs for the 
poor and contributing to economic development. 
 
Although PPP firms already subcontract SMEs at both the implementation and 
application phases of PPP projects, the share value of the project subcontracted to 
SMEs is small compared to big firms. At the application phase of PPP projects, PPP 
firms outsource a number of services with long-term contracts. Such services 
include, but are not limited to, maintenance of the asset, provision of security, 
catering services, laundry services, toll collection and IT services. The long-term 
nature of these contracts makes it possible to develop the SME sector through PPP 
projects. 
 
There is no special treatment given to SMEs when SMEs bid for a tender. This is 
because most of PPP project requirements focus mainly on the technical and 
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financial abilities to deliver the project in time and at the lowest cost possible and on 
the transfer of risk to the private party. Therefore, in most cases, SMEs are 
contracted based on fitness for purpose. This automatically excludes most SMEs 
from the tender process due to their weak financial and technical abilities. This 
needs to change. PPP firms must be incentivised through legislation to contract 
SMEs to provide services to PPP projects. 
 
SMEs face challenges when providing services to PPPs. The main challenges faced 
by SMEs in the PPP market is failure to deliver services on time, poor management 
skills, lack of technology and poor quality services delivered. The root cause of these 
problems is lack of human capacity within the SME sector as a whole, which may be 
due to lack of access to finance, which is due to lack of collateral and a good credit 
history, which is normally required by financial institutions to assess the creditability 
of any borrower before a loan can be granted to the borrower. Government needs to 
assist SMEs with access to finance and human capacity building. 
 
The use of PPPs to develop the SME sector has never been the objective of 
government. The main reasons why the public sector followed the PPP approach to 
procure infrastructure projects was to obtain the much needed skills, such as the 
design and construction of big infrastructure projects which the public sector did not 
have at the time. Other reasons included securing private funding through private 
party lending and equity contribution, as the public sector did not have the required 
finances to build the needed infrastructure. Transfer of risk to the private sector, 
which is better able to manage it, also was an important reason to go the PPP route 
and to take advantage of the private sector efficiencies in delivering infrastructure 
projects.  
 
An innovative conceptual PPP model for SME development was finally developed to 
facilitate the ease of SME participation in PPP projects. The model is innovative in 
that it recognises the potential of PPP projects to create jobs through SMEs. It is also 
innovative in that it unbundles PPP projects to allow different components of the 
project to be provided by different SMEs and big firms where necessary. It also has a 
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PPP-SME support system aimed at supporting SMEs struggling with different 
challenges in the PPP market.  
 
8.3 Recommendations 
 
This section gives recommendations based on the research findings of the different 
chapters of the study. It is believed that, if implemented, the use of SMEs by PPP 
firms would be enhanced and the fight against unemployment, poverty and inequality 
would be won to a certain extent. Linking SMEs to PPPs can increase the benefits of 
PPPs in society, as this may achieve two things at one go; namely: providing the 
needed infrastructure to the citizens and developing the SME sector. It can also 
improve the competitiveness and efficiency of the local SME sector, thus allowing 
SMEs to participate in international markets. 
 
 Develop a policy to foster the use of SMEs in PPP projects: Government 
needs to introduce an incentive-based policy or a section in the existing policy 
that will make it mandatory for PPP firms to use SMEs during both the 
implementation and operational phases of PPP projects. The policy should 
clearly state the minimum requirement for SME participation in PPP projects; 
 
 Unbundle PPP projects into small but viable projects: Given that PPP 
projects are big in nature and SMEs do not always have the technical and 
financial know-how to execute such projects, to accommodate SMEs in PPP 
projects, government should incentivise PPP firms to unbundle PPP projects 
into smaller but viable projects or components to allow ease of SMEs 
participation in PPPs; 
 
 Award PPP firms that go an extra mile in using SMEs: PPP firms that 
surpass the minimum requirement on using SMEs should be awarded, while 
those that only strive to meet the bare minimum requirement should be 
penalised. The policy should also clearly define the role of government and 
that of the PPP firm in developing SMEs; 
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 Develop managerial skills for SME staff: SMEs face challenges when 
providing services to PPP projects, which are mainly due to lack of 
appropriate skills. Government and PPP firms should therefore empower or 
up-skill SMEs with the necessary skills. This service should be provided by 
the PPP-SMEs support system as shown in Figure 7.1 of Chapter 7.    
 
 Develop a database for SMEs with experience in PPP projects: In order to 
encourage increased participation of SMEs in PPP projects, the PPP Unit 
needs to develop a database of all SMEs that have provided or are providing 
services to PPP projects, showing their delivery track record to help PPP firms 
identify suitable SMEs to be contracted to PPP projects. 
 
 Identify all services to be supplied by SMEs: PPP firms bidding for a PPP 
project should be required by law to unbundle the PPP project into different 
components and list all services or components that PPP firms will outsource 
to SMEs. This means that any bid for a PPP project should show the type of 
services to be subcontracted to SMEs at both implementation and application 
phases of PPP projects;   
 
 Incentivise PPP firms to use SMEs in PPP projects: Government should 
put mechanisms in place to give incentives to PPP companies who actively 
involve SMEs; such incentives can include tax breaks and other benefits.   
 
 Grade PPP firms: PPP firms should be graded like the CIDB grading. PPP 
firms that consistently show innovative ways of developing SMEs and 
consistently exceed a set target should be given a higher grade compared to 
those that do not assist SME development. A higher grade should mean a 
better chance to be awarded a PPP project tender in future.  
 
 Have a clear policy direction on the use of PPP projects: The state needs 
to have a clear policy direction and make consistent decisions or policy 
statements on the future use of PPPs to provide infrastructure in the country 
to improve regulatory certainty thus developing the PPP market.  
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 Develop a monitoring mechanism to monitor policy implementation: 
Once a policy has been developed, departments or government agencies 
responsible for the implementation of PPP projects should develop a 
monitoring system to monitor the implementation of the policy and any agreed 
performance indicators related to the use of SMEs in PPP projects.   
 
 Develop human capacity within the public sector: In order to ensure that 
implementation of the proposed model is not hindered by lack of capacity 
within the public sector, it is suggested that capacity building within 
government departments working on PPP projects should be given priority, 
and lastly;  
 
 PPP unit to develop a database for PPP projects: A proper PPP data 
management has THE potential to assist policy-makers in understanding the 
development of the PPP market and formulate relevant policies that would 
facilitate the development of the SME sector through PPPs.   
 
The study findings show that there is a need for government to start seeing PPPs as 
a vehicle for creating jobs through the SME sector. However, this calls for a 
fundamental change of mind and to see infrastructure backlogs not as a problem, but 
as an opportunity to develop the SME sector through the use of PPP projects.  
 
Supporting the SME sector of developing countries has the potential to stimulate 
economic growth, reduce unemployment, accelerate poverty reduction and improve 
living standards, thus contributing to government revenue through taxes. As Hussain 
et al. (2012:1584) assert, these taxes may strengthen the capacity of government to 
provide social services such as education, health, medical care and welfare for 
societal development. The availability of these services can further improve the well-
being of a country’s economy, further contributing to the development of SMEs.    
 
The following section lists four research topics that need further research in order to 
improve understanding of the PPP market in the country, thus improving SMEs 
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opportunities to participate in PPP projects and create the needed jobs for the 
unemployed. 
 
8.4 Recommendations for further research 
 
 Research on the criteria to be used by the public sector when identifying a 
project as a PPP project is required. This is because this research has 
shown that it is not all infrastructure projects that should be procured 
using the PPP approach and the economic costs of procuring a project 
using the PPP approach when it is not required could be huge. 
 Research on the importance of conducting a comprehensive public 
consultation process before the public sector decides to procure a project 
using the PPP approach is paramount, given the increasing public 
resistance against PPP projects in the country, which can limit the growth 
of the PPP market in the country, thus limiting opportunities for SMEs to 
participate in PPP projects. 
 Research on the specific economic sectors that employ the PPP model to 
procure infrastructure is required in order to understand the different 
challenges facing SMEs in a particular sector. Research on the contract 
conditions of the concessionaire between the public and the private party 
is paramount. The study has found that some of these conditions limit the 
private parties’ potential to increase the number of people they can 
employ to provide the service over time, even if the conditions or 
environment of the project have changed. 
 Research on other possible SMEs opportunities within the financier, SPV 
and government components of the traditional PPP model. This research 
should identify the type of SMEs opportunities within these components of 
the PPP model structure. 
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 Annexure A: Cover letter 
 
P O Box 1096 
Halfway House 
Midrand, 1685 
        
 02 February 2014 
Dear Sir/Madam 
Request to participate in a study by completing the attached questionnaire 
 
The purpose of this letter is to introduce myself and the above-mentioned subject. 
 
My name is Patrick Mabuza, a PhD student, currently undertaking a research project on the 
development of a PPP model for sustainable development of small and/or medium 
enterprises (SMEs) in South Africa. Your company has been randomly selected from a list of 
private companies and government departments or agencies involved in PPP projects in the 
country. I would therefore kindly request you to spend some 15–20 minutes of your time to 
complete the questionnaire to the best of your ability. The questionnaire is very easy to 
complete, as many of the questions have multi-choice responses. 
 
The information that you may provide will remain confidential in the sense that you and your 
company will remain anonymous. When the study is completed, a seminal paper will be 
written where the results of the study will be contained. It is hoped that it will be of good use 
in your organisation in providing future direction in the area of planning and enhancing the 
participation of SMEs in your current and future PPP projects. If you are interested in the 
findings and recommendations, please provide your email address so that I can supply the 
paper when completed. 
 
I will be grateful to receive your response as soon as possible, but not later than 30 June 
2014. Should you have any queries or comments regarding this survey, you are welcome to 
contact me telephonically at 082 909 4627 or email me at patrickmabuza@hotmail.com. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Patrick Mabuza. 
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Annexure B: Questionnaire on the participation of small medium enterprises 
(SMEs) in public-private partnership (PPP) projects. 
 
General instructions: Please read every statement or question and then mark the 
most appropriate response with an X. 
SECTION A 
This section refers to the respondents’ general experience with PPP projects. 
1. Provide your name___________________________________ 
 
1. Which of the following best identifies you within a PPP project setup?  
A A PPP project company representative   
B A public sector agency or department representative   
C A PPP project financer representative  
D A contractor to a PPP project  
E Other (specify)  
 
 
2. What is your position within your organisation?  
a A PPP advisor  
b PPP Operations Manager/Senior Manager/Supervisor  
c Director/Managing Director/Executive Director  
d Other (specify)  
 
 
3. How many years of experience do you have in PPP projects?  
a 5 years and less  
b 6–10 years  
c 11–15 years  
d More than 15 years  
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4. Which sector do you have experience working in PPPs?  
a Public sector  
b Private sector  
c Both public and private sector  
 
 
5. How many years of experience do you have in the sector? Public 
sector 
Private 
sector 
a 0–3years   
b 3–5 years   
c 5–10 years   
d More than 10 years   
 
 
6. Which of the following PPP projects have you been involved with?  
a Hospitals  
b Roads/Transport/Rail  
c Prisons  
d Office accommodation  
e Water and sanitation  
f Power and energy  
g Housing  
h Tourism  
i Other (specify)  
 
 
7. What role did you play 
within the PPP project? 
Project 
manager 
Advisor to 
government 
Technical 
advisor 
to a PPP 
project 
General 
employee 
in a PPP 
Other 
(specify) 
a Hospitals      
b Roads/Transport/Rail      
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c Prisons      
d Office accommodation      
e Water and sanitation      
f Power and energy      
g Housing      
h Tourism      
i Other (specify)      
 
 
 
SECTION B 
 
This section of the questionnaire explores whether small/medium enterprises (SMEs) 
play a role in PPP projects or not. 
 
8. Does your company have a policy on the use of SMEs in PPP 
projects? 
 
A Yes   
B No  
 
 
9. Does your company outsource some of the services needed by the PPP 
project(s)? 
 
a Yes  
b No  
c Not applicable  
 
 
If you answered NO to Question 9, please answer Questions 10 to 15 only. If you 
answered YES to Question 9, please skip Questions 10 to15 and continue from 
Question 16. 
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10. Do you think small and medium enterprises (SMEs) can play a role in 
PPP projects during their operational phase? 
 
a Yes  
b No  
 
 
11. What role do you think can be played by SMEs in PPP projects during 
the operational phase? (you can tick more than one answer if they are all relevant) 
 
a Maintenance of the asset  
b Provide catering services, e.g. for hospitals and prison PPPs  
c Provide laundry services, e.g. for hospitals and prison PPPs  
d Provide security services  
e Provide information technology (IT) services  
f Provide tolls/tariff collection services  
g Other (specify)  
 
 
12. What do you think needs to be in place first in order to allow SMEs to 
provide services to PPP projects (tick more than one if applicable) 
 
a Must have a clear government policy that forces PPPs to contract SMEs during the 
PPPs' operational phase 
 
b Government must provide start-up capital to SMEs that want to provide services to 
PPP projects 
 
c Government must provide SMEs with business skills relevant to services needed by 
PPP projects 
 
d PPP companies must set aside a certain percentage of its services to be provided by 
SMEs during the operational phase of the project 
 
 
 
13. Does your company intend outsourcing some of the services to small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs) in future? 
 
a Yes  
b No  
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c Not applicable  
 
 
14. If you are a public sector representative in a PPP project, what has 
been the challenge in fostering the use of SMEs in PPP projects 
 
a PPP projects companies are reluctant to use SMEs  
b Lack of suitable SMEs to provide the required services  
c Other (specify)  
 
 
15. Can you give reasons why your company does not outsource some of the 
services to small enterprises? 
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. In your opinion, what do you think government’s role should be in order to ensure 
that SMEs participate in PPP projects? 
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________ 
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17 Which of the following services are outsourced during the operational phase of 
the PPP projects? (If you worked in more than one PPP project indicate in the column the 
type of PPP that outsources the service.) 
  A  
Road 
and rail 
B 
Nature 
conservation 
C 
Water 
D 
Prison 
E 
Hospitals 
F 
Office 
accommo
dation 
G 
Other 
a Maintenance of the asset        
b Catering        
c Laundry        
d Security        
e Information technology (IT) 
services 
       
f Tolls/tariff collection        
g Other (specify)        
 
 
18. Which types of enterprises provide these services to the PPP project?  
a Big private enterprises/companies  
b Small and medium enterprises (SMEs)   
c Both big enterprises/companies and SME enterprises  
d Foreign big enterprises/companies and foreign SMEs  
e Other (specify)  
 
 
19. What priority does your company give to considering the use of SMEs 
in PPP projects? 
 
A Use preferred supplier database  
B Award contracts based on fitness for purpose  
C Include SMEs as part of the tender requirement  
D Only engage SMEs for special skills  
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20. Does your approach to using SMEs vary depending on the 
geographical location of the project? 
 
a Yes  
b No  
 
 
21. If answered Yes in Question 19 above, what are the geographical 
factors considered for awarding a tender to an SME? 
 
a Understanding of local environment  
b Availability of suitable local SME suppliers  
c Proximity of SME to site  
d Other, specify  
e Not applicable  
 
 
22. Do you have targets in percentage (%) for contracts to be awarded to 
SMEs? 
 
a Yes  
b No  
 
 
23. If answered Yes in the above question, what is the target?  
a 0–20%  
b 21–40%  
c 41–60%  
d 61–80%  
e 81–100%  
f Not applicable  
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24. What is the percentage share of Rands amount of the total 
services outsourced provided by SMEs and big companies? 
SMEs Big 
companies 
a 0–20%   
b 21–40%   
c 41–60%   
d 61–80%   
e 81–100%   
 
 
25. Give the number of employees employed by the SMEs contracted to your PPP 
project(s). (If your company is involved in more than one PPP projects please indicate 
likewise, i.e. PPP-1, PPP-2, etc.) 
  PPP-1 PPP-2 PPP-3 PPP-4 
a 0–20     
b 21–40     
c 41–60     
d 61–100     
e More than 100      
 
 
26. How do you make SMEs aware of tendering opportunities with your 
company? 
 
A Use preferred supplier database  
B Direct contact  
C On line registration portal  
D Through bid adverts in the media  
E Other (specify)  
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27. Have you introduced any SME to other PPP project opportunities or to 
wider PPP market opportunities? 
 
A Yes   
B No   
 
 
28. Are there any tools that would assist your company to engage with 
SMEs for work with PPP projects? 
 
A Yes   
B No   
 
 
29. If answered Yes in the above question, what are these tools?  
a List of approved SMEs service providers  
b Improving awareness of tendering through newspapers etc.  
c Website development for supply chain  
d Local area directory of suppliers  
e Other (specify)  
f Not applicable  
 
 
30. Do you face any challenges with enterprises providing services to PPP 
projects? 
 
a Yes  
B No  
 
If your answer is NO to Question 30, please skip Questions 31 to 35 and start 
answering from Question 36.  
 
 
31. What type of challenges? (tick more than one if applicable)  
a Failure to deliver the service when required  
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b Late delivery of the service  
c Poor quality of service delivered  
d Other (specify)  
 
 
32. What do you think are the causes of these challenges? (tick more than one 
applicable) 
 
a Lack of appropriate human resources  
b Lack of appropriate technology  
c Lack of finance to expand capacity  
d Poor management skills   
e Poor relationship with PPP project operators or contracting company  
f Other (specify)  
 
 
33. How would you rate the impact of the following factors on the PPP 
project(s) based on your experience? (6 = significant and 1 = less 
significant) 
 
a Lack of appropriate human resources  
b Lack of appropriate technology  
c Lack of finance to expand capacity  
d Poor management skills  
e Poor relationship with PPP project operators  
f Other (specify)  
 
 
34. What do you think could be a solution(s) to these challenges?  
a Provide these enterprises with training to improve the quality or skills of their human 
resources 
 
b Acquire the right technology for the task to be rendered  
c Improve their access to finance to expand operation  
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d Improve management skills   
e Improve relationships with PPP operators/contracting company  
f Other (specify)  
 
 
35. What has your company done in order to help SMEs cope with the 
problems? (indicate if it has done more than one activity) 
 
a Provided human capacity building  
b Helped SMEs acquire the right technology  
c Provided finance or helped SMEs to have easy access to finance from other sources  
d Nothing  
e Other (specify)  
 
 
36. Is there any legislation that you are aware of that forces PPP projects to 
outsource some of the services they need to SMEs? 
 
a Yes  
b No  
 
 
37. If you answered Yes to Question 36, please specify the legislation. 
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________ 
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SECTION C 
Open-ended question: 
This section explores your opinion regarding SMEs’ participation in PPP projects. 
 
38. Please give your opinion on how the participation of SMEs in PPP projects can 
be improved. 
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
39. Who do you think should play a significant role in improving the participation of 
SMEs in PPP projects between government and the PPP company and why? 
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
Thank you for your co-operation in completing this questionnaire. Kindly return the 
questionnaire as specified in the cover letter. 
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Annexure C: Complementary questionnaire: Participation of small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) in public-private partnership (PPP) projects 
 
If you are a public sector employee, please answer Section A only. If you 
are an SME employee, please answer only Section B. 
 
Section A: Public-sector-related questions. 
Questions 
What was the main reason for the department to go the PPP route to procure the 
project? 
Answer: 
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Was the participation of SMEs a requirement for the project? 
Answer: 
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
If yes, what were these requirements? 
Answer:  
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
What stage of the project were these requirements expected to be met by the PPP 
concessionaire? i.e. construction or operational stage, 
Answer: 
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
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___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Had the PPP concessionaire been able to meet these requirements? 
Answer: 
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
If not, what were the reason(s) for not meeting them? 
Answer:  
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
As a department, what did you do to ensure that the requirements were met? 
Answer:  
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Were there any penalties imposed on the PPP concessionaire for failing to meet the 
requirements? 
Answer:  
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
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What were those penalties? 
Answer:  
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Were they successfully imposed on the PPP concessionaire? 
Answer:  
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
What were the PPP concessionaire’s views about the requirements and the 
penalties? 
Answer:  
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
What is the relationship between your department and Small Enterprise 
Development Agency (SEDA) when it comes to involving SMEs in PPP projects? 
Answer:  
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
In your opinion, how has the involvement of SMEs in PPP projects worked in the 
PPP projects you have been involved in as a department? 
Answer:  
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
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___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
What do you think is missing in the current PPP model if it was to be used as one of 
the tools to alleviate poverty and unemployment? 
Answer:  
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
What type of support is needed to facilitate SMEs participation in PPP projects? 
Answer:  
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Who should provide this support? 
Answer:  
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
How should the support be provided? 
Answer:  
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
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Do you have any idea on how the current South African PPP model could be 
improved in order to ensure that PPP projects also benefit SMEs and play a bigger 
role in alleviating poverty and unemployment? 
Answer:  
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Do you have any documentation that you can share with me that stipulates clearly all 
the requirements that the PPP concessionaire had to meet or fulfil in order to be 
awarded the contract for the project, especially at the operational stage?  
Answer:  
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Section B: SME-related questions. 
Questions 
  
To what type of PPP project is your SME providing services?  
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
When the SME(s) started operating, how many people did it employ? ___________ 
  
How many people are employed now? _____________ 
  
How many are employed on a permanent base? ______________ 
  
Name the type of services the SME is providing to the PPP project.   
(a) ___________ 
(b) ___________ 
(c) ____________ 
 
  
For how long is the contract with the PPP project? ___________ 
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What challenges do SMEs face when providing services to PPP firms (if any)? 
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
What do you think needs to be done in order to enhance the participation of SMEs in 
PPP projects?  
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________  
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Annexure D: Different PPP models that involve the SME sector 
 
The aim of this section is to discuss different SME-PPP models that exist in different 
countries. The objective is to identify models that can be adapted to address the 
challenges faced by SMEs in providing services to PPP firms. This process also 
takes into consideration the issues raised in Chapter 7 that comes from the research 
survey. The views that came out of the survey were analysed against the best 
practices identified in this section and presented in the Chapter 8 of this study. Below 
is a discussion on the different institutional PPP models as identified in the literature. 
 
1. Institutional PPP models for SMEs  
 
The review of literature showed that the most common PPP models for SMEs are 
programme or institutional type of PPPs. They are based on the formation of 
business research centres and industrial parks or other institutions to provide 
human, financial, and technical help to small enterprises. Such institutions are 
usually financed and operated by both the public and private sectors. Such 
arrangements do not provide SMEs with an opportunity to supply certain services to 
a PPP project; however they empower SMEs with the technical and analytical know-
how of how to expand their operations and access markets for their goods and 
services (Klewitz and Hansen, 2012:10). In this case the institution that is formed is 
called a PPP, as it involves the public as well as the private sector partners.  
 
An example of such collaboration in South Africa is the Anglo-Zimele Empowerment 
initiative Limited, which is the Anglo American Group’s development fund. This fund 
operates as a catalyst to empower entrepreneurs in South Africa through the 
creation and transformation of SMEs, particularly in rural areas where Anglo 
American operates (SBP, 2009:7). Such arrangements can empower SMEs 
operating in the PPP market with the necessary skills needed in the PPP projects. 
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2. SMEs-PPP conceptual model  
 
This model does not involve or include PPP projects as defined in the first chapter of 
this study. Here PPP refers to the private sector working together with a public sector 
entity to help SMEs. It is based on the premise that this relationship can help SMEs 
improve their access to finance, technological capabilities and human resources 
capabilities. These factors were identified in the literature review as posing a big 
challenge for SMEs. The Hussain et al., model (2012:1586) (as shown in Figure 3.1 
below) shows the relationship between the growth of PPPs and SMEs. The empirical 
testing of the model indeed showed that SMEs linked to institutional PPPs do benefit 
from improved access to finance, improvement in human capital and technological 
capabilities which are the main factors constraining the development of the SME 
sector in most countries. However, this model assumes that once SMEs have 
access to finance, technology and high skilled labour they will automatically become 
competitive and have access to markets for their products. This is not always the 
case, as access to market is another obstacle that hinders the development of small 
businesses as they are dependent on many factors that are sometimes outside the 
control of the SME itself or the country in which the SME operates. However, 
empowering SMEs with the right skills and technology could go a long way in helping 
SMEs compete effectively in local and international markets. 
 
PPP-SME conceptual model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Hussain et al. (2012) 
Public-private-
partnership in SME 
sector 
Improving availability of 
finance to SMEs 
Improving human resource 
capabilities of SMEs 
Improving the technological 
capabilities of SMEs 
Growth and 
development of 
SMEs 
   303 
 
 
The model shows how SMEs can be helped to grow if both the private and the public 
sectors work together to improve SMEs’ access to finance, technological capabilities 
and human resources capabilities.   
 
3. Public and private sector SME-development model 
 
Another conceptual PPP model for SMEs development identified in the literature was 
developed and tested by Hussain, Hussain,  Hussain & Si (2009:42) for its 
effectiveness of combining the public and private sectors efforts for SME-
development programme. The figure below shows this model. The model shows that 
combined efforts between the public and the private sector can help develop a viable 
SME sector in a country, with the roles of the parties clearly defined, as shown in in 
the figure below. Some of the responsibilities can be executed by both the private 
and the public sector, for example, promoting rural industrialisation and facilitating 
business advisory services. 
A conceptual model for public and private sector SME-development 
programmes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Hussain et al. (2009:42) 
Role of private 
sector 
Role of public 
sector 
 
 Facilitating access to credit, 
 Facilitating access to business advisory 
services 
 Supporting access to technology 
 Promoting rural industrialisation 
 Adopting quality standards 
 Training in entrepreneurship and 
management skills 
 Building capacity 
 Advancing opportunities to women and youth 
 Promoting support from universities 
 Creating a legal framework 
 Taxation and other incentives 
 Access to credit 
 Facilitating access to business advisory services 
 Improving the physical infrastructure 
 Supporting access to technology 
 Promoting rural industrialization 
 Training in entrepreneurship and management 
 Building capacity  
 Promoting support from universities 
SME 
development 
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An empirical analysis of this model found that both government and the private 
sector have a significant role to play in developing the SME sector of AJ & K 
Pakistan (Hussain et al., 2009:44). A similar model is followed by the government of 
Mauritius. This programme or model is called a public-private dialogue – Mauritius 
Joint Economic Council (JEC). Its purpose is to build institutional expertise for the 
different industries represented in the Council (OECD, 2004:27). An empirical study 
by Silva and Rodrigues (2005:22), supported these type of models and found that 
programmes that combine both the public and private sectors have succeeded in 
promoting SME development.  
 
4. Market-based PPPs to SME development 
 
This type of PPP support to the development of SMEs focuses on creating a market 
environment conducive for SMEs development. Theory says any SME that is to 
provide a service to a particular entity should be contracted based on merit. 
However, in reality many SMEs that operate in the PPP market do not have the 
know-how needed by PPP firms, and as a result they struggle to deliver the services 
they are contracted to deliver. This may mean that, if SMEs were to be contracted 
based on merit only, there would be very few SMEs that qualify to provide services 
to PPPs. It is difficult to contract with SMEs in a PPP project because most of the 
available SMEs do not have the required skills. This reveals that there is a need to 
create an SME-friendly environment in the PPP market that will take into account 
that SMEs struggle in different ways. 
 
A good example of this approach is the State of Victoria’s Industry Participation 
Policy Act No.72 of (2003) (Australia. State of Victoria. Department of State 
Development, Business and Innovation, 2003) which seeks to increase opportunities 
for participation by SMEs in major government procurement contracts, projects and 
infrastructure. The aim of this programme is to boost SME employment and business 
growth and to expose SMEs to technologies, new processes and best practices. This 
helps to ensure a sustainable increase in competitiveness for the participation of 
SMEs in large infrastructure projects (UNIDO, 2001:68). It is worth noting that this 
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type of PPPs may not be always effective especially when SMEs interests are under-
represented in the partnership (Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, 2007:19).  
  
5. PPP stakeholders’ model 
 
This type of a PPP involves the government, private sector service providers, 
consumers or users association, contracting authority and a monitoring or support 
agent. This is also an institutional PPP arrangement. Such partnerships can be 
formed by the different stakeholders. For example, the World Bank created a 
partnership as a response to a failure of village management committees which were 
responsible for providing water to rural areas of several African countries such as 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Rwanda. The failure of the 
committees resulted in unreliable water supply to communities. As a result of these 
failures, governments of these countries started to engage the private sector to 
operate small water schemes as an alternative to the community-based 
management model, hence the PPPs for small piped water schemes. The private 
sector party could be an NGO and not a private firm as is normally the case with 
PPP projects. Sometimes the partnership can be between local governments, water 
user associations and private operators (Hoang-Gia and Fugelsnes, 2010:7). This 
type of a PPP is presented in the figure below.   
 
The PPP stakeholders’ model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Hoang-Gia and Fugelsnes, 2010 
Regulator 
central/ 
government 
Monitoring/support agent 
            Operator Contracting 
authority 
Local or central government  Private service providers 
          user association 
Private service provider 
Regulator agency 
central govt 
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The regulator is independent from the contracting entity and the operator. It only 
ensures contract compliance and acts as an arbitrator of disputes, monitor 
operational risks and give guidance on mitigation measures to be taken. The 
monitoring or business support agent is responsible for data collection and analysis 
and providing advice and decision-making inputs. The responsibilities assigned to 
the different stakeholders vary from country to country (Hoang-Gia and Fugelsnes, 
2010:7). Other PPPs similar to the PPP stakeholder model are the public-private 
partnerships in small-scale aquaculture and fisheries (WorldFish Center, 2010:3). 
Such a model can also be effective in improving the participation of SMEs in PPP 
projects in a country in that it has a monitoring function and a dispute resolution 
mechanism built into it. In an environment where small businesses are working 
together with big firms in PPP projects, disputes are likely to occur, and without a 
mechanism to deal with them, SMEs may always lose and suffer financial losses 
against PPP firms and that may affect the effective participation of SMEs in PPP 
projects.  
 
6. A peer networking model for SMEs development  
 
This model brings together a peer-group of SME owners. It creates an informal 
platform supported by a facilitator, in which SME owners meet on a regular base to 
share experiences, ideas and challenges, and to contribute constructively to the 
collective learning of the group. The objective is to build capacity among members, 
enabling them to establish business relationships with other SMEs and to develop 
the necessary knowledge and capacity to successfully enter the supply chain of 
large corporations. The peer group provides an environment where members can 
submit their difficulties, brainstorm solutions and gain access to information, 
including the identification of the main players in specific sectors and emerging 
opportunities that match the skills available within the group. This helps SMEs to 
build business confidence, grow local business relationships and transfer soft skills 
(SBP. 2009:5). In the case of SMEs contracted to PPP projects, such an 
arrangement could be helpful in that SME owners providing services to PPP projects 
can share experiences and help each other in cases where help is needed. They can 
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also discuss issues that affect SMEs in PPP projects with government and influence 
policy development for the SME sector as a whole.  
 
7. Local content approach in supporting SMEs 
 
Many countries at different economic development stages still use local content 
requirements despite their restrictions under World Trade Organization law 
(UNCTAD, 2013:5). Local content requirement have been found to be not delivering 
the expected results if not attached to sound economic policies. If used under a 
protected environment with few competitive pressures to invest in upgrading of 
capabilities, they result in inefficient SMEs that burden the economy with high costs, 
out-dated technologies or redundant skills, ultimately doing more harm than good. 
However, local content requirement can facilitate the development of supply capacity 
and strengthen local SMEs to compete on the international markets under the right 
conditions (UNCTAD, 2013:5).  
 
The Zambian government introduced a range of local content quotas for SMEs with 
preferential treatment and certain minimum participation quotas in public tenders 
under the country’s Citizen Economic Empowerment Act No. 9 of 2006 and the 
Statutory Instrument No. 36 of 2011 on preferential procurement as a way of 
strengthening the productive capacity of its domestic contractors (Government of 
Zambia, 2010). In South Africa such an approach was used during the country's 
renewable energy procurement process for independent power producers19 (IPPs). 
For example, one of the requirements was that bidders should ensure that at least 
40% of the project company bidding to produce renewable energy should be owned 
by South Africans and that companies should also show their commitments to 
BBBEE (Republic of South Africa. Department of Energy, 2013:9). Although this 
approach does not enforce the participation of SMEs as it is more concerned with 
the use of local expertise and local intermediate inputs and empowerment of local 
people, SMEs also benefit as are also local companies some of which are owned by 
historical disadvantaged people. The same requirement can be introduced in the 
                                                          
19
 IPPs are a form of PPPs 
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PPP market in general with the aim of strengthening domestic SMEs productive 
capacity in the PPP market. 
 
8. A joint ownership PPP model 
 
The joint ownership PPP model is a new approach in PPPs. In this model the 
government and the private sector team up to start a for profit company. The model 
operates like the traditional PPP model. The difference with the joint ownership 
model is that both the government and the private sector partner get a stake in the 
newly formed company. The public sector owner is the government agency or a 
ministry responsible for the provision of the service to the public. The private sector 
partner can be any company that has the skills to deliver the service. This type of 
PPP can offer straight-forward exit strategies not available in most other types of 
PPPs. The problem with the type of collaboration like the traditional PPP is that it can 
create a monopoly supplier of the service once a concession has been granted to 
the new company. It can also create conflict of interests as the government would 
normally push for lower prices, while as a stakeholder it should be pushing for 
maximising profits. Some of the risks and benefits associated with this model are 
similar to those of the traditional PPP model (Atalla, A and Hakim, n.d.). This model 
has the potential to assist in solving the current challenges faced by SMEs in the 
South African PPP market as discussed in the previous sections of this chapter. 
 
Having discussed the different PPP models for SMEs, the following section 
discusses infrastructure needs for the African continent with the aim of showing that 
PPPs have a role to play in closing this infrastructure needs and thus opening 
opportunities for SMEs. 
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Annexure E: Summary of problems and possible solutions 
 Current 
problems in 
the PPP 
market 
Sections 
where 
problems 
were 
identified 
Possible solutions to the 
challenges/problems 
Potential PPP-SME 
model to address 
challenges (see 
following sections 
in Annexure D) 
1. Not enough 
preferential 
treatment 
given to SMEs 
by PPP project 
firms when 
PPP project 
firms award 
contracts to a 
third party 
Chapter 5 
Section 
5.3.2.3 and 
Chapter 6 
Section 
6.3.1.3 
The government should make the 
requirement for the tender to be 
such that any PPP firm that tender 
for a PPP project should present a 
comprehensive plan on how it is 
going to involve SMEs in the project 
implementation and operational 
phases 
Market-based PPPs 
to SME development 
(Section 4) 
OR  
Local content 
approach in 
supporting SMEs 
(Section 7) 
2. SMEs are only 
awarded small 
tenders (in size 
and in rand 
values) 
Chapter 5 
Section 
5.3.2.4 and 
Chapter 6 
Section 
6.3.1.4 
Government should amend its PPP 
policy or legislation to incentivise 
PPP firms to set aside a certain 
percentage or identify services that 
will be provided by SMEs during the 
operational phase of the project. 
This can be done by awarding more 
points to bids that demonstrate to 
do more to develop SMEs than 
what is required by the current 
transformation policies of 
government. In cases where SMEs 
lack the required expertise, big 
firms should be incentivised to 
partner with SMEs for big tenders 
Local content 
approach in 
supporting SMEs 
(Section 7) 
 
3. Poor quality of 
service 
delivered by 
SMEs 
Chapter 5 
Section 
5.3.3.1 and 
Chapter 6 
Section 
6.3.3.1 
The PPP unit of the National 
Treasury should develop a 
database of SMEs, based on 
performance during the past five 
years, to assist concessionaires to 
select appropriate SME partners. 
PPP contracts should require the 
concessionaires to have a 
programme on skills transfer.  
A peer networking 
model for SMEs’ 
development 
(Section 5)  
Or 
PPP-stakeholders' 
model (Section 6)  
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4. SMEs’ failure 
to deliver 
services to 
PPP firms 
Chapter 5 
Section 
5.3.3.1 and 
Chapter 6 
Section 
6.3.3.1 
As failure to deliver services may 
be a result of a number of issues, 
such as lack of financial, human, 
and technological resources. 
The solution to this problem is to 
overall improve SMEs’ human 
capacity development. This should 
be the responsibility of government 
complemented by PPP firms. 
A peer networking 
model for SMEs’ 
development 
(Section 6) 
OR  
PP-stakeholders' 
model (Section 6)  
5. SMEs lack 
management 
skills 
Chapter 5 
Section 
5.3.3.2 and 
Chapter 6 
Section 
6.3.3.2 
Government need to intervene to 
help SMEs acquire management 
skills in general and financial 
management skills in particular to 
ensure that problems are 
addressed as early as they emerge. 
Such skills can be provided by the 
state with the help of the PPP 
operator.  
A Joint ownership 
PPP model, a Peer 
networking model for 
SMEs development 
(Section 8) 
OR  
PPP-stakeholders' 
model (see Section 
5) 
6. SMEs lack of 
finance  
Chapter 5 
Section 
5.3.3.2 and 
Chapter 6 
Section 
6.3.3.2 
Improve access to finance by 
SMEs. Governments and PPP firms 
should assist SMEs to have access 
to finance. Or the two parties can 
form a joint ownership in the early 
stage of the project and then PPP 
firms transfer the ownership to 
SMEs at a later stage once SMEs 
have gained the required skills and 
cash flow from the project. 
A joint ownership 
PPP model (Section 
8) 
 
7. Lack of 
suitable SMEs 
for PPP 
services 
Chapter 5 
Section 
5.3.3.5 and 
Chapter 6 
Section 
6.3.3.4 
A database of SMEs that are 
involved in PPPs should be 
developed by government so that 
concessionaires may choose SMEs 
based on their track records of 
performance and experience. 
Where possible, SMEs can partner 
with big firms for a PPP tender that 
may be difficult for the SME to 
execute. 
Market-based PPPs 
to SME development 
(Section 4) 
8. PPP firms are 
reluctant to use 
SMEs due to 
the amount of 
risks involved 
in PPPs 
Chapter 5 
Section 
5.3.3.5 and 
Chapter 6 
Section 
6.3.3.4 
Government should put 
mechanisms in place to give 
incentives to PPP companies that 
actively involve SMEs; such 
incentives can include tax breaks. 
More clear objectives need to be 
set on what and how much work to 
be outsourced to SME's and 
government to monitor compliance 
with these targets.  
Market based PPPs 
to SME development 
(Section 4) or a Joint 
ownership PPP 
model (Section 8) 
 
Source: Author 
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Annexure F: South African PPP model 
 
Annexure F (a) Typical South African PPP model 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Republic of South Africa. National Treasury (2004a:29) 
 
 
Government 
   Debt BBBEE qualified 
(SPV) 
Loan 
Subcontracts 
Equity 
PPP agreement 
Shares 
Experts: 
Operation 
Sub-contracts 
Experts: 
Construction 
Subcontracts 
Applicable BEE elements 
 Ownership 
 Management control 
 Employment equity 
 Skill development 
 Preferential procurement 
 Enterprise development (SMMEs) 
 Socioeconomic development 
indicatives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
? 
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Annexure F (b): An innovative conceptual PPP model for sustainable 
development of an SME sector based on the current South 
African PPP model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Republic of South Africa. National Treasury (2004a) and modified by the Author  
Government 
   Debt BBBEE 
qualified 
(SPV) 
Loan 
Subcontractors 
(Applicable BEE 
elements) 
 
Equity 
PPP agreement 
Shares     E 
qualified (SPV) 
Loan 
Government’s PPP-SMEs support System 
To provide SMEs with: managerial skills, improve access to finance, 
improve financial management skills, improve human capacity, help 
SMEs access the right technology, resolve disputes, monitor 
implementation of the PPP policy and provide other relevant supports.  
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OPERATION EXPERTS  
(Applicable BEE elements) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SMEs  
- Consulting services 
 Road markings 
 Road signs installation 
 Consulting services 
 Road rail installation 
 Security services 
 Construction of toll 
offices 
 Furniture provision 
 Plumbing services 
 Electrification services 
  Supply of construction 
materials 
 etc. 
 
Big firms  
 Engineering design 
of asset 
 Construction of 
asset 
 Construction of 
bridges 
 Refurbishment of 
existing asset 
 Major IT system 
installation 
 Security (for prison 
PPPs) 
 Medical equipment 
(for hospitals PPPs) 
 etc. 
 
 
Big firms   
 Major asset 
maintenance 
 It system 
maintenance  
 Major equipment     
maintenance and 
replacement 
 etc. 
 
 
 
 
SMEs  
 Minor asset maintenance 
and replacement 
 Toll collection/billing 
services 
 Tow truck services (road 
PPP) 
 Road marking 
 Guard rail replacement 
 Road signs replacement 
 Security  
 Furnisher provision 
 Catering 
 Laundry 
 Cleaning 
 etc. 
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